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OUR REAL DANGER IN INDIA.

OUR REAL DANGER IN INDIA.

BY

C. FORJETT,

LATE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE OF BOMBAY.



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Dedicated,

IN RESPECTFUL REMEMBRANCE,

TO THE MEMORY OF

THE LATE LORD ELPHINSTONE,

GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY DURING THE PERIOD OF

THE INDIAN MUTINY,

BY

THE AUTHOR.

P R E F A C E.

THE object of this little work is twofold. It is intended, first, to explain the causes of the Mutiny which threatened to deprive us of our possession of India in 1857; and, secondly, to show how the present aggressive conduct of Russia is more than likely to occasion the most serious fears in regard to the future of India.

The book consists of three chapters. In the first I have tried to prove that Sir John Kaye, the only writer who has attempted a full historical account of the "Sepoy War," is mistaken in his views as to the causes which produced it; in the second I have endeavoured to give a more intelligible and accurate statement of the circumstances which led to the outbreak in Bengal, as well as a narrative of the measures which were adopted to check the extension of mischief from the open manifestation of Sepoy disaffection in Bombay; and in the concluding chapter I have stated the causes of danger

to India, arising from the Russo-Turkish war, and the means by which that danger might yet be averted.

In the preventive and precautionary measures taken in Bombay during the Mutiny, my share was a very prominent one, and I have found it impossible to exclude all mention of myself in the relation of those incidents, and I solicit, in consequence, the indulgence of the reader for the obtrusive but unavoidable display of egotism.

I have deemed it a duty to dedicate this little volume to the memory of the late Lord Elphinstone, in admiration of his efforts in the cause of order during the period of the Mutiny, and from feelings of official gratitude. But for Lord Elphinstone, I should, in all probability, both at Belgaum and in Bombay, have been superseded for having presumed, under critical circumstances, to act in contravention of the orders of Government.

C. F.

9th September, 1877.

OUR REAL DANGER IN INDIA.

CHAPTER I.

TWENTY years have elapsed since the outbreak of the memorable Indian Mutiny. The more important results which have followed the transfer of the government to the Crown, and which mark the successive periods of the new Viceregal administration, have, in point of interest and public concern, begun to be regarded as portions of the political history of Great Britain. The siege of Delhi, the relief of Lucknow, the massacre of Cawnpoor are as familiar subjects of table talk as any of the remarkable events in our past national history. The story of that fearful mutiny has already been told, but it has been told only as a story full of danger and daring, of horror and heroism. Some of the more striking events have been related with the view of exciting sympathy or repulsion, according to the taste and bent of the narrator; but we have not as yet had anything like a reasonable and satisfactory explanation of the causes which led to the outbreak. The event itself is now recorded, with its details and dates, in all text-books of modern

history, but no attempt has been made to unravel the skein of antecedent circumstances, so as to discover a clue which shall be sufficient to account for the occurrence.

I had long wished to undertake the task of stating those circumstances; but a writer of such literary reputation as the late Sir John Kaye, had elaborately represented his own views on the subject, and supported them on evidence so specious, and in language so emphatic, that the world at large, I doubted not, had arrived at the conclusion that the reasons set forth by the author of "The Sepoy War" were those which led to that terrible military outbreak. To one, moreover, who had spent much of his time in the saddle, and very little at the desk, the thought of engaging in such a conflict was by no means encouraging. It was therefore abandoned; but the recent visit of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales to India has led to misconceived views as to our military organisation in the East. The statement too of politicians who believe the existence of Turkey in Europe to be an anachronism, and the utterances of the Secretary of State for India at the banquet of Merchant Tailors, on the evening of the 11th of June last, of seeing no reason to share in the apprehensions of those around him as to danger to India from the Eastern question, have led to the desire to overcome all feelings of reluctance, and, however feeble the effort, to engage in indicating the causes which, in my humble opinion,

led to the Indian Mutiny, and to show, also, that if Turkey in Europe is displaced by Russia, or if Russia is allowed to pursue her course of aggression in Central Asia, or in Asia Minor, how inevitably disastrous either result would be as regards our hold on India.

Before giving my own account of the causes of the Indian Mutiny, I shall briefly examine Sir John Kaye's explanations. My object is not to write a book, but merely to give prominence to facts that are in themselves incontrovertible.

The reasons assigned by Sir John Kaye may be generalised into—(1) The baneful consequences of annexation; (2) The unrighteous enforcement of the "right of lapse," by withholding from the adopted heir, succession to the titular dignities and territorial sovereignty of the deceased; (3) The resumption of the holdings of the talookdar, or revenue contractor; (4) The confiscation of *eenam*, or rent-free tenure; (5) The measures of private individuals for the propagation of Christianity, and the identification of Government with educational and social progress.

The readers of "The Sepoy War" will have remarked, however, that the terms of condemnation in which these measures are commented on, are far from unqualified. The baneful consequences of annexation are generally described in language which leaves one in doubt as to whether the writer was in earnest in

exhibiting annexation as one of the causes which brought about the Indian Mutiny.

Of the several instances of annexation to which the Indian Government deemed it necessary to give effect, that of the kingdom of Oude may be cited as the most prominent in point of territorial and ethnological importance.

With reference to this annexation, Sir John Kaye states (vol. i., page 112): "There was still another province to be absorbed into the British Empire under the administration of Lord Dalhousie—not by conquest, for its rulers had ever been our friends, and its people had recruited our armies; not by lapse, for there had always been a son, or a brother, or some member of the royal house, to fulfil, according to the Mahomedan law of succession, the conditions of heirship, and there was still a king, the son of a king, upon the throne; but by a simple assertion of the dominant will of the British Government. This was the province of Oude, in the very heart of Hindoostan, which had long tempted us, alike by its local situation and the reputed wealth of its natural resources."

The last lines contain an accusation against the Indian Administration, as grave as it is thoughtless and unreasonable. This great province, in the very heart of Hindoostan, it is stated, "*had long tempted us.*" An act of moral and political courage, in bringing it under our rule, is thus represented as one of

spoliation, and elsewhere as having been accompanied with violence and pillage. Happily, it is not necessary for me to vindicate the grounds on which this annexation had become a duty as necessary as it was imperative. Sir John Kaye has himself set forth this vindication with much emphasis and justice. In vol. i., page 114, he states: "Never were the coils of misrule more horribly apparent; never were the vices of an indolent and rapacious Government productive of a greater sum of misery. The extravagance and profligacy of the Court were written in hideous characters on the desolated face of the country. It was left to the Nabob's Government to dispense justice: justice was not dispensed. It was left to the Nabob's Government to collect the revenue: it was wrung from the people at the point of the bayonet. The Court was sumptuous and profligate: the people poor and wretched. The expenses of the royal household were enormous. Hundreds of richly-caparisoned voracious elephants ate up the wealth of whole districts, or carried it in glittering apparel on their backs. A multitudinous throng of unserviceable attendants, bands of dancing-girls, flocks of parasites, costly feasts and ceremonies, folly, and pomp, and profligacy of every conceivable description drained the coffers of the State. A vicious and extravagant Government soon beget a poor and a suffering people; a poor and a suffering people, in turn, perpetuate the curse of a bankrupt Government. The

process of retaliation is sure. To support the lavish expenditure of the Court, the mass of the people were persecuted and outraged. Bands of armed mercenaries were let loose upon the ryots, in support of the rapacity of the aumils, or revenue-farmers, whose appearance was a terror to the people. Under such a system of cruelty and extortion, the country soon became a desert, and the Government then learnt, by hard experience, that the prosperity of the people is the only true source of wealth. The lesson was thrown away. The decrease of the revenue was not accompanied by a corresponding diminution of the profligate expenditure of the Court, or by any effort to introduce a better administrative system. Instead of this, every new year saw the unhappy country lapsing into worse disorder, with less disposition, as time advanced, on the part of the local Government, to remedy the evils beneath which it was groaning. Advice, protestation, remonstrance were in vain. Lord Cornwallis advised, protested, remonstrated; Sir John Shore advised, protested, remonstrated; but all proved unavailing"!

This was up to the year 1798. Further trials were made, with the object of awakening the Nabob and his officials to a sense of their responsibility; but they allowed things to take their course. "Sunk in voluptuousness (vol. i., page 120) and pollution, often too horribly revolting to be described, they gave themselves up to the guidance of panders and para-

sites, and cared not so long as these wretched creatures administered to their sensual appetites. Affairs of state were pushed aside as painful intrusions. Corruption stalked openly abroad. Every one had his price. Place, honour, justice—everything—was to be bought. Fiddlers and barbers, pimps and mountebanks became great functionaries.”

This was up to the year 1817. The period of probation was still further prolonged. Advice, remonstrance, and protest again and again proved unavailing. Then warning succeeded warning, each more earnest than the one that preceded it, but with the same abortive result. And while the Court was indulging in high carnivals of profligacy, “the talookdars (vol. i., page 135) kept the country in a perpetual state of disturbance, and rendered life, property, and industry everywhere insecure. Whenever they quarrelled with each other, or with the local authorities of the Government, from whatever cause, they took to indiscriminate plunder and murder, over all lands not held by men of the same class. No road, town, village, or hamlet was secure from their merciless attacks. Robbery and murder became their diversion, their sport; and they thought no more of taking the lives of men, women, and children than those of deer and wild hogs.”

The career of anarchy and wild misrule had long been such as to have sufficed to exhaust a heaven-born forbearance. But it was not till the year 1856, after

a painful experience extending over considerably more than half a century, during which three generations of kings had succeeded each other, that the annexation was proclaimed !

Provided with materials of information in abundance, the author of "The Sepoy War" could not but have been aware that no interference in the affairs of territorial and titular princes was ever sought after, but forced on the Indian administration by misrule, which it was not possible otherwise to prevent. This being so, his observations in respect to the subsidiary force provided to the King of Oude, for the internal as well as external defence of his dominions, are singularly uncalled for. He states (vol. i., p. 113) that although the Nabob possessed in abundance the raw material of soldiers, he had not been able to organise an army sufficient for the requirements of the State, and so was fain to avail himself of the superior military skill and discipline of the white men, and to hire British battalions to do his work. At first, he says, this was done in an irregular, desultory kind of way ; but afterwards it assumed a more formal and recognised shape, and solemn engagements were entered into with the Nawab by which we undertook, in consideration of certain money payments, to provide a certain number of British troops for the defence of his dominions, which, the author adds, was, in truth, a *vicious* system, one that could not be too severely condemned ; that by it we established a

double government of the worst kind; that the political and military government was in our hands, while the internal administration of the country still rested with the Nawab; that, in other words, hedged in and protected by the British battalions, a bad race of Eastern princes were suffered to do, or not to do, what they pleased, and that under such influence it was not strange that disorder of every kind ran riot over the whole length and breadth of the land.

How was such interference to be avoided? The reports of Colonel Sleeman and other political functionaries, quoted in more than a single instance by Sir John Kaye, contain evidence by no means limited in scope, of the licentiousness practised by sovereign and inferior princes, by their minions, by talookdars and their adherents, and, in fact, by every one who had it in his power to play the despot. This was so, notwithstanding the presence of the British battalions and the influence of British officers; what then would have been the state had such preventive influence been wanting? It is by no means difficult to conceive that law and morality and every sacred tie, violated as they have been under these checks, would have been immeasurably more so violated had they been wanting.

The next question is the unrighteous enforcement of lapse. The Shaster, or holy writ of the Hindoos, enjoins that the funeral pile of the deceased shall be lighted by his son, whether begotten or adopted; or

in the absence of such son, by the nearest of kin, or that the family or other priest, "bhut," shall perform that rite in order to ensure the deliverance of the departed from "the hell called Put." The author of "The Sepoy War," in maintaining that lapse "pursued the victim beyond the grave," and that its significance to the deceased was "nothing short of eternal condemnation," has attached to it an unreal and exaggerated importance.

The lapses (enumerated in book i., chapter xi., of vol. i.) all took place within a few years of each other, since 1848, and may be said to have been coeval with the annexation of the Oude territory.

It is necessary to bear in mind that the principalities which so lapsed, and had been incorporated with British territory, had all been created by the British Government after conquests which, in each instance, had been so signal and complete as to supersede the necessity for pursuing a conciliatory course towards any of the princes in relation with the paramount powers, whose systematic perfidy towards the British, notwithstanding engagements the most solemn and binding, had brought about their overthrow. These, as well as a large number of other principalities, were created, as is well known, in pursuance of a deeply-cherished policy, devised by the wisest and most philanthropic of our Indian statesmen, with the view that India might be, as largely as possible, studded with indigenous centres, where those

to whom our own administrative institutions afforded no opening, might find occupation and employment. Great hopes were at the same time entertained that the princes so established, would be influenced by our example, imitate our principles of government, and encourage the social, intellectual, and moral improvement of their respective subjects; and thus, it was believed, British connection with the East would be made a blessing to the millions of its population. But bitter disappointment was the result. These princes abandoned themselves, as a rule, to sensual indulgences. The profligacy of the different Courts kept pace with the baseness and profligacy of intriguing courtesans and unscrupulous panders. Favouritism swayed every department of the provinces, and incompetency, mismanagement, and cruel oppression were the results.

The Sattara and Nagpore principalities had been revived by the British Government in the persons of the older surviving representatives of the family which last occupied the throne. The former was a prisoner in the hands of Bajee Roa, the Peshwa, and on his defeat and the conquest of the Deccan, was liberated and placed on the throne of Sattara. With reference to the cases of both Sattara and Nagpore, Sir John Kaye states that "the princes had forfeited their rights, the one by hidden treachery and rebellion, the other by open hostility. The one, after full inquiry, had been deposed; the other, many years before, had been

driven into the jungle, and had perished in obscurity, a fugitive and an outcast. In both cases, therefore, the crime had been committed which the natives of India are so willing to recognise as a legitimate reason for the punishment of the weaker State by the stronger." But the offence, it is said, had been condoned, and the sovereignty had been suffered to survive—other members of the reigning family being set up by the paramount State in place of the offending princes. This is perfectly true; but what was the object of the condonation and the re-establishment of these thrones? To evince to the people of India at large that the British Government was influenced by no selfish views, but that *their* good was its object. It was also done with the hope that the princes so favoured would carefully study the welfare and the good government of their subjects. The result, however, was the same bitter disappointment; and the howl of the oppressed from these as well as other principalities still continued to sound forth clarion-toned, so that the British Government was driven to the necessity of taking advantage of lapses on the failure of direct heirs.

With reference to the third question, the resumption of the holding of the talookdars, or revenue contractors, the reports of Colonel Sleeman and other officers, quoted by Sir John Kaye, prove, as clearly as anything can be proved, that it was not possible to surpass their acts of oppression and violence, nor

to equal their worse than brutal disregard of human life. To have maintained them in the several provinces over which the right of conquest gave us the supremacy, would have been to perpetuate and encourage the most unbridled licentiousness. Like the talookdars of northern India, there were talookdars, or deshmooks, all over southern India at the time of the conquest of the Deccan. Happily, Mountstewart Elphinstone, who, previous to the conquest, was Resident at the Court of the Peshwa, had made every branch of the Peshwa's administration his study, and was well acquainted with the shortcomings of the deshmooks; and under his auspices, Mr. Chaplin, who was appointed Commissioner for the settlement of the conquered provinces, superseded them, and substituted the village communities in their dearly-cherished tenant-right, and entrusted the collection of the revenue to stipendiary native officers, supervised by European assistant-commissioners, one of whom, I believe, was Mr. John Warden, who at a later period stoutly resisted the operations of the Eenam Commission. For some years the revenue was collected yearly, on a valuation of the crops; but this practice was not found to work satisfactorily, and led to the introduction of the revenue survey and assessment, and, in connection with them, to a thirty years' permanent settlement, which not only placed the cess payable to the Government on a satisfactory footing, but it opened the way for the agricultural

classes to free themselves from their normal condition of deep indebtedness to the village banyan, or money-lender, to whom, under the deshmoock or talookdaree system, they were so tied down by mortgages that they could not call their agricultural implements, nor their tillage cattle, nor their houses their own. Surely no specious reasoning is necessary to show that the new method of collecting the revenue was immeasurably preferable to the one which it had supplanted.

With reference to the fourth question, namely, the confiscation of rent-free tenures, it is necessary, in the first place, to notice that these rent-free or eename villages were not the oases in a "barren, sandy desert," but that in consequence of the rack-rent practices of the holders of such villages, and the oppressive exactions with which they were followed, they were the plague-spots amid the broad Government lands occupied by a tenantry who were contented under the operations of the revenue survey and assessment, and made happy in the freedom they enjoyed from the uncertainties of taxation.

The tenants of these rent-free villages, finding their friends and neighbours so favourably circumstanced and themselves racked by a heavy cess, were naturally led to complain to British officers, who, owing to the exemption from control which the holders of those tenures enjoyed, were able to afford them no redress. Those who have indulged in a free and flippant condemnation of the Eename Commission,

however, will probably be surprised to learn that the idea of constituting that Board suggested itself to the Government from the complaints which poured in to them from the sufferers, who not only brought to notice the manner in which they were treated, but, at the same time, they exposed the fraudulent means by which the eenamdars possessed themselves of the villages they held—means that had not the sanction of the State. No lengthened inquiry was needed to show that this was so. The fact was notorious. The Peshwas of the later times, though personally licentious, were by no means given to the indiscriminate alienation of land; and, happily, their prime ministers were men of probity.

The Court of Bajee Roa, however, was proverbially profligate. The influence exercised over him by adherents and feudatories, especially by the Scindia, was baneful; so much so, that another high feudatory, Jeswunt Roa Holkar, marched with an army to the capital with the object of relieving his liege lord from their thralldom. A battle was fought, in which Holkar was victorious; but it was followed by no court reformation. Tradition, however, has handed down the names of a triumvirate—the prime minister, the general of his forces, and the keeper of the public records—as the uncontaminated three. Of these, the prime minister and the record keeper made entries in the *duftar*, or public records, of none but *bonâ fide* grants. The first step, therefore, taken by

the Eenam Commission, was to establish the rule that the period of sixty years should form the prescriptive proprietary limit, and that the right of eenamdars who held possession in excess of sixty years should remain unquestioned. With reference to cases within the limit, search was made among the Poona records for entries, and in respect to those found recorded, the inquiry was at once arrested. When there appeared to be no record, the eenamdar was allowed every opportunity to make good his claim, and had conceded to him the weakest probability of right in his favour; and resumption followed only when there was no doubt that the possession was unauthorised and illegal. The acts of the Eenam Commission, however, were questioned chiefly by Mr. John Warden, at the time a member of Council of the Bombay Government; but notwithstanding his highly influential position, the Commission was able to hold its own, for their dealings with eenams were based upon grounds at once sound and consistent. And it was only when the Indian Mutiny had excited the feelings of England to the condition of fever-heat, that instructions were sent out, I believe, to do away with the Commission, which, however, in the meantime, had put an end to a very great deal of the oppression practised by eenamdars.

The author of "The Sepoy War," basing his views on the opinions said to have been entertained by Lord Hardinge, Sir Thomas Munro, Sir John

Malcolm, the Honourable Mountstewart Elphinstone, and Lord Metcalfe, has declared, in terms bordering on deep lamentation, that, in extinguishing loyal native states by annexation, or by taking advantage of lapses, and in doing away with talookdars, and in resuming eename or rent-free tenures, we undermined the confidence of the people, weakened their allegiance, excited widespread dissatisfaction, and so paved the way for the outbreak which shook British power in India to its very foundation. But were these the causes that brought about the Mutiny? Suppositions have been largely indulged in; but of evidence that may be viewed as being at all reliable, there is none.

In regard to the annexation of Oude, Sir John Kaye states that "*it was not to be doubted*" that the measure itself made a very bad impression on the minds of the people of India; not because of the deposition of a king who had abused his powers; not because of a new system of administration for the benefit of the people; but because the humanity of the act was soiled by the profit we derived from it (page 152, vol. i.). It is only necessary to revert to page 137, where it will be seen that Colonel Sleeman, in writing to the Governor-General of India, strongly urged the assumption of the administration of Oude, stating: "What the people want, and most earnestly pray for, is that our Government should take upon itself the responsibility of governing them

well and permanently. All classes, save the knaves who now surround and govern the king, earnestly pray for this: the educated classes, because they would then have a chance of respectable employment, which none of them now have; the middle classes, because they find no protection or encouragement, and no hope that their children would be permitted to inherit the property they leave, not invested in our Government securities; and the humbler classes, because they are now abandoned to the merciless rapacity of the starving troops and other public establishments, and of the landowners, driven and invited to rebellion by the present state of misrule."

Colonel Sleeman was at the same time of opinion that the British Government, after assuming the administration, should honestly and distinctly disclaim all interested motives, and appropriate the whole of the revenue to the benefit of the people and royal family of Oude. The Governor-General, however, thought otherwise, and considered annexation the only effective remedy. He did so with the view, no doubt, of putting an end to the state of feverish excitement under which, from long-continued misrule, the people laboured; and also to guard against the likelihood of any course short of annexation keeping them in a state of suspense, and leading them to suppose that fear had restricted our interference to simply the administrative measure.

But have annexations had the effect stated by the

author of "The Sepoy War?" Speaking from an experience of forty years of Indian official life, as topographical surveyor; as translator in Hindoostanee and Mharatta; as sheriff; as head of the Poona police; as subordinate and chief uncovenanted assistant-judge; as superintendent of police in the southern Mharatta country, and commissioner of police in Bombay, I have been in close, constant, and familiar intercourse with all classes of natives of India: and having been born there, and lived among them for a very great portion of the time, I venture to state that, with the exception of those whom Colonel Sleeman himself declares to be "the knaves who surround and govern the king," and those who surrounded native princes and talookdars and eenamdars, there were no others who made annexations or lapses or resumptions the reason for impugning the integrity of the British Government, or for concluding that the humanity of its acts had been "soiled" by the profit said to have been derived from them. If, on the other hand, the princes of India, and others, have so viewed the actions of the Government, the impression produced upon them, it is to be hoped, has been salutary and conducive to personal morality and to good government.

The question may also be asked, What evidence is there to show that the acts of the Government, so freely animadverted upon, had occasioned a deep-seated disloyalty to our rule in India, and that the

Mutiny had been incited by those whose position and importance our measures had been the means of crushing? Much is advanced in the way of conjecture. It is stated that the sepoy disliked annexation because it placed him on the dead level of British subjects; that under the all-prevailing lawlessness and misrule which had so long over-ridden the province, the sepoy in the English service, whatever might be the wrongs of others, was always sure of a full measure of justice on appeal to the British Resident. Either he himself or some member of his family is a small yeoman, with certain rights in the land, and in all the disputes and contentions in which these interests involved him, he had the protection and assistance of the Resident, and, "*right or wrong, carried his point.*" Here an imputation is cast on British integrity, the gravity of which it is impossible to gauge; but happily it calls for no vindication, for since the days of Impey and Oomichund, British probity throughout India has been avowedly far beyond the reach of doubt or suspicion. Further on it is stated: "Many were the strange glosses which were given to the acts of the British Government; various were the ingenious fictions woven for the purpose of unsettling the minds and uprooting the fidelity of the sepoy. If we annexed a province it was to facilitate our proselytising operations and to increase the number of our converts. Our resumption operations were instituted for the purpose of destroying all the

religious endowments of the country. Our legislative enactments were all tending to the same result—the subversion of Hîndooism and Mahomedanism.” I venture with perfect confidence to aver, that the veriest novice of British cadets would denounce the idea that any sepoy was to have been drawn into the belief of tales so monstrously absurd. As a rule, the sepoys were men of great intelligence, especially those of the Bengal army, who were all high-caste men, and their officers—the native captains and lieutenants—were pre-eminently men of good judgment. If there was any matter with reference to which their convictions could have remained unshaken, it was that the Government would never tamper with their religion. Christian missionaries may have been sedulous in their efforts to proselytise, and addresses may have been extensively circulated in Bengal by Christian propagandists, to the effect that the “time had come when earnest consideration should be given to the question whether or not all mankind should embrace the same religion;” and there may have been some solitary instances of officers of sepoy regiments who, from conscientious but mistaken ideas of Christian obligation, had been so imprudent as to address natives on the doctrines of Christianity. But in such cases Sir John Kaye himself acknowledges that these addresses were never made either in the sepoy lines or in the regimental bazaar; and while one or two such officers acted the missionary, the major

portion of their brother officers, I have no doubt, held up their conduct to the ridicule of their men. I have myself known and heard of such instances. Hence, whatever the amount of zeal displayed by the Christian missionary and his lay imitator, there could have been no misconception on the part of the native soldiery as to the freedom of the Government from complicity in such acts.

The instrumentality by which sepoy allegiance was impaired is thus stated. That the men whose business it was to corrupt our sepoys were, *perhaps*, the agents of some of the old princely houses which we had destroyed, or members of the baronial families which we brought to poverty and disgrace. That they were, *perhaps*, the emissaries of Bhraminical societies whose precepts we were turning into folly, and whose power we were setting at naught. That they were, *perhaps*, mere visionaries and enthusiasts, moved only by their own disordered imaginations to proclaim the coming of some new prophet or some fresh avatar of the Deity, and the consequent downfall of Christian supremacy in the East; but, whatsoever the nature of their mission, and whatever the guise they assumed, whether they appeared in the lines as passing travellers, as journeying hawkers, as religious mendicants, or as wandering puppet-showmen, the seed of sedition which they scattered struck root in a soil well prepared to receive it, and waited only for the ripening sun of circumstances to develop a harvest of revolt. Such is said to have been the

instrumentality by which sepoy allegiance was impaired. All this is mere imagination, and, in my opinion, quite out of place in a work professing to deal with the facts of authentic history.

That religious toleration in regard to all creeds in India was maintained by the British Government with uncompromising firmness, was a fact perfectly well understood by every class of our native subjects in the Bombay Presidency ; and I have no hesitation in stating, that it was equally well understood throughout the rest of India.

As chief uncovenanted assistant-judge* of Ahmednuggar, I was, *ex-officio*, president of the committee of the Government vernacular schools in that town, and two high caste leading Hindoo merchants, and the native magistrate of the place, who was a Bhramin, were my colleagues. It was not usual to admit the children of Mhars, and other low classes, into these schools ; but I had only to point out the hardship of their exclusion from a privilege which it was the intention of a paternal Government should be enjoyed by all classes of its subjects, for my colleagues to recognise and adopt the suggestion at once. They were strong in the conviction that toleration to all classes and creeds was the governing principle of British rule, and that the proposal covered no hidden desire for levelling any caste distinctions, nor for introducing any measure of Christian proselytism.

In 1847, a high caste Bhramin convert instituted a civil suit at Ahmednuggar for the recovery of his son, who was born a month or two before the man embraced the Christian faith. He had failed to persuade his wife to join him, and over her he could exercise no legal control. But after the boy had attained the age of seven years, he took possession of him. The mother then complained to the magistrate, who ordered the convert to give up his son to her: he did so, and filed a suit in my court for his recovery. The trial was exciting a great deal of sensation among the large Bhraminical population of the place. In all Indian courts a Hindoo and a Mahomedan law officer are provided by the Government to assist the judges with expositions of the Hindoo and Mahomedan laws on points which bear upon the cases that come before them for adjudication. His exposition of the law texts, quoted by the Hindoo law officer in this case, was against the convert's claim; but happily, I happened to have by me the books which the law officer had consulted, and a reference to his texts clearly showed that they did not admit of the law officer's deductions. Having afterwards well considered all the special and technical grounds which led me to the conclusion that judgment ought to be in favour of the convert, I thought I should invite two Bhramins who were reputed for their learning in the Bhraminical laws, to discuss the merits of the case. After much deliberation, they arrived at the opinion

that the only course open to me was to give judgment in favour of the convert. Judgment was accordingly pronounced. An appeal was made to the judge, and my judgment was annulled. The convert then, under the guidance of the Rev. Mr. Ballantine, appealed to the Sudder Dewanee Adawlut, which at the time was the highest civil court in the land, and ultimately the judge's decree was reversed and mine confirmed. Both judgment and appeal form the Appendix A.

When a native wished to become a Christian, he was obliged to take refuge with the missionary to avoid being persecuted by his friends and relations. Previous to my connection with the police, it was usually the practice for a large number of castemen and idlers to make an attack upon the missionary and the intended convert, and to damage all the property that could be laid hands on. The police, as a rule, reached the scene after the disturbance was at an end, and the missionary invariably obtained no redress.

During the year of the Indian Mutiny, the Rev. Doctor Wilson called one day at the police office, and mentioned to me that a young man of the Sied, or chief Mahomedan class, wished to become a Christian, but that having a very lively remembrance of the violence he had suffered in person and property on previous occasions, when the candidates were not of a class so fanatical as the Sieds, he thought he should not take any steps in the matter without seeing me, and he said it was absolutely necessary to afford the

young man shelter in his house, or he would be disposed of by poison on his intention becoming known. On the following day the young man went to the doctor's house. Aware that an attack upon them would meet with no impunity, the priests and leaders among the Mahomedans called at the police office, and represented that they could not submit to the insult offered them and the indignity put upon Mahomedanism, and that such an outrage had never before been perpetrated. As soon as I thought they had exhausted the pleas they wished to put forward, I asked them if they knew the Padree-Lord? (The native distinction of the Bishop of Bombay.) They replied "Yes." "Well, try and make a Mussulman of him, and if you succeed, I promise you that I shall take care the European population do not interfere with you." At the same time I seriously cautioned them against any breach of the peace. "Adopt legal measures," I said, "to any extent you think proper," or see what argument might do in winning back your apostate, and I shall be present to see that you have fair play." I was not again troubled in this matter.

A year or two after, a body of Mahomedan priests walked into the police office, and informed me that a European wished to embrace Mahomedanism, but that they declined to admit him without learning my views on the subject. I said if it was the man's wish to become a Mahomedan, I could have nothing to say

against it. They then offered to call upon and ask him to see me, and accompanied him to the police office. He was a European of about five-and-twenty, a German by birth, and a Protestant; spoke English fluently, showed no want of intelligence, and expressed his belief in Mahomedanism with a degree of fervour which left me no alternative but to let him follow his own inclination.

On another occasion, five young Parsees of seventeen to twenty years of age, went away to Dr. Wilson's to become Christians. Soon after, there was a crowd of Parsees at the police office, complaining of the "seduction, by the Christian missionary, of boys who were not old enough to form any judgment or opinion regarding their own religion." "Beware of committing any breach of the peace," was my advice. "Adopt all possible legal measures, or try the efficacy of dissuasion, by means of argument." In this case the latter expedient was adopted. I named 10 a.m. on the following day for the meeting. To avoid confusion I thought it necessary to limit the number to half a dozen Parsees priests and friends; and as the doctor was not in robust health, I appointed the meeting to take place at his residence. I was there at the hour named. The Parsees, too, were in attendance, and the discussion commenced very soon after. There was no outburst of passion on either side; all was calm, quiet reasoning. The relative merits of Christianity and Zoroastrianism were fairly

discussed. It was interesting to see these young men, who were students of the Scottish college, and of fair intellectual training, attending first to the arguments of the missionary, then to those of the Parsees, then thoughtfully weighing the expositions of each, and often taking part in the discussion themselves. The meeting was prolonged till about three o'clock, and the result was that four of them returned home to their friends, and one remained, and was shortly after admitted to the rite of Christian baptism.

No missionary, previous to my time, could preach the gospel even in his own private grounds without being molested and very often assaulted by native bigots. But this was soon put a stop to, and proper police precautions secured freedom of access to teachers of all creeds and denominations; to the Christian missionary, the Parsee mobid, the Mahomedan kazeer, and the Hindoo pundit alike. Soon after the commencement of the Mutiny, the Mahomedans of Kurachee, it appears, fell into a state of excitement on seeing a board hung up in a missionary's verandah with the text, "He that believeth in Jesus, and is baptised, shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned." The Mahomedan priests applied to Sir Bartle Frere, who was then Commissioner of Scinde, to have it removed, on the ground that the public exhibition of such a text was derogatory to Mahomedanism. The application, for good reasons

no doubt, was attended to, and the missionary desired to remove the board, which he did under a strong protest. This circumstance was followed by an application in Bombay by a body of Mahomedans, to prohibit Christian missionaries from preaching publicly, though standing upon their own grounds, as such preaching was a degradation of the religion of the Mahomedans. My answer to them was, "Put a stop to the practice, by all means, if you will. Make it worth the missionaries' while to sell you their grounds; and if you are prepared to make the purchase, go and tell them, with my salams, that I had asked you to call upon them. These," I added, "were the only terms on which the preaching could be put a stop to;" and I gave them clearly to understand that I should not be influenced by the Kur-rachee example. I heard nothing more on the subject.

The following circumstances will give a fair idea of the confidence which the Bhramin priesthood of Western India had in British integrity and toleration. In order to discourage the preaching of European missionaries, and to influence the natives against their teaching, the Bhramin priests of Bombay—a large and influential body—availing themselves of the presence from the interior of a number of their most learned men, invited the missionaries to a discussion on the relative merits of Christianity and Bhraminism. In Bombay there are no spacious

buildings for the accommodation of large gatherings. These meetings were therefore held on the open sea-beach, and excited a deep and widespread interest. The Bhramins necessarily ^{18,367} formed a very large majority, and the priests wishing to guard against the possibility of a breach of the peace by their followers, suggested to the missionaries that the attendance of the police should be requested. A deputation from both parties called at the police office for that purpose, and I arranged to go myself, and was present at five of their meetings. It was quite clear that there would be no conversion of Bhramins to Christianity; nor was it less clear that there would be no leading of any Christian missionary into the fold of Bhraminism. I therefore proposed that the meetings should be brought to a close. This was at once assented to by the missionaries; but the high priest of the Bhramins, exclaiming, "Hold on, sir! I have a question or two to put to the missionaries," unfolded a piece of paper which he held in his hands and read out a long list of the different Christian denominations, with a visible feeling of triumph, and addressing the missionaries, said, "Sirs, you are all Christians, professing to serve a triune God, and seeking salvation in the atonement offered up by Jesus Christ, and how do you explain these distinctions?" The missionaries made a reply, which was patiently listened to; and then, in a tone of great gravity, the Bhramin rejoined, "Sirs, your explanation

is by no means satisfactory. I will give you one that is much more consistent. The approach to Bombay is not limited to a single beaten path. There are many ways of reaching it, and so are there many ways of reaching heaven. Your several ways have been vouchsafed to you; to Bhramins, Bhraminism is the way; to Mahomedans, Mahomedanism; to Parsees, Zoroastrianism, and so on;" and repeating some Sanscrit verses in a tone of exultation, he concluded by observing that it was best for each to keep to his own religion.

Had I the inclination to dwell upon the subject it would not be difficult to show the lamentable extent to which Christianity has been blighted in India by our own divisions. And it would be by no means very flattering to our pride and superior intelligence to learn the opinion of the Bhramin priests on the extravagant views and practices of the ultra high church section of English Protestantism.

During my official experience and free intercourse with the people, extending over a great many years, I had never heard the slightest whisper of suspicion with reference to complicity, or favouritism, or partiality, or bias on the part of any public functionary; and with regard to the "sirkar," the confidence of the people I always found to be unbounded. In the southern Mharatta country, where there had been a good number of lapses and eename resumptions, the people at large were jubilant, and discontent was

confined only within palace recesses. In Bombay itself the detective organisation in connection with the police was of too perfect a kind to admit of the probability—I may say, the possibility—of such impression being existent without its being brought to my notice; and I have the strongest conviction in stating that in respect to the religious element having had anything to do with weakening sepoy allegiance, the statements of the author of “The Sepoy War” are without any base to rest upon.

But is Sir John Kaye right in saying that our measures of annexation and resumption had so undermined the confidence of the people in British integrity and excited discontent so widespread as to have paved the way for the outbreak of the Mutiny? If want of confidence in British rule was so universal, how are we to account for the loyal conduct of Holkar, of Scindia, and a host of other feudatories, whose names appear in the pages of “The Sepoy War?” The revolt of Holkar’s troops was brought on by the contaminating influences of our own troops at Mhow. It was so unexpected, and the attack upon the residency so sudden, that terror and confusion reigned supreme within the palace. The reports brought to Holkar as to the cause of the outbreak were wild, contradictory, and bewildering; and the mysterious flight of the British Resident from Indore, Holkar’s chief councillor in all circumstances of difficulty and danger, made the confusion still more confounding.

Immediately after this the mutiny at Mhow took place, and the sepoys, marching to Indore, united with the forces of Holkar, and for a time at least made common cause with them. Holkar, however, identified himself with the British, and with a sublime forgetfulness of self and the personal danger he incurred, afforded an instance of loyalty which the most unreasonably sceptical only would venture to question. Scindia's conduct, too, has been throughout most brilliantly loyal. The same may be said of the Chief of Joobooah, the Begum of Bhopal, the Rajas of Puteeala, Jheend, Mahidpoor, Jahodpore, Bhurtpoor, Jyepoor, Ulwar, Dholepoor, the Maharana of Oodeypoor, and the chiefs of Rajpootana, and no doubt of a large number of others. I am strong in the conviction that loyalty to the British cause would have been general but for the fear inspired by the mutineers.

Under the influence of fear and the promptings of the natural instinct of self-preservation, the strongest feelings of loyalty might cease to exist. The inhabitants of Bombay, than whom there is not a more devotedly loyal people in any part of the world, were also painfully swayed by feelings of apprehension in consequence of the persistence with which the mutineers at Cawnpoor, Lucknow, and Delhi, were able to maintain their ground. And I have no hesitation in stating that if the sepoy regiments in Bombay had mutinied, and by

some chance obtained a temporary advantage, devotedly loyal as Bombay was, not a single man in it would have had the courage to engage openly in our defence, but would at once, though most unwillingly, have sided with the stronger party. Private and secret succour we should have had to the fullest extent; but from everything involving danger to person and property, they would have strictly abstained. Could we have expected more in the disturbed districts?

They regarded the crisis with great anxiety on account of their own safety; for the sepoys, who were trained in our school of discipline and warfare, and had helped us to effect the conquest of India, were maintaining their stand against the Government successfully and with great valour and determination. The bare possibility of the mutineers being successful inspired the people of Bombay with great fear; and the large number of letters I received from native friends in the interior, as to the fears entertained by the people generally of the possible success of the mutineers, left no doubt in my mind, that that fear was general and by no means limited.

Were the people of India a united nation, they would have had no cause of apprehension; but largely intersected as they are by caste and class distinctions, and still more so by religious prejudices, and having at the same time both personal experience and traditional knowledge of the anarchy common to native

rule, and conscious of the antagonisms that would pervade the length and breadth of India in the event of the expulsion of the British—if there was any one matter in respect to which the feelings of India were united, it was in the wish that the mutineers might not be the successful party. The voice of allegiance may not have been audible to most English ears, but it was sufficiently audible to satisfy, most fully, those who were familiar with the feelings and characteristics of the natives.

The native princes who “presented a revolting picture of the worst type of misrule, of feebleness worse than despotism, of apathy more productive of human suffering than the worst forms of tyrannous activity; who, abstaining from all controlling authority, permitted the strong to carry on everywhere a war of extermination against the weak,” were just those whom it was found necessary, in the exercise of a wise policy, to set aside by means of annexation or by the opportunity afforded by lapses. These chiefs and the talookdars, with their rabble adherents, finding the native army in a high state of inflammation, and freely boasting of their valour as being equal to that of the European, were no doubt gradually tempted to inspire the sepoys with the belief that a revolt on their part would prove a most popular act. In this too they must have found it necessary to act with the greatest caution; to satisfy themselves that the ground upon which they stood was no quagmire, and

that sepoy allegiance was in a state of disruption; for nothing but the clearest evidence of this would have tempted the Nana, or the King of Delhi, or any one else, whether prince, noble, or commoner, to dare to tamper with sepoy fidelity.

In 1802, when it was proposed to the Peshwa of Poona that the British should enlist a body of native horse, designated Spiller's Horse, and more commonly known as the Poona Horse, and to enrol a couple of native battalions, known as Ford's regiments, both prince and courtiers received the proposal with an ecstasy of delight, believing that it would work for their advantage, as the men enlisted would be the Peshwa's subjects, and in the event of any exigency presenting itself, all that would need be done would be to order them to join the Peshwa's forces. The exigency did present itself. The request to join was conveyed to both horse and foot. The reception that the request met with, is matter of history.

The chief rissaldar or native captain of the body of horse was Dajee Saib, a descendant of Tanajee Malosroy, who was the general of the forces of Shivajee Maharaj, the founder of the Mharatta empire. It is said that finding the impregnable hill-fort of Shewghur (lion's den), in the neighbourhood of Poona so guarded, that the only means of effecting its capture was by a surprise, Tanajee Roa had provided himself with an animal known in India as the ghore-pudde, possessed of wonderful tenacity of grip, and

remarkable for the ease with which it can run up a wall. He attached a rope to its waist, took advantage of a dark night, approached the fort with his party, and letting the animal ascend the fortification, was the first who pulled himself up by means of the rope. An alarm was raised by the garrison, and was followed by a challenge, the reply to which was an arrow from Tanajee Roa's bow discharged into the challenging sentry who was killed on the spot. The garrison immediately mustered to arms, Tanajee was slain, and his party attempted to retreat, but were rallied by his brother Sooriajee, who had, in the meantime, gained the heights with the rest of the men. A fierce struggle ensued, and the fort was captured. When the success of the expedition was reported to Shivajee, he exclaimed in sorrow, "The den has been taken, but the lion that captured it is no more." In commemoration of the event, the family has ever since been surnamed Ghorepudde. The above circumstances, well known in Poona, were repeated afresh to Dajee Saib, the native captain of the Poona Horse, by the Peshwa's emissaries. The sorrow and admiration expressed by Shivajee for the devotion with which his ancestor encountered death in the discharge of his duty to his sovereign, were vividly dwelt upon in order to revive his feelings of allegiance and loyalty to his native prince; but all was in vain. The native officers of both horse and foot promised fairly and received the bribes offered

them; but when the moment arrived the enemy made the discovery that they had misplaced their confidence. Aided by these men, who were led on by only three or four European officers, the small European force, then at our disposal, encountered the hosts marshalled against us by the enemy, and inflicted upon them an irretrievable defeat,—the body of horse, numbering under a thousand, led on by Captain Spiller, charging most successfully the enemy's horse five thousand strong. All this the Nana was perfectly aware of. These and other no less signal victories were achieved by our forces, assisted by the native army, during periods when the faith of the native soldier was strong in the omnipotence of the white man's fighting power and indomitable pluck. But we dispelled the charm and suffered the consequent penalty.

It is often strongly dwelt upon by Sir John Kaye, that there would have been no sepoy outbreak if we had treated the princes and feudatories and talookdars and others as they should have been treated; that is, if we permitted them to outrage humanity without let or hindrance, and violate every principle of law and morality. Even on grounds of political expediency the extenuation of such conduct would hardly be attempted; and the author of "The Sepoy War" himself would have found it an impossible undertaking to reconcile the sanction and encouragement of extreme cruelty and turpitude with the stern

and uncompromising dictates of morality, and with those principles of duty, due from the governing body to the governed, which political experience in all ages of the world has laid down as an inviolable axiom, namely, the good government and the welfare of the people.

General Sir George le Grand Jacob, K.C.S.I., who, in his "Western India," following the footsteps of his great prototype, the author of "The Sepoy War," has uttered a groan, and implied that he could utter a deeper groan, has given, under the title of *Female Rulers, Plot and Counter-plot, and Succession Troubles*—terms in themselves of no small significance—instances of depravity and misrule which exemplify the wisdom of the Government in carrying out the measures which Sir John Kaye and General Jacob strongly deprecate. Of the female rulers, she whom the General designates as the heroine of his "story," made away, successively, with her father-in-law, her husband, and her son, because they stood in her way; then to quiet the qualms of her conscience, she placed the principality for the time in her daughter-in-law's charge, and proceeded on a distant pilgrimage. During her absence, the daughter-in-law, equally ambitious to rule, arranged to forestall the heroine, who on her return, finding the palace inaccessible to her, proceeded some hundreds of miles away to the British Resident, and beset him with her grievances, and corrupted his native subordinates with

her gold. Finding this ineffective, she returned, raised the country, "enrolled cut-throats," "took the field," had an engagement, in which one of her chiefs was killed at her side, and eventually, by means chiefly of bribery and corruption, reinstated herself. It then became the turn of the daughter-in-law to beset the British Resident with her ineffective wail.

The next is the case of a prince who died leaving three widows, apparently without hope of issue. Each of these women did her best to promote her own views and ends, and they vied with each other in bribing the native officials of the Residency. Intrigue succeeded intrigue. Troops, or as the General has more correctly described them in another part, cut-throats, were raised, which rendered repressive measures necessary. At this stage, one of the widows was declared to be pregnant. Various means became necessary to test the truth of this, but it was no easy matter, for no male, not even a brother, after childhood, can see a young Rajpoot lady of rank. There was satisfactory evidence, however, of the pregnancy, and steps the most conclusively effective were taken, to guard against a spurious substitution if the child should prove to be a girl. But plots and counterplots still continued; the General himself was very nearly poisoned; and such was the scepticism of the opposite party, that there were no means of convincing them that fair play was intended by the British authorities. The woman was at last in the pains of labour; the

European surgeon of the Residency was in attendance, and the opposing ladies were sent for to be present at the birth. They declined at first to come; but the General was urgent, and they yielded. They arrived after the birth had taken place. The child was a boy, and though the evidence that it had been just then born was in all respects positive, they would not be convinced, and went away denouncing it all to be a sham and a subterfuge! And this was followed by the Resident and his assistant, the General, being accused of guilty connivance and court intrigue.

The next case of succession troubles is one in which the death of a Nabob left three claimants to the estate, the first of whom was his stepson, who held a formal deed of succession from the deceased, but which, during lifetime, the deceased had treated as null and void. He had associated with his own, the name of the second claimant, who was his own son, and in all state papers proclaimed him heir, and treated him as such. The mother of the third claimant was of royal blood, and held that her son had the best right. The right of the second son, however, was acknowledged by the British Government. A plot was immediately set on foot, followed by the enrolment of armed mercenaries, which rendered necessary a display of military force. After an interview, which the General had had with the elder of the disputants, he was so surrounded and held

by Arab mercenaries, that but for a commendable exercise of patience and good judgment, he would have been cut down. These disputes led to the disorganisation of the principality, and to insurgent gangs raising the standard of revolt, against whom the General found it necessary to march with British troops. In the meantime a plot was matured for shooting the prince who was placed on the throne by the British Government, and it was only after a great deal of trouble and some bloodshed that the tranquillity of the principality was restored.

Another principality was then thrown into a state of confusion for reasons of disputed succession, which too was only quelled by a march up and show of force. This was followed by another similar disturbance, with an array of forces on both sides, which was not quelled without a collision, attended with some slaughter and bloodshed.

Such is about the normal condition of successions in India. The General has confined himself to matters connected with his political and military occupations; but it is easy to imagine the very great extent to which the peace and quiet of the general population must have been disturbed, and the hardship and oppression they must have been subjected to.

But it is argued that the native mind is essentially conservative; that our system of government might be far better and more civilised than their system, but that the people did not like it better; that they clung

to their own institutions, however rude and defective, and were averse to any change, even though it were a change for the better. It is impossible to say by what means this notion of the conservatism of India was arrived at. To suppose that any race of men would prefer grinding despotism to a rule of justice and equity; to suppose that systematic oppression, accompanied by murder, pillage, incendiarism, and gang robbery would be a more desirable condition, than a life of peace and safety, under the protecting wings of an impartial and powerful Government, is to suppose something that is contradicted by the most ordinary experience and the plain common sense of mankind.

When the trial of the Gaekwar, on the charge of having poisoned Colonel Phayre, was in prosecution, the agricultural and artisan classes, who form a very large proportion of the population, petitioned Government that the country might not be absorbed, but continued to that prince. Surprise, I am aware, was expressed at the time, that such a petition should have been submitted, and conclusions were hastily drawn, that though the people might deem our administration free from oppression, they still preferred their own native rule, with all its defects and disadvantages. Neither the agricultural nor artisan classes would, of course, have thought of such a petition, without its having been suggested to them. And were the truth known—and there were many, no doubt, who were

cognisant of the truth—it would have been seen that the consideration which influenced them in signing the petition was, if the country was annexed, they would not be worse treated by the British Government for having signed the petition ; but if, on the other hand, they declined to take part in the petition, and the government of the Gaeekwar was continued, their refusal to sign was sure to be visited by some additional impost, and hence the signatories deemed it prudent to take part in the petition. This is the true and simple explanation of the matter.

Again, what evidence is there that those who are supposed to have incited the Mutiny, or to have made common cause with the mutineers after the outbreak, would not have done so but for the dispossession and the ruin they are said to have suffered. The King of Delhi had been subjected to neither dispossession nor ruin ; but on the contrary, was rescued from the condition of a prisoner, and maintained by the British Government in all the pomp and parade of regal splendour. He lived on from childhood to adolescence, from adolescence to manhood, and from manhood to years of decrepitude, without, in all probability, a single thought of discontent ever crossing his mind or that of his sons ; or a single idea suggesting itself that he or they could sway a sceptre with safety to themselves or with advantage to the country. The universally acknowledged omnipotence of British power could have left no room for such a thought ; nor, till

latterly, was there any reason to doubt sepoy allegiance or sepoy devotion to the British cause. But the cartridge question was then in agitation, and in some regiments there was insubordination, and if not actual mutiny, something very much akin to it.

That the Mutiny sprung from causes inherent in the organisation of the sepoy army, and that it was not the result of incitement, I hope in another chapter to be able to show. The insubordination and the state of disquietude among the sepoys were, no doubt, known to the king; but the outbreak at Meerut, with the murder of most of the European officers, the march of the mutineers to Delhi, their coalition with the regiments stationed at Delhi, the slaughter there of Europeans, the advance to the palace, and the proposal to the king to have him installed as their sovereign, accompanied probably with some show of coercion, were circumstances which must have convinced him that the British power had become cankered. And the mutineers, too, must have looked forward to the prestige which a union with the ancient house of Timour was calculated to impart. That the presence of such a person as the King of Delhi at the head of the rebel hosts tended to foster rebellion, and, by affording a centre of convergence, imparted hope, encouragement, and strength to the mutineers, and that the combinations which centred in Delhi were such as had immeasurably augmented the difficulties which the Government had to contend

with, are beyond question. Would these difficulties have been what they proved to be if the king had not been present at Delhi? Other instances in the Bengal Presidency may be mentioned, in which princes, feudatories, and others made common cause with the mutineers after several of the outbreaks had taken place.

In the Bombay Presidency there were the Rajas of Kolapoor. The succession was secured to them by a double line. Both princes were young. There was no probability of a failure of progeny, nor was any portion of their territorial possession subjected to the process of amputation ; but still, suspicion against the younger prince of complicity with the mutineers was so strong that General Jacob found it necessary to recommend and carry out his deportation to Scinde, his presence at Kolapoor being considered to be dangerous.

There is also the case of the Nurgoond chief, whose only grievance was said to be the prospect of refusal by the Government to allow him to adopt. He was a man of middle age, and no native, with the freedom to marry more wives than one, abandons the hope of an heir to inherit his possessions. On finding that the native regiments in Bengal had proved disloyal, and that those who had established themselves at Delhi had not been evicted, and also that the regiment at Kolapoor had mutinied, and those at Belgaum and Dharwar were very largely tainted, he

too thought, no doubt, that he should try in time to get what he could; and to his unfortunate act of rebellion he added the atrocity of murdering Mr. Manson.

These instances of active and overt disloyalty clearly showed that the annexations and lapses and resumptions, so loudly denounced by the author of "The Sepoy War," and others, are not to be viewed as unmitigated evils, such as they have been represented to be. On the other hand, considering the terrible disasters inflicted by the Sepoy Mutiny, that the conflagration was spreading far and wide, that the European forces in the country were merely a handful, that the sepoy hosts, disciplined and trained in the arts of war by ourselves, were overwhelming in their numbers and daring, and, notwithstanding all the efforts to dislodge them, exhibited considerable judgment in being able to maintain their hold in Delhi,—considering all these circumstances, is it surprising that some among the vast populations of India should have been bold, ambitious, and enterprising?—some who, by plunging into the perils of treason, should choose to run the gauntlet of any and all dangers? To this extent I am prepared to admit the existence of rebellion during the period of the Mutiny—that bold men, men of enterprise and daring, men prompted by personal advantage, by the cravings of self-interest, did make common cause with the hydra-headed monster, mutiny, after it had fully exhibited its

destructive tendency. But that the Nana, or any one else, had incited the mutiny, I hold to be a myth.

What are the grounds upon which it is stated that the Nana was the prime mover in the work of seducing the sepoys from their allegiance? I shall quote from the author of "The Sepoy War" (page 578, vol i.) :—"By this Dhundo-pant Nana Saib, by all who were festering with resentment against the English, and malignantly biding their time, the annexation of Oude had been welcomed as a material aid to the success of their machinations. It was no sudden thought, born of the accident of the greased cartridges, that took the disappointed Bhramin and his Mahomedan friend to Lucknow in the spring of the year of trouble. For months—for years, indeed—ever since the failure of the mission to England had been apparent, they had been quietly spreading their network of intrigue all over the country. From one native court to another native court, from one extremity to another of the great continent of India, the agents of the Nana Saib had passed with overtures and invitations, discreetly, perhaps mysteriously worded, to princes and chiefs of different races and religions—but most hopefully of all to the Mharattas. At the great Mharatta families, the families of the Raja of Suttarah, of the Peshwa, and of the Bhosla, Lord Dalhousie had struck deadly blows. In the southern Mharatta country, indeed, it seemed that

princes and nobles were alike ripe for rebellion.* It was a significant fact that the agents of the great Suttarah and Poona families had been doing their masters' work in England about the same time, that both had returned to India rank rebels, and that the first year of Lord Canning's administration, found Rungo Bapoojee as active for evil in the south as Agimoolah was in the north—both able and unscrupulous men, and hating the English with a deadlier hatred for the very kindness that had been shown to them. But it was not until the crown had been set upon the annexations of Lord Dalhousie by the seizure of Oude that the Nana Saib and his accomplices saw much prospect of success. That event was the turning-point of their career of intrigue. What had before been difficult was now made easy by this last act of English usurpation. Not only were the ministers of the King of Oude tampering with the troops at the Presidency, and sowing dangerous lies broadcast over the length and breadth of the land, but such was the impression made by the last of our annexations, that men asked each other who was safe, and what use was there in fidelity when so faithful a friend and ally as the King of Oude was stripped of his dominions by the Government whom he had aided

* The state in which I found the Belgaum division of the Southern Mharatta country, the measures adopted in reorganising and reforming the police, and the opposition met with and overcome—to which the safety of the Southern Mharatta country during the Mutiny was in a very great measure due,—are stated under Appendix D.

in its need? It is said that princes and chiefs who had held back then came forward, and that the Nana began to receive answers to his appeals."

The above, as will be seen from a footnote, is surmise, based on the statement of a man, said to have been the Nana's emissary, who was detained at Mysore and examined. What this man states is, "The Nana wrote at intervals, two or three months previous to the annexation of Oude; but at first he got no answers. Nobody had any hope. After the annexation he wrote still more, and then the soukars of Lucknow joined in his views. Maun Sing, who is chief of the poorbeahs or pardesee, joined. Then the sepoys began to form plans among themselves, and the Lucknow soukars supported them. Until Oude was annexed, Nana Saib did not get answers from any one; but when that occurred, many began to take courage and to answer him. The plot among the sepoys first took place—the discontent about the greased cartridges. Then answers began to pour in. Golab Sing, of Jummoo, was the first to send an answer. He said that he was ready with men, money, and arms, and he sent money to Nana Saib through one of the Lucknow soukars."

It is a maxim of law, and of common sense too, that the testimony of a witness, to be acknowledged as reliable, must bear the impress of truth in every particular. But the only available test—the conduct of Golab Sing, of Jummoo—by which this man's

evidence is to be estimated, brands it at once as false and untrustworthy. From first to last Golab Sing stood staunchly by our side. That the soukars of Lucknow joined in the Nana's views before the Mutiny and supported them is too absurd to be even alluded to. That the princes and nobles of the southern Mharatta country were alike ripe for rebellion is equally without foundation. According to General Jacob, the conduct of one of the princes of Kolapoor was not above suspicion; and the chief of Nurgoond committed himself by acts of active hostility. But on the other side might have been catalogued the Rajas of Gudjunderghur, Mhodole, and Savanoor, and a long list of chiefs. Look for instance at the conduct of the Ramdroog chief—half-brother to the traitor of Nurgoond. He remained not only firm in his loyalty to the British Government, but placed in Mr. Manson's hands the letter received from his brother, urging him to co-operation in expelling the English from India.

If anything was an unveiled fact to the kings, princes, and nobles of India, it was, that from the very earliest time the policy of the British in India was an aggressive policy. They saw their dominions gradually extending. Now one potentate was overthrown, now another, and their territories absorbed. The fear inspired by such aggressions led to a general confederacy against the British, in 1779, of the Mharattas, Hyder Alli, and the Nizam of Hydrabad; and

the exorbitant exactions imposed on the Raja Cheyte Sing, of Benares, and others, by the Governor-General of India, led to similar combinations on the Bengal side. Cheyte Sing, moreover, was a prince who was popular and beloved by his subjects. By an act of the most unexampled imprudence, the Governor-General placed himself in his power, and found himself a prisoner. This was followed by a widespread insurrection, to quell which, and to liberate the Governor-General, troops—by far the greater portion sepoy—took part, and fought against “*their own connections and friends, in the heart of their own country!*” But sepoy fidelity stood unimpaired under even those fiery tests; and the combination for the overthrow of British power, though widely ramified, proved of no avail. It was then that the question might have been asked, “Who was safe?” When at a later period the power of the great Hyder Alli was smitten down at the gates of his own capital, then, too, the princes and nobles of India, formidable as they were at the time, might have repeated the inquiry, “Who was safe?” and engaged in “quietly spreading the network of intrigue all over the country; from one native court to another native court; from one extremity to another of the great continent of India.” And it was then for some wily Machiavel to have undertaken the task, from the Himalaya to Cape Comorin, of bringing into a well-banded coalition “the princes and chiefs of different races and

religions." But could the Nana have been ignorant of the fact that his adoptive father, the Peshwa Bajee Roa, had made the most strenuous efforts to bring about such a coalition, that he had had at his command powerful feudatories, men who with their Mharatta hordes had conquered Delhi and Mooltan, had carried their conquests to the classic rivers of Alexander, had swept up to the confines of Afghanistan, and had installed and proclaimed emperors? Could he have been ignorant that previous to the outbreak of the war his adoptive father had made the most persistent efforts to bring about sepoy defection; that at the time of the conflict with the British, he had the families and friends of the sepoys in his power, and acted with cruel severity towards them. And could he have been ignorant of the fact that even *all this had failed to impair sepoy allegiance?* If such was the case during the days of their superior strength and our comparative weakness, is it possible that the Nana, or any number of other individuals, during the days of our strength and India's weakness could have been successful in such an undertaking? The answer, I think, is simple enough and obvious enough. And is it likely that the Nana, by despatching emissaries "all over the country, from one native court to another native court, from one extremity to another of the great continent of India," could have entertained the idea of inducing all the princes and nobles—whom, with one or two exceptions, he had never

seen, and who were perfect strangers to him—to fall in with his intentions, and those intentions involving the peril of life and property? Such a thought might have been possible under more auspicious circumstances, and with more promising political prospects; certainly not when they were the reverse of promising. And by such a man too as the Nana, who was constitutionally a coward, and who, on learning that Havelock and his handful of Europeans were within a couple of days' march of Cawnpoor, disappeared from the scene without so much as striking a single blow! The statement in General Jacob's "Western India," that Chimma Saib had been waited on by emissaries from the Nana, one of whom, who had travelled round by the south, coming last from Mysore, had informed him that he had secured the co-operation of forty different regiments, and that Chimma Saib had bid him assure the Nana that he had gained over all the red-coated men in the southern Mharatta country, may be classed with the mythical. It may, I think, be safely assumed, that instead of being the seducer of the sepoys, Chimma Saib was probably their dupe. And from an intercepted letter quoted by General Jacob, which was posted by a sepoy in the regiment at Belgaum, purporting to be from several sepoys to their brethren of the 75th Bengal Native Infantry, stating, "We are your children, do with us as it may seem best to you; in your salvation is our safety. We are all of one mind; on your

intimation we shall come running;" it will appear that the seduction, as a rule, came from the mutineers of the Bengal Presidency.

General Jacob "was sorely puzzled to account for the mutiny at Kolaporee." Two days "were spent" in the ineffectual task of "examining every officer, European and native, of the regiment and others, without any clue to the causes of discontent or explanation of the extraordinary conduct of the men; not one would or could admit the existence of any grievance, or assign any reason for the outbreak." This is by no means surprising. They had no grievance, and could improvise none to meet the General's inquiry. Instead of attempting, in the regiment itself, to trace the cause of the outbreak, a glance at the progress of the mutiny in the Bengal Presidency would have disclosed this fact to General Jacob, that it proceeded from a derogated estimation, on the part of the sepoy, of the importance of the European, and from a highly inflated view of his own superiority, which the Daood Begs in the regiment took advantage of and worked upon. Take, for instance, the statement of the sepoy who, on the night of the mutiny, escaped to his village. When taken into custody and asked why he had not kept with his European officers, he replied, "Where was I to go? All the world said the English raj had come to an end, and so, being a quiet man, I thought the best place to take refuge in was my own home."

This is clearly illustrative of the extent to which the less intelligent among the men had been practised upon by the bolder and the more daring.

Sir John Kaye states that the Kolapoor mutiny did not come out of the greased cartridges, but out of the Sattarra lapse. There is not one word of evidence or authority for the statement. The only thing advanced is, that it "*may be assumed*, without any violent straining of the imagination," that Rungo Bahoojee, who had been to England as the advocate of the Sattarra claimant, *must* have been in communication with the Nana.* General Jacob states: "The conspiracies in Western India first came to light at Sattarra through the exertions of Mr. Rose and his able assistants, and were there nipped in the bud by the deportation of the two Sattarra princes, and the execution of sundry conspirators." These events occurred during the height of the Mutiny agitation in Bombay and elsewhere, and I was not aware of the grounds upon which the executions had taken place. A few months after, Kooshaba Leemiah, a Bhramin gentleman of great intelligence (an alumnus of the Poona College, who was formerly my clerk in the Poona Police, and afterwards, for some years, tutor to the Raja of Jamkhundee, and at the period of

* This man was captured by my detectives in 1863 in the neighbourhood of Ajmeer; but two medical officers were of the opinion that his appearance did not correspond with the description given of him at the time of the mutiny. Particulars will be found in my letter to Government, and a subjoined note, Appendix B.

the Mutiny, sudder ameen or second class native judge of Sattarra), came on a visit to Bombay and called to see me. Alluding to the executions at Sattarra, I said, "I hope, Kooshaba, you rendered some eminent service to the Government at the time." His answer was: "Sir, I had nothing to do with the executions. The panic at Sattarra was such that the authorities had lost their heads, and every designing scoundrel took advantage of it. You are aware how remarkably cautious natives always are. Is it possible that, without making quite sure of the grounds upon which they were acting, they would attempt any communication suggestive of treason to the sepoys? or that a rabble was likely to arrange an attack on the camp, guarded as it was by the native regiments whose loyalty there was no reason whatever at the time to doubt?" Sir Henry Anderson will remember my incidentally mentioning what the sudder ameen had stated to me, and his having afterwards called on Sir Henry and repeated it to him.

General Jacob has instanced the fact of native officers who sat in judgment upon and condemned their fellows, having been themselves subsequently tried, condemned, and executed. He has instanced also the fact of a native captain having made himself conspicuous by seizing a man who had gone to him with a message of inquiry from some person of note as to "co-operation and promise of support." The man was tried, convicted, and executed on the evidence,

no doubt, of the native captain, *who was himself afterwards proved to have been one of the leaders of the mutiny*, and, after a long and careful trial, was condemned and executed. The fact is, every regiment was tainted and watchful of the progress of events in the north; and being aware of the doubts entertained as to their own fidelity, freely accused others in order to avert suspicion from themselves.

General Jacob states that the commander of the Jamkhundee troops was an active agent in the conspiracy, and, on proof of carrying on a seditious correspondence with our soldiery, was tried and executed. The Raja of Jamkhundee was himself so charged, and placed in confinement at Belgaum, under a European guard, and was brought to trial, and would, in all human probability, have terminated his career at the gallows or at the cannon's mouth, but for his having employed Mr. Barton, a barrister of the Supreme Court of Bombay, who showed up the puerility and worthlessness of the evidence brought against him.

The General mentions that Chimma Saib, the younger of the Rajas of Kolapoor, whom he had sent for and had had an interview with, when returning home, found the streets crowded with women cracking their fingers' joints over their heads, and uttering cries of joy and congratulation at his having gone back to them. And this manifestation, he concludes, denoted the Raja's popularity and the fact of

"his being the head of the rebellious movement." Womankind will always take a deep interest in a handsome young man, especially if he happens to be a prince. We all remember the story of the laird's son, who said he had never seen a man hanged, and would like to witness such a sight; and of the good woman, the wife of a feudatory, who happened to hear the wish expressed, running away to her spouse and exclaiming, "John, dear, do go and be hanged; it would so please the young laird." At a time when executions were by no means uncommon, the women of Kolapoor concluded that when the young Raja had been sent for by the great British functionary, with whom rested the dispensation of life and death, he had gone to meet his doom, and were, no doubt, rejoiced to find that he had been allowed to return safe and alive. But to suppose that any rebel, whatever his position, would make confidants of all the women in the place, is to suppose what is perfectly absurd.

The author of "The Sepoy War" has repeatedly alluded to annexations and lapses and resumptions in terms of condemnation, and has reiterated the assertion, that by giving effect to them, we caused widespread discontent, and, to a perilous extent, weakened our hold upon India. The instances I have enumerated point to an opposite conclusion, and are suggestive of the belief that if the measures carried out by Lord Dalhousie in vindication of the rights of humanity had not been carried out, the

omission would have been imputed by the people of India to pusillanimity ; and when the perils of the sepoy outbreak had come upon us, we should have encountered from the princes and nobles of the land an opposition all the more formidable:

No one will deny that we were very largely assisted by the Sikhs during the outbreak. If, after the second war, we had followed the advice of those politicians who apprehended danger and disaster in the acquisition and extension of territory, and allowed the Sikhs to retain their government, with His Highness the Maharaja Duleep Sing re-established in his ancestral throne, what would have been the consequence during the period of the Mutiny? I cannot do better than answer the question in His Highness's own words. He did me the honour of calling upon me on his return from the Punjab in 1864, and in the course of conversation expressed himself "happy at finding the country well governed and the people prosperous and contented ;" but added that "he was most thankful he was not in the Punjab during the time of the Mutiny ; for if he had been, he felt quite sure his people would have compelled him to take part against the British Government." Who can be a more competent judge of this than His Highness?

The efforts of Government in the promotion of education, the countenance accorded by Lady Canning to female seminaries, and the zeal displayed by

missionary labour, have also been severely censured by the author of "The Sepoy War." These measures, it is stated, tended to lead the soldiery and the civil population to the belief that proselytism was the object of the British Government; that it excited their fears and contributed largely to the causes which brought about the "sepoy outbreak and rebellion." A quotation, however, in vol. iii. page 228 of "The Sepoy War," from a volume published by Mr. Charles Raikes, gives the above imputation a full and complete contradiction. Mr. Raikes says that while "every Englishman was handling his sword or revolver, the road covered with carriages, people hastening right and left to the rendezvous; while city folk were running as if for their lives, and screaming that the mutineers from Aligurh were crossing the bridge, and budmashes twisting their moustaches and putting on their worst looks; while outside the college all was alarm, hurry, and confusion, within calmly sat the good missionary, with hundreds of young natives at his feet, hanging on the lips which taught them the simple lessons of the Bible. And so it was (it is stated) throughout the revolt,—the students at the Government, and still more the missionary schools, kept steadily to their classes; and when others doubted or fled, they trusted implicitly to their teachers, and openly espoused the Christian cause."*

* I think it necessary to quote also the following, to show how wild was the panic at the time, and that too at Agra, the seat of the

The constancy of *hundreds* of native students who, under such peculiarly trying circumstances, continued to attend the missionary and other schools, affords strong and unquestionable evidence, that neither the native soldiery, nor the population at large, were under any apprehension as to proselytising attempts on the part of the Government. If any such fear had existed, these schools would at once have disappeared at the very outburst of the Mutiny. The outcry on the subject, like the outcry against greased cartridges, was first raised by the more designing among the native military, and was taken up afterwards by others. Then followed the factitious and circumstantial story, that annexations and lapses and resurrections had caused widespread disaffection, and that the Nana, by means of emissaries, had been enabled to band together, with the object of effecting the eviction of the English from India, the princes and nobles of different races and religions, and that he and others with him, brought about the sepoy outbreak.

Contemporary historians may not do Lord Dalhousie justice, nor those who preceded him in the

Lieutenant-Governor of the province! Mr. Paterson Saunders, writing to his brother, said: "The panic here exceeds anything I have ever witnessed. Women, children, carts, gharries, buggies, flying from all parts into the fort, with loads of furniture, beds, bedding, baskets of fowls, &c. The Europeans have all escaped from Alighurh. Lady Outram came in here, partly on horseback, partly on foot. One or two civilians here have behaved most shamefully. One of them went into his office, pale as his own liver, and told all the crannies to save their lives as they best may."

work of emancipating the large masses of the people from oppression, outrage, rapine, and murder. They may not think that acts, the outrageous licentiousness of which placed the stigma of infamy upon human nature, should have been visited with punishment upon the perpetrators; that, on the contrary, those who effected the extinction of profligate dynasties, of libertine courts, of worse than brutal territorial aristocracies, and of predatory armies, should have considered, not the condition of the rural populations, not the good which a sacred sense of duty dictated should be conferred upon them by British rule, but the resentment which such a policy was likely to arouse in the breasts of the influential classes of the community!!! Had such been the views which governed the conduct of those by whom those great measures had been carried out, the connection of England with India would have proved a curse rather than a blessing. Happily, the statesmen and philanthropists by whom the destinies of India were then governed were actuated by no interested or sordid motives. Influenced by a lofty spirit of humanitarianism, they did what duty dictated. Their conduct was a practical exemplification of the sublime maxim, *fiat justitia ruat cælum*. They did justice though the heavens should have fallen.

CHAPTER II.

OUR REAL DANGER IN INDIA.

THE East India Company,—which in the course of time had subjugated one of the greatest empires in the world, originally a small trading corporation, its first settlement in India, comprising a few square miles for which rent was paid to native princes; its soldiers, armed with swords, shields, and bows and arrows, and scarcely numerous enough to man four or five badly constructed fortifications erected for the protection of their warehouses,—encountered, from a French trading corporation, which was established at no great distance from them, a dangerous rivalry, which bid fair to extinguish their commercial hopes, and threatened their expulsion from India; but following the example of the French, the British factors enlisted natives of the country as soldiers, and trained them in the art and discipline of European warfare. They were thus enabled, not only to keep their own footing, but gradually, in the course of time, as opportunities offered, to assert their wonted national superiority in arms. And their indomitable courage and repeated success in the field, inspired the people of India with awe, and won for them the devotion and allegiance of their sepoy followers.

It has been often stated that, under the pretext and with the ostensible motive of furthering the interests of a trading corporation, the British pursued an aggressive policy in India; that they excited dissensions among native princes, and urged them on to war in order to their own advantage. The early history of the British connection with India, however, very clearly points to the fact that it was a struggle—at times a hard struggle—for very existence. It will be seen that while at Madras they were busied in taking stock, shipping cargoes, and making money advances in promotion of the objects of commerce, the French corporation at Pondicherry were constituting themselves into a military power. And taking advantage of the war in Europe of the Austrian Succession, the French governor of Mauritius led an expedition to the continent of India, and landing his troops in defiance of the opposition offered by the British fleet, appeared before Madras, and compelled the town and fort to capitulate. The French colours were hoisted on Fort St. George, and the principal English factors were marched off under a guard to Pondicherry, where, under the gaze of “fifty thousand spectators,” they were paraded through the town in a triumphal procession.

Whilst the French were thus rapidly rising to ascendancy in India, the fortunes of the English East India Company were at their very lowest. At this conjuncture, Mahomed Ali, the legitimate Nabob of

the Carnatic, was besieged at Trichinopoly by a pretender who laid claim to the throne. The French supported the pretender's claim, the English espoused the cause of Mahomed Ali. Owing to the smallness of the force at Madras, it was not possible to relieve Trichinopoly. A diversion was therefore thought of, and under the command of the renowned Clive, a force consisting of 200 Europeans and 300 sepoys was despatched for the capture of Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic. The enterprise was perfectly successful; but Clive was himself besieged, immediately after, by a force about ten thousand strong, a hundred and fifty of whom were French European soldiers. Clive's forces were less than one-twentieth the number.

Brilliant and valorous was the defence of the besieged. Every white man displayed a heroism that commanded the admiration of every beholder. The siege had lasted fifty days. The defences were maintained with vigour and ability. The walls, however, were in a ruinous state; the trenches were dry, the ramparts too narrow to admit the guns, the battlements too low to protect the soldiers, and the breaches becoming wider every day. The garrison was greatly lessened by casualties; Clive's two hundred Europeans were reduced to one hundred and twenty, and the three hundred native soldiers to two hundred. Preparations, on the other hand, on a formidable scale, were being made by the enemy to capture the place

on the occasion of the Mohorum, a Mahomedan festival, during which there is great excitement and greater religious frenzy and fanaticism. To add to Clive's trials and difficulties, the garrison fell short of provisions. Then occurred that touching scene, that manifestation of devotion to the white on the part of the black soldier. The sepoys came to Clive in a body, and desired that all the grain should be given to the Europeans, and that they themselves would be satisfied with the gruel strained from the rice. It may well be said that history contains no more touching instance of military devotion, which an unmistakable consciousness of the white man's superiority could only have prompted,—a superiority which evidenced to the sepoy that on the white man's safety depended his own salvation.

The last desperate effort of the enemy was then made to carry the place by storm, but it met with a resistance from the besieged, as crowning as the one which has embalmed the memory of "the handful" of Thermopylæ, and from which both frenzy and fanaticism recoiled. It was expected that the attack would be renewed on the following day; but when the morning dawned, no enemy was found within sight. Afterwards, on the arrival of reinforcements from Madras, Clive assumed the offensive.

The affair of the Calcutta Black Hole may be regarded as the most cruel and terrible incident chronicled in British India. One hundred and

twenty-three Englishmen, out of one hundred and fifty, perished miserably, because an oriental Nero who had retired to rest, was not to be awakened. But it is gratifying, even at this distance of time, to contemplate the signal retribution that overtook the incarnate demon. On receipt of the intelligence at Madras, the bitterest feelings of resentment were aroused, and an expedition was immediately despatched to avenge the atrocity. The land forces, consisting of nine hundred British infantry and fifteen hundred sepoy soldiers, were under the command of Clive; the naval squadron was commanded by Admiral Watson. Sooraj-oo Dowla, on the other hand, lost no time in marshalling his hosts to meet the British advance. After some successes obtained by Clive in the Hoogly and on land, Sooraj-oo Dowla wished to treat for peace, and made offers of restitution and indemnity. But during the course of the negotiations, it became evident that his motives were not sincere. It was at the same time known that he was intriguing with the French at Chandernagore, and had invited their general to march from the Deccan to the Hoogly to drive the English from Bengal. It then became necessary to commence operations against the French, which was done by land and water. The French were vanquished. Their fort, their garrison, in fact all belonging to them, fell into the hands of the English, and some five hundred European troops were among the prisoners.

Shortly after, a conspiracy was set on foot in the capital to depose Sooraj-oo Dowla, and place Meer Jaffer on the throne. Then occurred that unfortunate event which has left a stain on Clive's moral character, —the episode of the white and red paper treaties, and the counterfeiting of Admiral Watson's signature. After this Clive moved forward to encounter Sooraj-oo Dowla, and reached a spot within a few miles of his encampment. Here he expected that Meer Jaffer, according to a previous understanding between them, would separate himself from Sooraj-oo Dowla, and join him with his division; but as the crisis approached, the fears of Meer Jaffer overcame his ambition. He returned evasive answers to Clive's urgent requests to march up and unite with him. It was a most anxious moment, when even the stout-hearted Clive, a stranger to every feeling of fear, might well have been perturbed at the prospect of the responsibility he was on the eve of incurring. It was by no means a light matter to find himself opposed by an army twenty times as numerous as his own, and abandoned by his powerful confederate who, for anything he was aware of to the contrary, might take part against him. Placed in circumstances so desperately critical, he hesitated to act without due deliberation, and called a council of war. The decision of that council was opposed to the adoption of any hostile measures. Clive acquiesced; but was by no means satisfied. He soon after separated from his councillors and resolved

to engage the enemy at all hazards. It is the brave only who may hope to conquer; and Clive did conquer. But every white man proved himself a hero; and the black soldier, fighting by his side, was perfectly conscious of the guardianship under which he fought. Without his white soldiers, with even ten times the number of only native soldiers, Clive would not have challenged the issue against such tremendous odds. Every native of India was as conscious of this as was Clive himself. Clive's European infantry numbered a thousand; his native infantry two thousand. The hosts opposed to them were no less than sixty thousand. But Clive gained a most complete victory; and Plassey is a name which the battle has rendered memorable.

The King of Delhi at this time was a prisoner in the hands of a subject. His eldest son, Shah Allum, at the instigation of the King of Oude and other powerful princes, raised his standard, and was soon joined by an army of forty thousand, consisting of Rohillas, Jhats, Afghans, and Mharattas, some of the most hardy of the races in India; and with the object of overthrowing Meer Jaffer, commenced hostilities by laying siege to Patna. Clive, with only four hundred and fifty Europeans and two thousand five hundred sepoy, was marching up to give battle; but such was the terror which Clive and his white soldiers had established, that the sight of the advanced guard sufficed to scatter the hosts of Shah Allum.

These splendid services rendered to Meer Jaffer, failed to secure his fidelity or excite his gratitude. He looked upon his powerful English allies with fear rather than with confidence; for he argued that the power which had set him up might pull him down again. He accordingly intrigued with the Dutch at Chinsurah, and at their request the Dutch Government at Batavia, anxious to extend the influence of their country in India, equipped a powerful armament which arrived unexpectedly in the Hoogly. The troops were landed, and attempted to force a passage; but were encountered by the English by land and by water, and vanquished on both elements.

It is not necessary for my purpose to state any further instances of battles or of victories which uniformly attended British warfare in India. From Arcot and Plassey to the latest engagements, the results were always the same. Everywhere greatly outnumbered, but everywhere triumphant. There have been occasions in which native soldiers alone have been employed to put down a petty insurrection or quell a trifling outbreak, but they were always led on by their European officers. In all important engagements the white soldiers, however small in number, were invariably a most powerful and indispensable element, which no numerical superiority of the enemy could withstand.

Sir John Kaye states that our first sepoy levies were few in number when the English and French

were striving for predominancy in the south, and at the outset were commonly held in reserve to support our European fighting-men; but in course of time they proved themselves worthy of being entrusted with higher duties, and that they then went boldly to the front under native commandants who had been disciplined by the English captains.

There can be no question as to the importance of the body of men held in reserve to act as supports to forces led into action; nor can there be the least doubt that if Indian generals had at any time adopted the plan of holding "native troops in reserve to support our European fighting-men," that the former must have had but little or nothing left them to do; for had the Europeans been worsted, not even the bravery, the example, and the leading of the European officers would have sufficed to induce the men to come into action. I may take upon myself to state that sepoy courage had never been subjected to such a test. The plan, so far as I am aware, was always to intermix Europeans and natives in detachments, so that the native soldier might have ocular demonstration of the bearing and bravery of the European, and do as he did. During the first Punjab war, it will be remembered that when one European and two native regiments were being led to the charge, the European regiment was unexpectedly brought to a momentary stand on account of a precipitous break in the ground, and were obliged to make a détour;

but observing them halt, the native regiments, though meeting with no impediment themselves, halted too, exclaiming, "Ghore log hut geya!"—"The Europeans are holding back!"—and advanced only when the Europeans went on again.

I have not met with any official or historical record of the circumstance; but the following general order, issued by the Commander-in-chief, on the 28th January, 1846, appears to me to refer to it:—

"Justice to the 62nd Regiment, and to the native regiments brigaded with that corps, demands the exposition of the sentiments of the Commander-in-chief in connection with an erroneous impression with respect to the conduct of the brigade which had been produced by the publication, purely through an oversight, of a dispatch written exclusively for his Excellency's information."

We have also the opinion of that maturely experienced and brave old warrior Sir C. J. Napier, stated in a letter to the Governor-General of India after the battle of Meeanee, that "the want of European officers in the native regiments at one period endangered the success of the battle. Three times I saw them retreat, evidently because the officers had fallen, and when another appeared and rallied them, they at once followed him boldly."

I cannot think any measure more dangerous, when the enemy was likely to offer any serious resistance, than taking sepoy into action unaccompanied by

European soldiers. My own arrangement in Bombay during the Mutiny—in which the possibility of an encounter with the native military was at all times kept in view, was to lead on the native mounted police, *followed* by the European body. I had in this a double object. The greater part of the native mounted police being Purdesees, men from the north-west, it was quite possible that they might have been tainted with the mutinous spirit of their brethren in Bengal, and in case it became necessary to lead the police force against the sepoy, among whom there was a large number of their castemen, and the Europeans were brought to the front, the native police, left to follow, might have proved false; whereas, in leading off with them, and the Europeans following in their rear, there was the very best chance of guarding against their treachery, if such was intended.

Sir John Kaye states “how the sepoy fought in the defence of Arcot; how they crossed bayonets, foot to foot, with the best French troops at Cuddalore, historians have delighted to tell.” On all such occasions there were the Europeans who set them the example. “Large bodies of troops,” Sir John Kaye says, “were sometimes despatched on hazardous enterprises under the independent command of a native leader; and it was not thought an offence to the European soldier, to send him to fight under a black commandant. That black commandant,” he adds,

“was then a great man, in spite of his colour. He rode on horseback at the head of his men, and a mounted staff officer, a native adjutant, carried his commands to the soobedars of the respective companies; and that a brave man or a skilful leader was honoured for his bravery or his skill as much under the folds of his turban as under a round hat.” This is the only instance I have seen mentioned of European soldiers being sent to fight under black commandants; nor am I aware that black commandants ever rode on horseback at the head of their men with an adjutant to carry his commands to the soobedars of the respective companies during battle; and I very much question if any one else ever heard of commanding authority having been exercised by black commandants. From the earliest period of the formation of the native army, no native regiment was ever left without European officers in command, and this is very clearly evidenced by Williams’s “Bengal Army.” The youngest ensign was always far superior to the highest native officer in army rank, and the idea of European soldiers being commanded by native officers is utterly at variance with the general fitness of things. Indeed, it is ludicrously absurd when considered in relation with the temperament and characteristic of the two races.

There have been frequent opportunities of witnessing the respect and deference paid to European sergeants by native officers of the highest rank.

Many years ago, I was at the residence of the officer commanding the garrison of Cuddalore. It was Christmas Day. At nine o'clock, the hour for the delivery of the daily reports, the sergeant-major and the native officer of the day walked in, followed by all the native commissioned officers of the regiment, to pay their commanding officer their Christmas congratulations. At the major's request the native officers became seated; the sergeant-major, being only a warrant officer, remained standing. The major had occasion to leave the room for a few minutes, when, taking advantage of his absence, the native officers, with the soobedar major at their head, apologised to the sergeant-major for being seated while he stood; "but what could we do," they said, "the major ordered us to be seated."

The official existence, however, of native commandants and their adjutants does not appear to have been a lengthened one. The first mention of them in Williams's "Bengal Army" is in 1773, when a commandant and an adjutant were tried by court-martial for cowardice in action with the "Suneeashee," or ascetic warriors, and blown away from guns; and the next is, that the appointments were done away with in 1781.

Sir John Kaye states: "The British sepoy had faced death without a fear, and encountered every kind of suffering and privation without a murmur." I again repeat that he did so, following the example.

of the European soldier. I have myself witnessed similar devotion in the discharge of duty. The Bombay powder works were on fire; the flames had reached the roof of a large room filled with barrels of gunpowder and ingredients for the manufacture of powder. All I had to do was to call upon the native policemen present to follow me, and I was instantly followed by two European constables and some thirty policemen. The powder and other materials were removed from the room while the roof was burning over our heads.

Sir John Kaye states further, that the sepoy had planted the colours of his regiment "on a spot which European valour and perseverance had failed to reach." This is Sir John's highest flight! Instead of history, instead of an impartial narration of facts, we have here the emanation from a fancy that has been rendered fervid by sepoy enthusiasm. In no other manner is the statement that the sepoy planted the colours of his regiment on a spot which European valour and perseverance had failed to reach, to be accounted for! It has no doubt surprised many an Anglo-Indian, as it has surprised me.

Sir John Kaye had in view, probably, the incident which occurred at Bhurtpoor in 1805 when penning his eulogy on sepoy valour. What Grant Duff states on the subject is this:—Two European regiments, one of them the hitherto brave 76th, refused to follow their officers, and thus gave the 12th Regiment of

Bengal Sepoys an opportunity of immortalising themselves. *Following the gallant remains of the flank companies of the 22nd Regiment of Foot*, the sepoy's advanced with the greatest alacrity, planted their colours on the top of a bastion, and, it was *supposed* that an equal degree of ardour on the part of the 75th and 76th would have made them masters of the place. Next day the men of the regiments, when addressed by General Lake, were overpowered with shame and remorse; they volunteered to a man, and a fourth and last attempt was made, when the *men, walking over the dead bodies of their companions* which crowded the ditch and glacis, rushed with a desperate resolution which would have overcome any practicable obstacle. *On this as on the former occasions*, none of the troops relaxed in their efforts; and for two hours, until ordered to desist, they persevered at the breach or in climbing up a high bastion which adjoined it; but as fast as the leaders got up, they were knocked down with logs of wood or speared by rows of pikemen who crowded the tops of the parapets. The besieged took every precaution, and used every effort of prudence and resolution. The damage done to the mud wall was generally repaired during the night. Their guns were drawn within the embrasures, to prevent their being dismounted, and during the assault, particularly in the last, pots filled with combustibles, burning cotton bales steeped in oil, with incessant discharge of grape from the cannons and

a destructive fire of small arms were poured upon the British troops, whose casualties were very great; and in the four assaults, 3,203 men were killed and wounded, of whom were 103 European officers. The most affecting circumstance attending these failures, was the necessity of leaving many of the wounded behind, who were almost invariably put to death by a sally from the garrison."

The discipline of a soldier consists of course in the observing of the strictest obedience to superior authority. When under orders he has no right to exercise his own judgment as to the practicability or the impracticability of what he is called upon to undertake. His duty is to set aside all thoughts of self, all promptings of reason, and to do just as he is bidden. If such are the requisite qualifications of a disciplined soldier, how heavy is the responsibility of the commander-in-chief, of ordering that only to be undertaken of which there is a reasonable probability of success! When the ardour that impels a first assault is damped by a repulse, it generally needs some skill and good sense to prepare the way for a second attack. But the second, too, proved signally unsuccessful. All that was possible had been done. The most persevering efforts of European valour had proved abortive. The opposition to be overcome was insurmountable, and smarting at the same time under the painful feelings of having had to abandon their wounded comrades to be cruelly butchered, led the

men of the 75th and 76th, no doubt, in the first instance, to represent the difficulties ; but finding the Commander-in-chief unyielding, they refused to follow their officers. A third attempt was then made without them ; but the result was the same. And the fourth attempt, led on by them, in which the Europeans fought on with a "desperate resolution, walking over the dead bodies of their comrades," proved equally unavailing. And the sacrifice in killed and wounded of 3,203 men, of whom 103 were European officers, in the four assaults, shows that Lord Lake, the Commander-in-chief, was more bull-headed than discerning and tactical. If these men had persevered in their refusal to follow their officers, they would have been tried, and the court-martial, in all probability, would have given them but a short shrift to the cannon's mouth ; but it would have been, notwithstanding, a noble display of manliness in vindication of the moral rights of military life. With facts such as the above before him, especially that of the sepoys having been led by the gallant remains of the flank companies of the 22nd Regiment of Foot, Sir John Kaye's disparagement of European "valour and perseverance" is neither just nor fair.

Indian historians and poets have deplored, in mournful strains, the indomitable valour of the British in India. In fact they declare that the British conjoined "undaunted bravery" with "courage the most resolute," and "the most cautious prudence." While

prosecuting my studies of the Indian languages, I found it was necessary to read considerably of the history of the country, and though I found much in it in praise of native valour, previous to the advent of the English, the most complete silence was maintained on this point in the subsequent periods to it. The successful repulsion of two thousand five hundred Mharatta horse, and eighteen hundred of the Peshwa's infantry, by a handful of European artillery, headed by Lieutenant Patteson, at Koregoan, immediately after the battle of Poona, was as vivid in the recollection of the inhabitants of Poona in 1836 as if the occurrence had taken place only a few days previously. Nor had the charge at the village of Ashte upon Sir Lionel Smith and his handful of English dragoons, by four thousand horsemen of the "Hoozoor Paga," headed by Bapoo Saib Gokla, the General-in-chief of the Peshwa's army, been forgotten. The remarkable circumstance about this charge is that though Bapoo Saib Gokla had commenced it with an overwhelming number of the household cavalry, only about thirty or forty remained with him and came into conflict with the dragoons. These and the general were of course cut up; the rest had wheeled round and galloped back. Such was the dread entertained of European troops by native soldiers, and those the choicest of the Peshwa's forces. But what is still more remarkable in connection with this display of

cowardice is, that the people did not view it as a disgrace to their manhood, but looked upon it as a matter of course, considering it impossible for natives of the country to cope with European warriors!!*

The fact of there being no mention in native history of sepoy valour since the advent of the European in India, is in itself a most significant fact. The people, too, whenever the sepoys were spoken of, spoke of them as the shadow of the Europeans, following in their footsteps when they went forward, and falling back with them when they receded; and I have no hesitation in stating that the belief among natives throughout India is universal, that without the European, the native soldier is worthless. The sepoy may not have estimated himself so low; but he unquestionably indulged in no inflated views of self-importance, and there would have been no mutiny in 1857 if, in an unfortunate moment, in a paroxysm of explosive generosity, the belief had not been instilled into his mind that he was as brave and as good a soldier as the European.

Sir John Kaye mentions an instance of combination on the part of British officers, and resistance to the orders of Government for curtailing their double batta, which caused a serious reduction in their pay. In that case, it is said the European soldiers had got under arms, and were preparing to follow their officers; but "the unexpected appearance of a firm

line of sepoys, with their bayonets fixed and arms loaded, threw them into some confusion, of which Captain Smith, the officer who was acting on behalf of the Government, took advantage, and warned them that if they did not retire peaceably into their barracks he would fire upon them." The soldiers, it will be seen, were following the example of their officers, and the officers themselves no doubt joined Captain Smith in dissuading and inducing the soldiers to remain. This was a happy termination of a somewhat unfortunate occurrence. If the soldiers had resisted and charged, it is possible that the sepoys, under the orders of Captain Smith, might have discharged their loaded firearms into them; but at the very next moment they would all have wheeled round and fled. Of this there can be no doubt. I have had myself personal proof of their cowardice. In 1843 a drought was followed by a heavy advance in the price of grain, and more than three hundred sepoys, belonging to regiments stationed at Poona, entered the grain market in the city, armed with bludgeons and provided with bags and baskets, to convey away plundered grain. Their appearance overawed the grain merchants, and the work of plunder was being proceeded with actively, when a report was brought to me of what was going on. I immediately hurried into the saddle, reached the market, and charged into the nearest crowd of them. Some half a dozen or more were knocked down; but this was followed by a flight

so wild and reckless, that more were floored by running against each other than I and my horse had succeeded in knocking over. Such was the result of the encounter of a single individual with a body of more than three hundred duly trained regimental sepoys. And such, too, was my estimation of sepoy gallantry, that on the receipt of intelligence in Bombay of the mutiny of the 27th Regiment at Kolapoor, I called on Colonel, now Sir P. M. Melvill, who was at the time military secretary to Government, and urged the disarming of the native regiments in Bombay, some two thousand strong, deeming the sixty European mounted policemen then under my command quite adequate to undertake the duty. Of this I had not the least doubt; but the step was considered hazardous, and it was moreover thought that the time had not arrived for so extreme a measure.

That which was said to be the first sepoy mutiny in Bengal, in 1834, is rightly described by Sir John Kaye as "one of those childish ebullitions" which had for its object certain pecuniary advantages, and not the overthrow of British rule; but the affair grew to such proportions, and assumed such a serious character, as to call for the extreme measure of blowing away from guns of twenty-four of the mutineers. The first mutiny in India, the purpose of which was the overthrow of British rule, was that which took place at Vellore; but in that case it was brought

on from want of consideration for the caste prejudices of the Mahomedan as well as the Hindoo. There is nothing connected with his person more sacred to the Mahomedan than his beard, which he regards as the emblem of manhood and veracity ; and the Hindoos are superstitiously attached to the different marks placed daily on their forehead, and which are distinctive of their religious and social gradations. When, therefore, the beard was ordered to be cut and shaved to a regulation form, and the mark on the forehead to be discontinued when in uniform, it is by no means surprising that both Mahomedan and Hindoo, jumped to the conclusion that these were the introductory measures for bringing about an amalgamation of all castes. And when those measures were followed by an order for the use of the round hat, and it became known that it was made of cowhide and pigskin, a contact with which, on religious grounds, both consider unclean and extremely desecrating, the point was at once reached which converted the loyalty and devotion for which the Madras sepoy was distinguished, into rancorous disaffection. This was no doubt taken advantage of by those who had experienced the effects of British power, and those who dreaded the advances which that power was steadily making ; and combinations were doubtless formed for bringing about its downfall. In those days of India's strength and of British weakness the conspiracy among the princes and nobles of

India, there can be no question, was widespread and well organised; but that peculiar Indian fatuity of watching the result of each outbreak as it took place, was the means of preventing a simultaneous uprising. In Vellore, the presence of the sons of Tippos Sultan encouraged the mutineers to take the initiative; but happily there was a Gillespie in the neighbourhood, and he had at hand a body of European dragoons, a regiment of native cavalry, and galloper guns. He was soon in the saddle. The native cavalry were, no doubt, very deeply implicated in the conspiracy for the overthrow of the English Government, but Gillespie gave them no time for deliberation, much less for consultation. The soldier's instinct, whether European or native, in obeying the word of command, is proverbial. The bugle sounded to saddle—to mount—to march—to trot—to canter. On they went. They reached Vellore. Two galloper guns had already shattered the gates. On they went again, and both European dragoon and native cavalryman at once received and obeyed the word of command to "charge." The carnage was great, and the work of retribution became complete.

The Vellore mutiny, and the speedy retribution which overtook it, left their traces in the feelings of the European and the Asiatic. The unexpected character of the outbreak, and its sanguinary accompaniments, had excited the hatred of the alien against the native, and the native mind was deeply imbued

with fear and suspicion of the white man's determination to do away with caste; for the absurd red-tapeism in respect to the cut of the beard and the interdiction in the use of the caste marks, had been such as to cause the deepest alarm. The wonder is that there was not a more terrible outbreak on the part of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, the capital of a reigning Mahomedan prince, where the sepoy were worried by commanding officers on the same account. But wise and judicious measures on the part of the Government and the authorities averted the evil there, as well as at Nundydroog and other places. This was followed by a quiet of some eighteen years.

The war with the Burmese afterwards rendered it necessary to transport to the seat of war some Bengal regiments then at Barrackpoor, consisting of men of high caste and high social privileges. To be despatched by sea was contrary to their religion, and was not provided for in the terms of their engagement. They must go by land, but cattle for the conveyance of kit and necessaries were not to be had. After a great but unavailing effort, the authorities gave up the idea of providing them, and the fiat, thoughtless and unwise, went forth that the sepoy were to supply themselves. Before such an order was issued, the probabilities and consequences should have been clearly weighed and estimated; but the order having been issued, it should have been

upheld at all risk. The sepoy's resisted the order: this might have been expected; but the resistance was unfortunately met by the offer of an advance of the money for the purchase of the cattle. One extorted concession is sure to beget other and more unreasonable demands. And hence it was that the want of firmness on the part of the Barrackpore authorities ultimately led to the necessity of bringing the regiment under the fire of grape-shot. Those of the sepoy's who could do so, threw down their arms and accoutrements, and took to flight. There was *no* attempt at resistance. *Battle was not thought of, and their muskets were all unloaded.* I have thought it necessary to enter into so much detail in this matter, to show that though Sir John Kaye speaks of it as the Barrackpore mutiny, the object of it was by no means the overthrow of British rule, as was the case in 1857; and if better judgment had been exercised, the extreme and severe measure might have been avoided.

With reference to the insubordination displayed at Arracan by the Bengal regiments, in 1825, Sir John Kaye states:—"The high caste men were writhing under an order which condemned the whole body of the soldiery to work as labourers in the construction of their barracks. The English soldier fell to with a will; the Madras sepoy cheerfully followed the example. But the Bengal soldiers asked, if Brahmins and Rajpoots were to be treated like coolies; and for

a while there was an apprehension that it might become necessary to make another terrible example, after the Barrackpoor pattern. But this, it is said, was fortunately averted by General Morrison calling a parade, and addressing the miscreants; that the speech, sensible and to the point, was translated by Captain Phillips; and so admirable was his free rendering of it, and so perfect the manner in which he clothed it with familiar language, that every word carried a meaning, every sentence struck some chord of sympathy in the sepoy's breast; and when he had done, the high caste Hindoostanees looked at each other, understood what they read in their comrades' faces, and forthwith stripped to their work." This was a remarkable achievement. There is nothing which the Hindoo law more strictly enjoins than that every man should, in the most exclusive manner, keep to his own profession, and exercise no other; and the hereditary profession of the Rajpoot is soldiering. To do otherwise, their holy writ declares, is to commit "mahapatak"—sin of the highest degree, the penalty of which is to become an out-caste, and this involves the forfeiture of all privileges pertaining to caste membership and of the civil rights of Hindooism. The only way, therefore, in which the success that attended General Morrison's address and Captain Phillips' rendering of it is to be explained, is, that the impression on the minds of the sepoy regiments at Arracan was, that British might was too great to

be withstood, and that it was expedient to obey its mandates even when opposed to the teaching of their own sacred writings. And happy would it have been for India, as regards the calamities of 1857, had this most salutary dread not been weakened.

Up to this time, and for some years later, there was nothing to ruffle the serenity of the sepoy mind. His disposition and temperament were peculiar, but impressible; and his belief in European superiority and power knew no limit. The potency of the white man, in fact, was an article of professional faith with him.

When at Madras and Calcutta our factors first began enlisting native sepoys, they were only able to secure the services of the lowest classes, of pariahs who had no caste, who partook of animal food as freely as the European, and owing to which, when asked what caste they belonged to, they prided themselves by saying that they belonged to master's caste. The victory of Arcot and other early conquests were achieved by us with the assistance of pariah soldiers. My father, who belonged to the Madras Foot Artillery, was present at the siege and capture of Seringapatam, and was wounded there. He often spoke of the pariah sepoys in terms of high commendation, but always qualifying his praise by saying that they only did well in company with Europeans. The higher classes of natives, seeing that these men were well treated—better, in fact, than they themselves would treat them;

that they were liberally and punctually paid, and that those who had become disabled in war were provided for, as were also the families of the men who had fallen in battle—began in the course of time to enlist too, and gradually to keep out the pariah classes.

In the Bengal provinces, which is especially under reference, the Bhramin, the Rajpoot, and the Mahomedan, are far superior to any of the classes in the Madras and Bombay provinces as regards physical proportions and mental intelligence. The Bengal officers, taken by their fine appearance, aided the high caste men in bringing about the expulsion from the ranks of the pariah element, so that in the course of time the Bengal army consisted only of high caste men who, of course, became the pride of their European officers. The native gained largely in the estimation of the European; but the European failed to bear in mind that the high caste Bhramin, the Rajpoot, and the Mahomedan, held him in detestation because of what was his food and drink.

In England and other European countries a lady or gentleman may indulge in the pastime of riding a donkey; but in India felons only are sentenced to be mounted on donkeys, as being the most degrading and ignominious of punishments. The sight of a lady or gentleman on a donkey in India would excite the deepest feelings of contempt in the natives. And with feelings equally contemptuous the Bhramin, the

Rajpoot, and the Mahomedan, view the beef-and-pork-eating and brandy-drinking European, and contemplate their connection with him with disgust. Outwardly they will show all possible respect; but in thought and feeling they are by no means sparing of their hatred and condemnation. To a Bhramin or Rajpoot, death would be far preferable to the desecrating touch of beef; and the touch of pork to a Mahomedan, is equally sacrilegious.

As long, however, as promotion went by merit, as long as the advancement of the rank and file to the higher grades depended on the officers in command of companies, and the promotion to the commissioned ranks on the commandant of the regiment, so long the evil of high castes was kept in check; but with the substitution for it of promotion by seniority, the tie that bound the sepoy to his European officers was snapped. They were his "Ma bap"—terms expressive of their being everything to him; but this event did away with the high official importance in which they were held. It reduced them in his estimation to the condition of nonentities. The active, the intelligent, the aspiring had no incentive left to work out their advancement; they were placed on an equality with the worthless and the incompetent. Thus a deadly blow was struck at military authority; and the army, rendered independent of the European officers, was left at liberty to form combinations of which, as the unfortunate circumstances

in connection with the Mutiny subsequently exemplified, the officers were in perfect ignorance.

Sir John Kaye states that there had been "great difference of opinion with respect to promotion; that some declared that the Bengal army was destroyed by the seniority system, which gave to every sepoy in the service an equal chance of rising to the rank of commissioned officer; that others maintained that it was the very sheet-anchor which enabled it to resist all adverse influences," which I suppose meant that it rendered the native army generally contented. But was it a wise policy to deprive the European officers of their influence over the native army, and so render the latter perfectly independent of them?

I have before me extracts of general orders, commencing from the battle of Hyderabad in Scinde to the conclusion of the war in the Punjab, and these may be considered as so many emphatic avowals, on the part of the Governor-General of India, that the sepoy is quite as good a soldier as the European.

The following short extracts will show that I am by no means extravagant in my conclusions:—

"The Governor-General's especial thanks are due to H.M. 39th and 40th Regiments, to the 2nd and 16th Regiments of Native Grenadiers, and to the 56th Regiment N.I., which took with the bayonet the batteries in front of Maharajpooor." "H.M. 40th Regiment, and the 2nd and 16th Regiments of Native Grenadiers, again serving together, again

displayed the pre-eminent qualities as soldiers, and well supported the character of the *ever victorious* army of Candahar."

"Everywhere, at Maharajpoor and Puniar, the British and the *native* troops *emulated each other*, and animated by the same spirit of military devotion, proved that an army so composed and united by the bonds of mutual esteem and confidence, must ever remain invincible in Asia. The Government of India will, as a mark of its grateful sense of their distinguished merit, present to *every general and other officer, and to every soldier* engaged in the battles of Maharajpoor and Puniar, an Indian star of bronze, made out of the guns taken at these battles."

"The Governor-General's thanks are due to the brave infantry of the native army, whose valour so mainly contributed to these victories (Punjab) and he cannot withhold his admiration of the patience and perseverance with which they endured privations inseparable from forced marches. H.M. 16th Lancers on this occasion have added to their former reputation, acquired in various fields of battle in Asia, by routing the enemy's cavalry in every direction, and by resolute charges under Captain Bere, Major Smith, and Captain Pearson, penetrating the enemy's squares of infantry; in which charges the squadrons were gallantly supported by the 3rd Light Cavalry, under Major Angelo. In these exploits the native cavalry distinguished itself during the day, and the Governor-

General is happy to bear his testimony to the fact, that since the army of the Sutledge commenced its operations on the 18th of December, *the native cavalry has on every occasion proved its prowess, whether in the general actions that have been fought, or in the various skirmishes at the outposts.*"

These general orders, published, read, and interpreted to every native soldier in the Indian army, with all the blandiloquent flattery peculiar to native diction, undoubtedly inspired them with very highly inflated views of their own valour and importance, and these, conjoined with the contempt for their European officers which was engendered by the concession to them of promotion by seniority, and the still deeper contempt inspired by habits in the European which are held as detestable by the Bhramin, the Rajpoot, and the Mahomedan,—the elements of which the Bengal army consisted—tended completely to undermine sepoy allegiance and devotion. And, then, what was it that naturally followed? The weighing, of course, of probabilities as to their competency to possess themselves of the dominion of India, and to govern the country for themselves. What were the grounds that afforded them hope? The belief that they were trained in the arts of European warfare, and rendered quite equal in that respect to the European. That fact, they must naturally have thought, is admitted by the highest European authority in the land—the great Governor-General

of India. "He tells us so, and has proclaimed it to the world; and we know it to be the case. And then, the Europeans are merely a handful—we an overwhelming body; and all we have to do is to kick them out of the country and possess it for ourselves." These are the circumstances that brought about the Mutiny. It was a military outbreak, not an insurrection worked out by means of a "widespread conspiracy." And the Government order, issued in July, 1856, for general service enlistment, and the report that it was the intention of the Government to enlist 30,000 more Sikhs, brought matters to a culmination. With the exception of only six regiments, the Bengal army was exempt from serving abroad, because of their unconquerable aversion, on religious grounds, to cross the sea. The change intended might not affect those who had already enlisted; but they saw, if the British Government retained its power, that it would prove a bar to their sons taking to the honourable profession of arms.

The more daring men in the army, and those capable of taking the lead, then commenced the work of spreading disaffection; the leaven had spread throughout the native regiments, whilst at Barrackpoor, in the 34th Regiment, the agitation arose in respect to the greased cartridges and the bone-dust. Under ordinary circumstances the word of his officers would not, for a single moment, have been doubted by the sepoy. *The utterances of the saibs must be the*

truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, was his firm and inalienable belief; and I appeal to every Anglo-Indian if such was not the case. But the men of the Bengal army, instigated by the designing amongst them, had now quite made up their minds to doubt everything that was told them. It would not have answered their purpose to do otherwise. Hence the assurances of the Government, of the Commander-in-chief in his clear and most sensible address, and of General Hearsey, in respect to the greased cartridges and the bone-dust delusion, produced not the least effect. Could anything have exceeded the monstrous absurdity that corn-dealers, themselves high caste men, could have laid themselves open as to be induced by us to sell bone-dust to the sepoys or to any one else? And the dogged persistence of the jemedar,—who was a Bhramin, of the Oude artillery, mentioned by Sir Henry Lawrence in his letter to Lord Canning on the day previous to the outbreak at Meerut,—in stating that he believed that for ten years the Government had been engaged in measures for the fraudulent conversion of the natives, and that he considered them quite capable of the bone-dust "dodge," shows the ineffable pitch of bold impudence reached by the Bengal army. And the conduct of the non-commissioned officer of the 26th Regiment, who visited the rifle depôt and was publicly taunted by a soobedar with having become a Christian, and who cried like a child when reporting the circumstance to Lieutenant

Martineau, that he was an outcast, and that the men of his regiment had refused to eat with him, shows the extent to which the ignorant had been imposed upon by the daring and the disaffected.

The fallacy of Sir John Kaye's statement that the outbreak was caused by "a widespread conspiracy," I have touched upon in the first chapter. Absurd as was the deposition of the "Nana's emissary," who had been detained and examined at Mysore, it was surpassed in absurdity by the statement that delegates had gone about the sepoy lines "saying that the great King of Delhi had sent a confidential agent *to give a month's pay* to every native officer and soldier in the regiments, in order that if any outbreak should occur in their part of the country, they should not lift a hand in support of the Government." The one month's pay and the alleged communication are much too absurd to deserve any comment. The jemedar to whom this offer was said to have been made, reported it to his commanding officer and produced the money paid to him. The amount is not stated; large sums were said to be forthcoming. What was paid may have been fifteen rupees, or perhaps twenty, which, if the jemedar's object was to either ingratiate himself with the commandant, or to prevent any suspicions of disloyalty from attaching to the regiment, it would have been worth his while to pay from his own pocket. The wildest stories were then set afloat. It is said that "it is

certain a scroll was found, *described by a witness* as being many cubits long, to which the names of some hundreds of respectable inhabitants of Patna, Hindoos and Mahomedans, were attached, and that the scroll contained a solemn declaration, binding them to die in defence of their religion." The civil magistrate, however, made the attempt to track down the instigators; *but it all ended in smoke.* "A native officer and a moonshee who traitorously took the corrupting coins were found implicated in the plot," on the evidence, no doubt, of the jemedar and his coadjutors, and were sentenced to death; but it was not followed by execution.

With regard to the King of Oude, it is stated that his followers "had endeavoured to corrupt the sepoy in the fort—especially the sentries posted at its gates; that Colonel Cavenagh, the town major, had received repeated warnings from Mahomedan friends that mischief was brewing; that Mussulman sepoy were frequently visiting the king's people at Garden Reach, and that some influential visitors from Oude, including the great talookdar, Maun Sing, had visited Calcutta, and held conferences with the king or his ministers." But the only item in the allegation admitting of proof and verification—the visit of the great talookdar—is contradicted in a foot-note on the same page. Instead of being closeted with the king, the talookdar was at the time under surveillance at Fyzabad!

In times of public excitement one can never be too cautious in accepting and crediting every rumour and flying report. In Bombay there was no lack of persons ready and willing to reveal plots and combinations. Lord Elphinstone himself, through the medium of European gentlemen, was stocked with all kinds of information, the particulars of which his lordship communicated to me. Mr. Jugonnath Sunkersett, a most respectable and wealthy native gentleman, had a reception-house in the garden attached to his mansion, intended for the accommodation of itinerant Bhramin mendicants who, during the day, begged their bread in the town. Immediately after the outbreak of the Mutiny, I placed an intelligent up-country Bhramin on detective duty at the reception-house, disguised as an itinerant mendicant, and who joined the other inmates in begging during the day; this reception-house was made to contribute its share to the prevailing excitement, and European gentlemen conveyed to Lord Elphinstone the stirring information that Jugonnath Sunkersett, Meer Jaffer Alli, the titular Nabob of Surat, and three other native gentlemen, were in communication and in conspiracy with the Nana Saib. This information was so frequently repeated, that his lordship thought it necessary to send for me a second time, and tell me what had been brought to his notice. I repeated my previous assurances, and adding that I should be happy to subject my

own arrangements to any test that the informants might suggest, begged of his lordship to ask the European gentlemen to send them to me. They came, and I received them with a hearty welcome. If I had been possessed of the faculty of ready belief, the conviction produced would have been that Jugonnath Sunkersett, Meer Jaffer Alli, Kassim Natha, Dhurmsee Poonjabhoy, and Bhow Dajee, were deeply dyed traitors. I left these informants under the impression that I believed they had it in their power to bring about a momentous revelation, and expressed myself ready to take action in the matter whenever they wished I should do so. "But," I added, "my friends, listen to what I have to say. I shall take nothing at second hand. You must know I never do. You know, too, that I can speak your language as well as yourselves; that I can so disguise myself as to render discovery impossible." I at the same time called to their recollection the fact of my having, previous to being gazetted in command of the police, bribed European constables and native policemen through the medium of their own go-betweens, in order to test the extent to which the reputed corruption of the Bombay police was well founded; and of my having dined with one of these go-betweens, a high caste Hindoo, on his pressing invitation, without being discovered. And I added that I should be at a moment's notice prepared to join them, and that I wished a beginning

as speedily as possible. They left, promising to call again; but they never came. The result was reported to Lord Elphinstone, and I heard nothing more on the subject of volunteer information. I afterwards learnt that the European gentlemen were desired by these men to go to his lordship in preference to coming to me, as that course, they thought, would be the more effective.

There is no evidence to show that the Mutiny was the result of any "conspiracy." There had been executions for alleged tampering with sepoy fidelity: but these cases rested only on sepoy evidence, and the sepoys, as I have already noticed, were anxious to divert suspicion from themselves and their regiments. Take for instance the case of the Bhramin at Alighur. He was said to have tampered with two sepoys, who reported the circumstance to their commanding officer. He was tried by a native court-martial, and sentenced to death. The execution had no sooner taken place, than a Bhramin sepoy stepped forward and exclaimed, "Behold a martyr to our faith!" *and the regiment immediately broke out into mutiny*, and the officers and Lady Outram had to fly for their lives. Had the regiment not been *thoroughly disaffected and ripe for mutiny*, the Bhramin sepoy would have been seized and dealt with by the regiment as a madman.

The outbreak of each regiment, as it took place, exhibited the spirit of mutiny full blown and clearly developed. Mungul Panday, of the 34th, at

Barrackpoor, aware of the determination formed by the native army to exterminate the Europeans, and hearing of the landing of a part of the 53rd Foot, took the alarm, and arming himself, called upon his fellow sepoys to follow his example. The sergeant-major, who then appeared upon the scene, was fired at, but was missed. The adjutant then galloped up, was also fired at, and also missed; but his horse being wounded, was brought to the ground. Extricating himself, the adjutant and sergeant-major closed with Mungul Panday; but finding him too much for them, they beat a by no means creditable retreat. All this took place in front of the quarter-guard, consisting of a jemadar and twenty men, and in the presence too of most of the regiment; but not a man stirred to assist the adjutant and sergeant-major. Mungul Panday, still master of the situation, paced up and down and called upon his comrades in a vehement and excited manner to follow his example; but as they did not think the time suitable, he "*reviled them as cowards, who had first incited and then deserted him,*" and he then shot himself with his own musket.

When the 19th were on their march from Barrackpoor to be disbanded, the 34th, stationed at Barrackpoor, sent emissaries to them to say that they would cast in their lot with them, if they would resist and mutiny.

Native officers of the regiments stationed at Bareilly, informed the acting brigadier, that they

believed the prisoners in the gaol were beaten and kept without food for five days; and presumed to add, that they *must go and see them!*

On the following day a general parade was held. The brigadier harangued the troops, spoke of the uneasy feeling that had recently pervaded all ranks; of the discontent too plainly manifested by their demeanour—the result, he said, of erroneous apprehensions; but if they would resume the cheerful performance of their duty, the past would be forgiven, and the good old relations of mutual confidence thoroughly restored. Commissioner Alexander, too, addressed the native officers. He told them that they had been led away by a great delusion; that the intentions of Government towards them were what they had ever been, and he besought them to dismiss from their minds all feelings of distrust and alarm. After this the brigadier reported to the Government that the troops were in a more happy and cheerful state, and in their own words, “had commenced a new life.” He asked for a formal assurance from the Lieutenant-Governor, that the promises made to the troops would be confirmed, adding, “Were the men under my command fully convinced that the past would be forgotten, I feel convinced that their loyalty and good conduct may be relied upon.” The Lieutenant-Governor lost no time in sending the required assurances. The brigadier was authorised to inform the troops “that nothing that had happened since the

commencement of the recent agitation had at all shaken the solid confidence of the Lieutenant-Governor in their fidelity and good conduct." This was written on the 30th of May. Before the letter could reach Bareilly, *the whole of the native troops there had revolted, "and there was not a living European in the place."*

From these and very many other instances recorded by the author of "The Sepoy War," nothing can be clearer than that within the native army itself, sprang the germs which ripened into mutiny. This is evident not only from the pages of "The Sepoy War," but it is evident from every line in General Jacobs' book in relation to the mutiny of the 27th Regiment at Kolapoor; it is evident also from the intercepted letter from the regiments at Belgaum, and from the conduct, as will be seen, of the regiments that were stationed in Bombay.

Had it been possible to have polled India during the time of the Mutiny, of the three hundred millions of the general population, there would have been but a *very* insignificant minority in favour of government by their own countrymen. Strong in this conviction, when the disasters at Meerut and Delhi were mentioned to me by Lord Elphinstone, and I was instructed to be most careful and vigilant, and told that it was of the utmost importance that Bombay should be kept quiet, I concluded that it was purely a military outbreak, and submitted the absolute necessity of the

sepoys being carefully looked after, which duty, also, the Governor desired me to undertake.

On the following day I received a letter from the Private Secretary (now Major-General Bates), telling me that it was the Governor's wish I should call upon Brigadier-General Shortt, and after doing so, to call upon his lordship. I called on the brigadier. He wished to know if I had spoken to and interested the respectable members of the Mahomedan community in the preservation of order, which he said he had suggested to the Governor, that it was the Governor's wish it should be done, and that he and his lordship considered it a measure of vital importance. I was sorry it was so viewed by them. I was born in the country, and had lived among natives all my life. I presumed I knew more of their character and peculiarities than any European in the country. The Kazees and a few other Mahomedans of property and wealth, who had nothing to gain and much to lose in the event of a disturbance, would gladly, if they could, have aided me in the maintenance of order; but the knowledge of my having spoken to them, and the communications they would make to their co-religionists, would, within four-and-twenty hours, have created an impression throughout Bombay, that the Government and the police were in fear of the Mahomedans. Such a result would have been productive of the worst consequences. Mahomedans, moreover, are fanatics in matters of government as

well as religion ; they would naturally have asked, What had they done to create apprehension ? *Why this stir ?* And they would say, *Surely our God has put fear into the minds of the infidels. Why has He done so ? In order that we might take advantage of it. Yes ; we see in it an indication of His will.* Such would have been the conclusions they would come to. If they even had not the desire to be troublesome, it would have been suggesting to them ; and the communication I was desired to make would have been productive of results the very opposite of what was anticipated, and I declined to make it. The brigadier then wished to know what I intended doing to keep Bombay quiet. I said I should remain watchful, and do all I could to prevent mischief : that if, notwithstanding, there should be an attempt at outbreak on the part of the people, the first man who committed himself should be shot or cut down. The brigadier here remarked, “ What would Sir William Yardley* say to this ? ” My answer was, that the mutiny was an exceptional occurrence, and that exceptional measures to meet it would be justifiable ; that I hoped also that if there was a rise in the town, the report which conveyed the intelligence of the rise would also convey that of its suppression. I felt no want of confidence in being able, with the police, to cope with any exigency among the inhabitants ; but I stated to the brigadier my apprehensions in respect to the

* Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

native military; that I had already a spy among them, and expected, in the event of there being anything in agitation within their lines, to obtain timely intelligence of it. This annoyed the brigadier, who remarked that his own officers were quite equal to every emergency in that way. This I did not, of course, gainsay.

After this interview I proceeded to see the Governor. I felt apprehensive that his lordship might suppose I was presuming to set up my own opinion in opposition to his. Being ushered into his presence, I was asked if I had seen the brigadier. I answered in the affirmative, and stated the grounds upon which I considered the brigadier's suggestion impolitic. After listening to me, the Governor thought for a few moments, and then expressed himself satisfied that I was "perfectly right."

When the disasters at Cawnpoor and other places became known, which evinced that no dependence could be placed in any sepoy regiment; and having at the same time a Mahomedan population in Bombay of more than one hundred and fifty thousand, and that, in the event of a mutiny, some ten or fifteen thousand among the people would have to be kept in check, in which case it would have been folly to trust implicitly to the fidelity of the native police, I applied to Lord Elphinstone to be allowed to incorporate into the police a body of fifty mounted Europeans, which was immediately sanctioned.

A few days previous to the Mohorum, Mr. Crawford received a letter from the Government, in which we were requested, in concert with Brigadier Shortt, to determine upon the several positions for defence in the event of a disturbance or attack, on the occasion of that festival ; and from it I was sorry to find that Government seemed to be quite under the impression that the townspeople were the only parties to be looked after. Of the loyalty of the sepoy's they seemed to entertain *no doubt*. I saw the danger of this view. At this time my own detectives even had not been able to discover that treason was active within the sepoy lines ; but I was not satisfied that all was right. From conversations that I had previously had with the brigadier, I was aware that his impressions were very strongly in favour of sepoy fidelity ; and I foresaw that he would fall in with the view taken by Government. I therefore called upon Mr. Crawford, and repeated to him—what I had often previously stated—“ *that the sepoy's were our only source of danger ;*” that so long as they remained quiet there was not a man in the town who would dare raise his finger ; that he and I should therefore hold together, and, in the event of the brigadier being disposed to view the danger in the light in which it was placed in the Government letter, we should try and carry out our own arrangements. Mr. Crawford, however, expressed himself resolved to make *no suggestion*, to incur *no responsibility*, and stated, that so far as he

was concerned, *he had "placed everything"* in the hands of the brigadier, whose letter to Government on the subject placed it beyond doubt. Hence, when called to attend the brigadier's office on the following day, I found the arrangements he intended to carry out already written down. They were essentially those suggested by Government; and under those arrangements there would not have been, and actually was not, a single European soldier under the brigadier's command to oppose an outbreak among the sepoys at the point where the outbreak would have commenced. I therefore urged that, though I had no reason to think there was any indication of unsoundness in the sepoys in Bombay, we should not lose sight of the conduct of the regiments in the north-west, and within our own presidency at Kolapore, who, to the last moment, commanded the confidence of their European officers, and that we should not allow ourselves to be blinded as to the possibility of an outbreak in Bombay. I suggested that, on the last night and day of the Mohorum, all our European infantry, and four or six guns, with men sufficient to man them, should be stationed on the esplanade, adjoining the cross road opposite the Jooma Musjeed (spot marked **A** in annexed plan), by which the sepoy lines would be placed under the immediate range of the guns, and the European soldiers would be at hand to check any attempt at mutiny on the part of the sepoys. It will be seen

from the plan that this measure possessed also the very important advantage of nearness—in the event of an outbreak among the townspeople, which, however, I always deemed improbable in the extreme, and I said so repeatedly—to the localities (points **B B** in the map) where such outbreak would have taken place. The moral effect, too, of such an arrangement, both on the sepoys and the Mahomedans, would have been incalculable. These suggestions, however, were not attended to. I was told that the guns on the ramparts were double-shotted, and that they covered the sepoy lines. This led to my remarking that he (the brigadier) was aware that only a street, twenty-five feet in width, separated the sepoy lines from the native town; that every sepoy had possession of his musket and ammunition, and that if they shouldered arms and walked into the native town, the shots from the guns would prove unavailing, since they could only be directed against empty sheds and bare walls; that the moment the sepoys found themselves within the native town, they would, if unopposed, spread in every direction, and, joined by the scoundrels among the inhabitants, engage in pillage and devastation, which the shots from the ramparts would not check; that the body of Europeans stationed in the fort could not be brought to the scene in time, and when brought, they could not be divided into small bodies to follow the sepoys, as such a measure would be opposed

to military tactics, and practically dangerous. My suggestions, however, were unheeded.

I objected, too, to the arrangement of separating from the small body of about 400 European infantry we then had in Bombay, 200 men in parties of 100, and posting them, with that number of sepoy, at the spots marked **C C** on the map, as, in the event of an outbreak, which would have taken place about midnight, the greater part of the Europeans would be asleep, and fall an easy prey to the sepoy. One hundred of the latter would not dare to attack one-fourth that number of Europeans openly; but in the event of an outbreak (which subsequent revelations proved we had very narrowly escaped on the last night of the Mohorum), nothing would have prevented the sepoy from quietly loading their guns and taking a cowardly advantage of the unguarded moments of the Europeans, and firing into them. This would have brought down three-fourths of the Europeans, and the rest, panic-stricken, would probably have been bayoneted in detail. The instance related in Sir William Harris's travels in Abyssinia I pleaded in proof of the likelihood of European soldiers in Bombay becoming panic-stricken under a sudden and unexpected attack, since European soldiers, travelling under a perfect consciousness of danger in Abyssinia, were not exempt from it; and Sir William Harris, I said, had been heard to say that, but for the presence of mind he displayed,

and the instincts of military habit in the soldier, the attack in question would have proved imminently perilous. Not even this, nor anything I could urge in deprecation of dividing troops into small detachments, proved of any avail. One point, however, I strenuously maintained, and was determined to carry, and that was, that the Government suggestion to station detachments of native troops in the town on the last night and day of the Mohorum should not be attended to; and this only was conceded by the brigadier and the senior magistrate.

As a last resource I penned the following protest, and placed it in the hands of the Private Secretary, for the information of the Governor :—

“I beg that I may not be deemed presumptuous in taking the liberty to observe, that from the tenor of the Government letter, lately addressed to Mr. Crawford, the apprehension of an outbreak would seem to be entertained entirely with reference to the townspeople. There has not been yet—widespread as the revolts in the north-west and elsewhere have been—a single instance in which the populace of a town or other place have taken the initiative in rising against their rulers. In every case the example was set them by the military.

“Up to the present moment I am strong in hope that the native regiments in Bombay are staunch; but from what has taken place at Dinapoor, and within our own limits at Kolapoor, I am humbly of

opinion that, in our precautionary arrangements for the preservation of peace during the ensuing Mohorum, it would be wise to direct some portion of our attention to the sepoy regiments.

“The loyal conduct, when the Mutiny first broke out, of one of the regiments at Dinapoor, in marching out and fighting and routing a large body of mutineers, is matter of record; and, as regards the regiment at Kolapoor, it was only a couple of days previously that an officer belonging to it wrote to a friend in Bombay that it was staunch to a man. In both instances, the rise was, notwithstanding, most sudden, and certainly most unaccountable, as regards the very slender hope there could have existed of such an attempt being made with impunity.

“In the north-west, the revolt is supposed to have been owing to the Bhramins and Mussulmans, of whom the regiments in that province were almost entirely composed. The Bombay army was supposed to be free from danger from the preponderance in it of other classes, especially the Kokunnee Mharattas. Singularly, this very class formed the *majority* of those who have rebelled at Kolapoor.

“Under these circumstances, I hope that I may be pardoned in pointing to the native regiments in Bombay as a possible element of danger, especially when reports are in circulation in the bazaars that Cawnpoor has been recaptured by the rebels, and that General Havelock and his forces have been cut up.

“I beg again to add that up to the present time I have no reason to think the native regiments in Bombay to be otherwise than staunch; but passing events point to the necessity of adopting all possible precaution; and hence I very humbly but strenuously deprecate the mixing together of European and native soldiers during the Mohorum at any point where the stationing of troops may be deemed necessary.

“I have no reason for supposing that the native soldiery would take advantage of the unguarded moments of the Europeans, and commence the work of destruction upon them; but, at the same time, we have no grounds for resting any positive assurance that they would *not* do so. For this reason I would deprecate their being stationed together, and pray also that the native soldiers be kept out of the town on the last night and day of the Mohorum.

“The Mohorum, if I am not mistaken, is viewed as a festival peculiarly Mahomedan. The Hindoo votaries of the false prophet on the occasion, I have no hesitation in stating, form a larger proportion than the Mahomedan classes, and after hearing the *Fatia* repeated, and being invested with the fakeer's thread, a Hindoo becomes in feeling, under the excitement of the festival, as much a Mussulman as any follower of Mahomed, and is quite as much carried away by the belief that he is bound to do honour to the prophet, and would as freely join

in any excess, led on by the cry of *Deen*, as any Mahomedan. It is notorious that most Hindoo sepoys become fakeers during the Mohorum."

With the above document I submitted also the following, containing the suggestions I made to the brigadier:—

"The arrangements which I would very respectfully beg to submit for consideration are—

"That of the European troops in Bombay, the whole of the infantry, and of artillery as many as may be required to man four or six guns, with that number of guns, be posted at the spot marked **A** on the accompanying map of Bombay, where they can be accommodated in tents.

"That the order issued to this body of troops be, that they hold themselves in readiness, with guns loaded, to move into the town at a moment's notice, to quell any disturbance that may take place.

"That the native regiments be paid the compliment of being ordered to hold themselves in readiness." (This I suggested, as the brigadier said he was "decidedly averse to any slur being put upon the sepoys.")

"Thus the European troops would be present, ostensibly for the purpose of marching into the town, while in reality they would be there as a check upon the sepoys; this, of course, need not be made public.

"The parts of the town densely populated by

Mahomedans are those marked **B B** on the map; and in the event of any outbreak, of which the probability is indeed most remote, it will be more convenient for the European troops to reach those spots from the ground marked **A**, than it would be from either of the places marked **C C** selected by the brigadier, under the suggestion of Government, for stationing two guns and 100 Europeans and 100 native soldiers at each.

“The above points, as well as the remaining ones, can be most effectually guarded by fifty European sailors at each point.”

The above particulars were stated in a letter to Mr. P. W. Le Geyt, who was then at Calcutta as Legislative Member of the Council of the Governor-General, with the object of ascertaining the opinion of General Sir James Outram on the merits of the plan proposed by me and that carried out by the brigadier. Mr. Le Geyt's answer forms the Appendix C. Before despatching my letter to Mr. Le Geyt, however, I thought I should send it for perusal to Major-General Bates, who was then private secretary to Lord Elphinstone. The following was the reply :—

“MY DEAR MR. FORJETT,

“As the letter you have sent for my perusal is a private one to Mr. Le Geyt, you can of course state in it your own view of what occurred in Bombay during the Bukree Eed and Mohurram. In returning it, however, I think I ought to tell you that I believe that Brigadier Shortt was quite

right in posting the detachment of Europeans, etc., at the point marked C in your plan.

In the arrangement proposed by yourself, although at that time you said you had no reason whatever to doubt the loyalty of the sepoys, your precautions seem to have been chiefly directed against the sepoys, not apparently giving equal consideration to the possibility of an outbreak amongst 150,000 Mahomedans at a festival when, notoriously, they become much excited and violent. In ordinary times, even, the presence of Europeans has always been considered necessary at this festival, to check disturbances in the town. Last year, more especially, this precaution was necessary, and if an outbreak had occurred, and Europeans had not been posted at the points marked in your plan, there would have been absolutely little or nothing to prevent excited men making their way unchecked to Malabar Hill and Mazagon, where, as you know, most of the European inhabitants with their families reside.

In regard to the sepoys, I have no doubt that Brigadier Shortt took such measures as in his judgment were necessary to suppress any attempt at an outbreak, and these, with your own good arrangements, seem to have been sufficient to check any determination of this kind, if any such existed.

“Yours sincerely,

“*Matheran, 27th April.*

“H. BATES.”

This letter led to the following remarks from me, which also were sent to Colonel Bates for perusal.

Colonel Bates states that my precautions seem to have been chiefly directed against the sepoys, without apparently giving equal consideration to the possibility of an outbreak amongst 150,000 Mahomedans at a festival when, notoriously, they become much excited. In this Colonel Bates is quite

in error. It is only necessary to mention that the spot **D** is the centre of the native town, especially as regards Mahomedan districts, and that, at that spot, and in its neighbourhood, were placed the *chief body of the European mounted police*, with communications kept up *on all sides*. So much for any possible contingency from the inhabitants; but *every* scoundrel in the town was closely watched and kept in a state of terror. When, on my rounds at night in disguise, I found anybody speaking of the successes of the rebels in anything like a tone of exultation, I seized him on the spot. A whistle brought up three or four policemen who, too, followed in disguise, and the person or persons were at once bound and walked off to prison. It soon became known that the police were everywhere about, which had a very salutary effect. Such were the impressions as regards its ubiquity, etc.; that during the whole of the last night and day of the Mohorum, the Mahomedans and the rest of the townspeople were so well behaved, that it was not found necessary to take even a *single man into custody*.

It stands to reason that, so long as the military remained quiet, the townspeople could not possibly be otherwise, and, up to the present time, nothing is known to the contrary.

Colonel Bates states, that in ordinary times (before I took charge) the presence of Europeans has always been considered necessary at the Mohorum

festival to check disturbances in the town, and more especially last year. Yes; but on such occasions a body of two hundred Europeans were stationed in the Bhendy Bazaar stables, where, if required to act, being all Europeans, they could do so with effect; while at the points **C C** they were not only far away from the densely populated parts of the Mahomedan portion of the town, but, in the event of a mutiny, their existence would have been imperilled by the hostility of the sepoys stationed with them. These points, as I had suggested, could have been effectively guarded by fifty European sailors at each point.

Colonel Bates thinks that if an outbreak had occurred among the townspeople, and Europeans had not been posted at the points **C C**, there would have been absolutely little or nothing to prevent excited men from making their way, unchecked, to Malabar Hill and Mazagon (and he may have added Breach Candy); where most of the European inhabitants with their families reside.

Anybody acquainted with Bombay would at once see that there are many ways by which the above localities could be reached by such men, without putting themselves at all in the way of the troops.

If an outbreak commenced, and *was not arrested at the instant and at the place it manifested itself*, the insurgents would immediately begin to spread and gather *their thousands* as they marched on with

the cry of "Deen," and reach the places they wished to attack before the Europeans (if at all enabled to leave their stations intact) could overtake them, and when overtaken, while their scattered scores were keeping out of the way of musket-shots and reveling in violence, the military would be practically useless, as they could not be broken up into small detachments to follow the different parties of rebels.

The tendency of every one of my measures was to crush the evil in the bud; and I was anxious that the military arrangements should be of the same character; and they would have been so, had all the European infantry then in Bombay, with four or six guns, been stationed at the point **A**.

In the event of a mutiny, that body would have crushed it at once, and the tranquillity of the town would have been effectively maintained by the police.

As it was, the risk incurred by defective military arrangements was, in my humble opinion, imminent.

Colonel Bates states he has no doubt that, as regards the sepoy, Brigadier Shortt took such measures as, in his judgment, were necessary to suppress any attempt at an outbreak. What those measures could have been it is difficult to conceive. Some half a dozen of the officers of each regiment were present in the lines on the occasion, who, in the event of an outbreak, would have been quickly

put out of the way. Excepting this, no other arrangement seems to have been made.

The Mohorum is a festival causing great excitement and religious enthusiasm among Mahomedans: so much so, that the presence in the native town, as stated by General Bates, of strong detachments of troops, both European and native, were always, previous to my time, found necessary for the preservation of the peace; but having a police force equal in my estimation to any emergency on the part of the population, the idea of being dependent on military aid, proved distasteful, and with the assistance of the Chief Secretary to Government—now Sir Henry Anderson—I discontinued the practice, and it was attended with the happiest results.

As the Mohorum was approaching, suspicion seemed to be directed towards the Mahomedans of the town, and the excitement was becoming very great. A similar excitement, just previously, had led to a panic, and it was followed by the wildest hurrying off on board ships in the harbour. I deemed it necessary, therefore, to call a meeting of all the leading members of the Mahomedan community. I was accompanied to it by Colonel, now Lieutenant-General, Birdwood, and his son, Doctor George Birdwood. The gathering was unusually large, and my address to the assembled native gentlemen, delivered in the native language, and reported on the following

morning in the local English newspapers, was as follows :—

“It affords me much gratification,” I remarked, “to see assembled so large a body of respectable and influential Mahomedan gentlemen. The readiness with which you have responded to my call is an earnest of your desire to be found on the side of order and tranquillity; and, indeed, I do not see what possible inducement you could have to be otherwise. I avail myself of the present opportunity to correct some strange ideas that are afloat in regard to the state of matters in the north-west. The tide of insurrection, there can be no question, is on the ebb. When comparatively small bodies of Europeans can encounter hosts of insurgents and scatter them to the winds; when thousands of the latter have been signally unsuccessful in dislodging the small body of Europeans before Delhi, who are waiting only for some reinforcements to sweep them away from that doomed city, and when dissensions have already crept in among the ranks of those ill-fated and misguided men, we may indeed anticipate a speedy termination to their career of lawlessness and wrong; but, be all this as it may, were even the tide of rebellion to reach the very shores of Bombay, what need is there for apprehension as regards Bombay? If not all, most of you, no doubt, are aware that this place has been a British dependency for more than 200 years. Up to the beginning of the

present century, and during a period of more than 150 years, all around was foreign territory, governed by despotic rajas, whose will was law, and whose enmity towards Christian nations was proverbial. History makes mention of various plans formed by native potentates whose shores overlooked Bombay for the subjugation of the 'Fehringee' Government, but all their efforts proved unavailing; and that, too, at a time when the British in India were weak, when their armament was insignificant, and when the Indian Dhoolups and Hubsees even dared to attack British ships of trade, and, in some instances, successfully. None, therefore, but visionaries, men fitted to be made the inmates of the Colaba Asylum, would at the present time dare entertain any idea subversive of the quiet of Bombay; and were anybody to do so, be they mad Mahomedans or *whosoever else*, you may rest assured that measures have been taken to circumvent all and every such design,—it will recoil upon themselves, and the vengeance taken upon them will be signal. Within a very short time some hundreds of British bayonets, and a thousand or fifteen hundred sailors, will be brought into play; then, what rebel dare stand? Every guilty man will be strung up before his own door.

“The more immediate object, however, of calling you together, is on account of the approaching Mohorum. We all know that it is a festival causing some excitement, and viewed by most people as a period for some little apprehension. The last two Mohorums,

we all know, passed off as peaceably as any festival in Bombay, either Mahomedan or Hindoo ; and the approaching one, I have no doubt, will come to an equally peaceable termination. This is the third time of my meeting you here with the same object in view, to suggest to each of you to keep a watchful eye over persons living near to you and within the reach of your influence. If you have reason to suspect the fidelity of any, let me know, and you may rest assured that he will be speedily dealt with, undeterred by the trammels of the law. During the last two Mohorums, you were eminently successful in the influence you exercised, and they passed off without its being necessary to take any one, Mahomedan or Hindoo, into custody. I am hopeful that at the termination of the coming Mohorum, I shall find matters exactly similar ; and I hope to be enabled to report to the Governor Saib and the Sirkar that we had been equally successful. The last two years were ordinary ones ; the present is somewhat different. I do not think it necessary to explain to you my own arrangements to defeat the object of the wicked, if any there be ; you may rest assured that the police shall be in no way remiss ; and with your co-operation, which I have no doubt will be hearty, and which *every man of property and wealth is, for his own sake*, bound to render, I feel certain that the coming festival will be brought to a peaceful termination.

“ And now, gentlemen, I have to thank you for

your kind attendance. I congratulate myself on your ready attention to my call; and I hope to have it in my power to congratulate you, by-and-by, on your exertions in the cause of order.

“Although late, it is gratifying to find that an address is in course of preparation by the Mahomedan community for presentation to Government. And why should not Mahomedans vie with and be as loyal as any other section of the inhabitants of Bombay? Have you not, under British auspices, enjoyed all possible freedom in the exercise of the rites of your religion? Many of you here present, no doubt, remember something of the desecration of the tombs of your holy men in the Punjab within the last fifty or sixty years. Has anything of that kind taken place within the length and breadth of British India? No! Independently of the rich blessings you enjoy—the fruits of good government—your religion has been protected to an extent which, certainly, you would not have enjoyed under any other government under the sun. Such being the case, your own Koran inculcates that you should pray for the prosperity of such a government; and it also denounces acts opposed to the well-being of such a government as *in the highest degree sinful*.”

After I had finished, Colonel Birdwood addressed some excellent remarks to the large assembly. He dwelt principally on the check which every species of improvement in India would receive in consequence

of the revolt in the north-west; and concluded with the words of a well-known Mahomedan ditty, that our just government was by scoundrels hated, and by the good beloved. After Colonel Birdwood had spoken, a leading member of the Mahomedan community assured me that the Mahomedans were most peaceably disposed, and that there was no fear of a disturbance taking place.

The Governor, the Judges of the Supreme Court, and other high functionaries being present at the time in Bombay, I was not quite sure, when on the following morning I saw my address published, that I had committed no breach of official propriety in declaring to the Mahomedan gentlemen that those whose fidelity there was reason to suspect would be speedily dealt with, undeterred by the "trammels" of the law, and that "every guilty man would be strung up before his own door." And this doubt was by no means allayed when a trooper brought me a note from the Private Secretary, telling me that it was the Governor's wish to see me. I was received by his lordship with his usual kindness, and resting his hand on my shoulder, he said, "You had a meeting yesterday of Mahomedan gentlemen; in addressing them you made use of very strong language; *but I am glad you did so.*" I was of course thankful. I then touched upon the protest I had placed in the hands of the Private Secretary for his lordship's information, against the military

and police arrangements ordered by Government for the preservation of the peace during the Mohorum. His Lordship said he was sorry he did not know my views before those suggestions were made ; but having made them, and the brigadier—the chief responsible military authority—having adopted them with the concurrence of the chief magistrate, he did not see his way to countermanding them ; but he hoped everything would pass off quietly. I then respectfully intimated that I should be obliged to disobey the orders of Government in respect to the police arrangements, for, I added, “I must keep my Europeans together and have them in hand in case of a sepoy outbreak.” His lordship kindly remarked, “It is a very risky thing to do to disobey orders ; but I am sure you will do nothing rash.” And I may now add, that it was happy for Bombay, happy for Western India, and happy probably for India itself, that one so noble and clear-headed as Lord Elphinstone was Governor of Bombay during the period of the mutiny ; but for which it is impossible to state what the results would have been ; and as regards the five native gentlemen already named, they would, in all human probability, have terminated their career at the cannon’s mouth.

Some four or five days after the above interview with Lord Elphinstone the following occurrences took place.

It was on the eve of the last night of the

Mohorum. A Hindoo god was carried in procession by some townspeople. A Christian drummer, belonging to the 10th Regiment N.I., whilst in a state of intoxication, assaulted the carriers and knocked over the god. Two policemen, by whom the outrage was witnessed, took the drummer into custody. A report of this reached the men of the regiment, and some twenty of them turned out, *broke into the lock-up, rescued the drummer, assaulted the policemen, and marched them off as prisoners to their lines!* The European constable of the section, with four policemen, then proceeded to the lines and demanded the liberation of the policemen; but a large body of sepoy surrounded them, and commenced an assault, when the European constable and the policemen, in self-defence, fought their way out, leaving two sepoy for dead and wounding several others. This was followed by great excitement among the sepoy, and a large number took to their arms. A report was brought to me that the native regiments had broken out. Ordering the European mounted police to come on as soon as possible, I hastened to the spot as quickly as my horse could carry me. I found the sepoy in a state of tumult, trying to force their way out of the lines, and five or six of their European officers, with drawn swords, keeping them back. On seeing me the sepoy clamoured that I was the man who ordered them to be killed; and the European officers repeatedly cried

out, "For God's sake, Mr. Forjett, go away; your presence is exciting the men." My reply was, "If your men are bent on mischief the sooner it is over the better." Within three or four minutes after, my assistant, Mr. Edington, came galloping up, followed very soon after by my mounted Europeans, about fifty-five in number. Bringing my men to the "halt," I cried, "Throw open the gates, I am prepared for them." This had the effect of cooling their ardour for an outbreak, and they soon fell back. Had I in compliance with the wishes of the officers, attempted to retire, and ordered my men to do so, the sepoys would have fired upon us and broken out into mutiny. This I was resolved not to afford them the opportunity of doing; feeling confident that if not disposed of before being joined by my men, I should be readily able to cope with sepoy disloyalty and violence.

Would these men, under ordinary circumstances, have been guilty of conduct so outrageously subversive of good order and military discipline? or is it to be doubted that it was the result of contempt for their European superiors, arising from a highly inflated view of their own importance, and a confident assumption of their own martial superiority?

The above events quite dissipated the small shadow of doubt that existed in my mind as to the necessity of disobeying the orders of Government in respect to the police arrangements for the Mohorum,

and led to my resolving that the sepoys should be strictly looked after by my Europeans being kept together. They were fifty-four in number, well mounted, well trained to thrusting with the sword in preference to the one, two, cuts, which, when lighting upon a belt, would prove useless, while every thrust would be more or less effective. Under the orders of Government these men should have been broken up into small detachments and spread over the island, far apart from each other, to look after the inhabitants, more especially the Mahomedans, and I was sorry to find that Bombay was not free from Wahabee-phobia; but I am glad to say that I experienced no lack of assistance from Wahabees. The kazee,—the high priest in Bombay of Mahomedans,—was a rank Wahabee, but made his services available at any hour of the day or night; so was the soobedar, Mahomed Booden, of the police, a Wahabee, by whom I was greatly assisted in bringing to light the plot hatched by the sepoys at Sonapoor; so was also an Arab gentleman who generally accompanied me to mosques, coffee-houses, and different places of Mahomedan rendezvous at night, which I thought necessary to visit, and which we did in disguise, to make myself acquainted with the feelings and views of the Mahomedans. Going to such places alone attracted more attention than when visited in company.

Shortly after the outbreak there was some talk of

introducing martial law into Bombay. The natives spoke of it as the "Nuwa Kaeeda" (new law), and entertained some strange ideas as to the rigour of its provisions. I considered it a fitting opportunity to impress upon the evil-disposed and disaffected, the danger of conduct in the least subversive of good order. I therefore put up a gibbet in the yard of the police office, and summoned the leading men among those who, in the event of a mutiny, would be foremost in the ranks of the lawless, and intimated to them, that if I should have the least reason to believe that any among them contemplated an outbreak in Bombay, they should be at once seized and hanged. What I stated was listened to in solemn silence, and every man, I felt assured, left the police office overawed, and under a thorough conviction that the game of rebellion would be a dangerous one. And if, during my presence at any place of rendezvous, the language of any one bordered on the seditious, I immediately threw off my disguise and seized him on the spot; and such was the fear inspired by the police, and such the opinion in regard to its ubiquity, that though the number assembled was a hundred, or two hundred, or more, they immediately hastened away, leaving the man who was taken into custody to his fate. And in order to keep up the awe of the gallows, Lord Elphinstone kindly permitted the deportation of the men so taken into custody to the Tanna Gaol by night, a mystery thus hanging over their fate. It

was known that they had been taken up by the police, but nothing was known—not till after the crisis of the Mutiny had passed—of what had become of them; but I am glad to say that such summary arrests did not exceed three or four.

To return to the police measure for checking sepoy outbreak, if such was attempted. On the last night of the Mohorum, three Europeans were placed on each of the two sides of the sepoy lines, and intermediately, I had three intelligent trustworthy native policemen, crouched down near the railings of the lines, on the watch, to report to the Europeans on either side, if anything was astir within. The remaining number (forty-eight) I placed at the spot **D** on plan, and in the neighbourhood, to unite at a moment's notice. Such was my confidence that everything in the town would be perfectly quiet, and that unless a beginning was made by the sepoys there was not a man among the inhabitants who would dare to raise a finger, that I confined my attention that night to the sepoy lines, and kept myself in their vicinity. If the sepoys attempted to break out, *which the revelation at Sonapoor proved they contemplated*, I should have become aware of it by their movements within the lines, and by the time they shouldered arms and marched out, I should have been in the street nearest to the lines with my men, and then it would have been only necessary to "right wheel," and "charge." We should have had twelve

or thirteen hundred bayonets to encounter; and though the number of Europeans was small, I calculated upon success by taking the sepoy's unexpectedly, and the suddenness of the dash in amongst them, I felt confident, would throw them into a panic and give us the advantage. On the evening of that day I went into the barracks, explained to the men my arrangements and the expectations I entertained, and concluded by saying, "We shall do our duty." The announcement was received with three such cheers as left no doubt that they would be found equal to any emergency.

Happily, or unhappily, caution is a dominant element of the Oriental mind, and there was no outbreak on the last night of the Mohorum. At the meeting in Sonapoor it was said that the "hoosharee" (vigilance) maintained, prevented it. *The only vigilance*, as will be seen, was *that of the police*. I have no object in wishing to adduce any testimony on the subject, but as the above may be looked upon as a mere unsupported assertion of my own, I think it necessary to add the following extracts:—

Resolution of Government, No. 1717, dated June 19th, 1858, Judicial Department:—"The Right Honourable the Governor in Council cannot too highly praise the devoted zeal of this excellent public servant, upon whom such grave responsibilities were imposed during the past year.

"The Right Honourable the Governor in Council

will only say, and the statement conveys very high praise, that the expectations raised by the appointment of Mr. Forjett to the executive command of the Bombay Police, have been amply realised."

Extract, paragraph 5, of a letter to the Commissioner of Police, from Mr. Secretary Anderson, Judicial Department, No. 1681, dated 23rd May, 1859:—

Paragraph 5.—"The Right Honourable the Governor in Council avails himself of this opportunity of expressing his sense of the very valuable services rendered by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Mr. Forjett, in the detection of the plot in Bombay in the autumn of 1857. His duties demanded great courage, great acuteness, and great judgment, all of which qualities were conspicuously displayed by Mr. Forjett at that trying period."

Letter from Colonel, now Lieutenant-General, Birdwood:—"I do feel that we are mainly indebted to Lord Elphinstone and yourself for the peace we enjoyed in Bombay."

Letter from the late Mr. Richard Spooner, Commissioner of Customs of Bombay:—"The fact is, that during the mutinies you were the preserver of Bombay and of the lives of all Europeans, Parsees, and Portuguese."

Letter from Mr. John Fleming, C.S.I.:—"I can assure you I was never more astonished in my life to see the small European force we had available at the Mohorum broken up as it was. When I was

told, some days before, that Europeans were to be posted outside, I scouted the idea as absurd, believing that our whole force (300 in number) would be kept in a central place, to crush rebellion at its earliest development. *Your vigilance saved Bombay.*"

Letter from Lord Northbrook, then Under-Secretary of State for India :—"I was sorry not to have seen you again ; but I read with great interest the papers you gave me. They prove (and I had always heard the same thing from those best acquainted with the facts) that you did *real good service during the Mutiny.*" And I may add, lastly, that "the gracious approbation of Her Majesty the Queen, of my conduct during the critical period of the Mutiny and disturbances in India," was communicated to me by Sir Charles Wood, then Secretary of State.

The European and native communities of Bombay, for my services during the Mutiny, presented me with flattering addresses, and, with the sanction of Government, with testimonials and purses to the value of £3,850. What was still more gratifying—after I had retired from the service and quitted India,—the native cotton merchants sent me a handsome address and a purse of £1,500, "in token of strong gratitude for one whose almost despotic powers and zealous energy had so quelled the explosive forces of native society that they seem to have become permanently subdued." The Back Bay Reclamation Company, too, *after I had quitted the shores of India,*

allotted to me five shares in their company, which they afterwards sold out, and remitted to me £13,580. Shares that had been brought to me in another company while I was in Bombay I declined to accept, and at once returned.

Sir P. M. Melvill, knighted for services during the Mutiny, taking exception to my having stated that “I had been the means of saving Bombay during the year 1857,” wrote,—“I have always myself considered, and have never hesitated to assert, that if the merit of saving the city of Bombay and the Presidency of Bombay, and I may say, the entire of Central India, can be ascribed to any single individual, it can only be to Lord Elphinstone, who was the guiding spirit through the whole terrible crisis [*this is indisputable*]. We were but his lieutenants, each labouring earnestly in his proper place towards the great end which, under Providence, was successfully accomplished. Among the agents thus working, your part was a most important one, *and all will readily admit that your services were most efficient, most valuable, and deserving of high reward.*”

The following are the particulars of the discovery of the sepoy plot at Sonapoor, as stated in the letter to Mr. P. W. Le Geyt, already mentioned.

A detective serving under Soobedar Mahomed Booden, of the Bombay Police Force, discovered a short time after the Mohorum of 1857, that the house of one Gunga Pursad was resorted to by sepoys. Measures

were, thereupon, immediately taken to *introduce a confidential agent of the police* to the meetings; but with *so much care was the admission into them of any but regimental sepoy*s guarded against, that my best efforts to accomplish that object proved unavailing. I was compelled, therefore, at all hazards, to determine upon forcing Gunga Pursad from his house during the night, to bring him to the police office, and there to coerce him into divulging all that could be learnt from him connected with the meetings of the sepoy's. This was at once done, and by means of intimidation and encouragement, and under promise of a comparatively large pecuniary reward, he was induced to divulge the plot which the sepoy's who met at his house had concocted. I learnt from him that in the triple character of priest, devotee, and physician, he had acquired the confidence of a large and influential body of the native military, who believed themselves perfectly safe with him, and who made his house their place of rendezvous and consultation.

It was then arranged that he should afford me the opportunity of being an eye-witness of what took place at his house when the sepoy's met there.

He was given to understand that any attempt on his part to play me false would be at his peril; and measures were taken, on the occasion of my first visit, to guard against surprise.

The house occupied by Gunga Pursad consisted of an ante-room about thirty feet long and fifteen

feet wide, with a narrow passage leading from the entrance to a small room at the back of the ante-room.

I proceeded to the house on the following evening in disguise, with my assistant Mr. Edington, and a trustworthy native policeman. We were shown into the small room before the sepoys came there.

Three or four small holes, made in the wall of plastered wicker-work which separated that room from the ante-room, enabled us to witness what took place when the sepoys were present.

They came into the room one by one at short intervals; and though their number was not large, it was *not* possible, from the conversation which took place, that there could be any misconception as to the widespread disloyalty of the sepoys in Bombay, or as to their traitorous intentions.

It was necessary, however, in taking steps to obtain evidence to bring them to justice, to bear in mind how emphatically sepoy defection was ignored in Bombay, as in every other place, by the officers of their own regiments.

To have depended upon police evidence alone to prove the charge of treason against the sepoys, would have been to make shipwreck at once of the endeavour to bring them to punishment.

Against such evidence I foresaw would be arrayed an overwhelming number of witnesses—their own officers—to prove that every man in the lines had

been most carefully looked after, and that the conduct of one and all of the accused was above suspicion.

I foresaw, also, that unless I went to Gunga Pursad's house, accompanied by an officer belonging to one of the native regiments in Bombay, my efforts to bring treason to punishment would prove unavailing, and that I should be placing myself in a questionable and doubtful position.

I therefore applied to Major Barrow, the officer commanding the Marine Battalion, to accompany me to the sepoy meetings; and he readily complied with my request.

As my daily visits to the major to accompany him to the meetings, would have excited suspicion, he very kindly, at my request, came to my house, where we disguised ourselves differently each day; and, with Mr. Edington, proceeded to the Back Bay, and there separating, we, one by one, reached the place of meeting on foot.

These visits we were able to repeat only four times. The presence of one of us in the immediate neighbourhood of the house, on the last occasion, excited suspicion, so that Gunga Pursad deemed it advisable that we should discontinue to go there.

During these visits, however, the following facts were very clearly ascertained:—

1st. That an outbreak and revolt, on the last night of the Mohorum of, 1857, had been determined upon by the sepoys of the regiments in Bombay.

2ndly. That their purpose had not been carried out in consequence of the "hoosharee," or vigilance maintained on the occasion.

3rdly. That it had been subsequently determined that the outbreak should take place during the ensuing Dewallee (when it is the practice with natives of all classes to gather together, in a room, all the wealth in the house for the purpose of worshipping it).

4thly. Their plan was to kill "as many as they might chance to come across, or all who happened to oppose them;" to pillage Bombay as speedily as possible, and then to march out of the island.

The plan of the contemplated outbreak and revolt was not discussed and matured at the meetings which we witnessed, *but were spoken of as matters that had been already planned and determined upon.*

The outbreak fixed for the last night of the Mohorum of 1857 had been put off, it was said, because of the vigilance that was maintained on the occasion. By postponing it to the time of the Dewallee festival, they calculated upon finding us less watchful, and therefore less prepared to resist.

Nothing fell from the sepoys during the meetings in Gunga Pursad's house which tended to show why they deemed it necessary that they should quit Bombay as soon as possible after the rise, and the pillage and the "destruction of as many as they might fall in with, or should oppose them;" nor was anything

stated, as to what they intended to do after quitting Bombay; but the statement of Gunga Pursad on these points may, I think, be depended upon. From the time he became an agent of the police his conduct was characterised by a total disregard of the ties which bound him to the native military, and by singleness of purpose to lay bare their wicked designs. He may therefore, I think, be believed when he stated that the sepoys determined upon quitting Bombay, as quickly as possible, in order that they might not come into collision with the European sailors, who, they believed, would cause them trouble and annoyance; and their plan, after leaving Bombay, he said, was to reach Poona as soon as possible, and, in union with the native regiments there, proclaim the sovereignty of the Nana as Peshwa of the Deccan. This, from what Gunga Pursad stated, was intended as a blind to quiet the inhabitants of Poona, and lead them to the belief that the good of the people at large was the object that the sepoys had in view.

What transpired in Gunga Pursad's house was duly reported to Brigadier Shortt by Major Barrow on the one hand, and by myself to the Private Secretary, for the information of Lord Elphinstone, on the other. Courts-martial were in due course convened by order of Government; and the proceedings resulted in the condemnation of a drill havildar of the Marine Battalion, and a sepoy of the 10th Regiment Native Infantry, who were blown away from guns, and in the

transportation to the Andamans, for life, of a soobedar and two sepoys of the 11th Regiment; and two sepoys of the 10th Regiment Native Infantry.

One other sepoy of the 10th Regiment was also convicted of treasonable intentions, and transported *on evidence given against him by sepoys of his own regiment.*

Major Barrow's astonishment when he saw some of his own men in Gunga Pursad's house was remarkable. He exclaimed, "My God, my own men! Is it possible!" And his memorable words to me at the court-martial were, "It is well I was present, and saw and heard them myself, but for which I should have been here, not as a witness for the prosecution, but as one for the defence: *such was my confidence in these men.*"

When the said revelations were reported by Major Barrow to Brigadier Shortt, the latter, Major Barrow informed me, in astonishment, exclaimed, "Mr. Forjett has caught us at last."

Happily this intended mutiny was nipped in the bud by the very opportune assistance rendered by Colonel Barrow. And it will, I think, be admitted that I had exercised a wise discretion in evincing the determination I did at the sepoy lines, when the sepoys, many with arms in their hands that were found loaded, were abusing me; and their officers, keeping them back sword in hand, were crying out to me, for God's sake, to go away, and that my presence

was exciting the men. It will be admitted too, I think, that I exercised an equally wise discretion, when, believing sepoy loyalty not to be depended upon, I formed the resolution of disobeying the orders of Government, and keeping my Europeans together, and so posting them as to have led to the postponement of the outbreak that had been arranged to take place on the last night of the Mohorum.

If the mutiny in Bombay had been successful, Lord Elphinstone was of opinion, and this is indisputable, that nothing could have saved Hyderabad and Poona and the rest of the presidency, and after that, he said, "Madras was sure to go too."

Soobedar Mahomed Booden was married to a daughter of a pensioned soobedar of the Marine Battalion, and being a Wahabee, I believed would have experienced no difficulty in being admitted into the councils of the native military; but as it happened both he and a very intelligent jemedar of police, together with two of my detectives, were excluded from their treasonable discussions *merely because they did not belong to the army.*

The volunteer horse furnished by the civilians, that patrolled the streets of Bombay at night during the Mutiny, mentioned by General Jacob and Sir John Kaye, *never existed.*

CHAPTER III.

LORD SALISBURY AND LORD DE MAULEY.

THERE are conditions of atmospheric haziness which the brightest rays of the sun fail to penetrate, and there are states of intellectual obscurity which the clearest facts fail to illumine. Problems in politics are at best only guesses at truth : they consist, for the most part, of probable and possible contingencies, and are solved, for the most part, by hypothetical processes and arguments. A bold and confident debater, as the Marquis of Salisbury, may have found it easy to overthrow a political argument to the satisfaction of himself and his peers in Parliament; but his success does not necessarily depreciate the value of the opinions expressed by Lord de Mauley as to the aggressiveness of Russia in Central Asia and Asia Minor, and the consequences they are naturally tending to.

The Secretary of State for India, the custodian of England's honour and interests in India, and of the welfare of three hundred millions of population, cannot be forgetful of the fact that from the earliest time that Russia has become a power her aim has been the acquisition of Constantinople. Her eighth attempt on Turkey resulted in the Crimean War,

which was frustrated by the combined efforts of England and France and Sardinia, at a considerable sacrifice of English blood, and expenditure of English gold to the extent of one hundred millions. He cannot be oblivious, too, of the fact that this frustration of Russian efforts brought about the death of an emperor, who is said to have died broken-hearted, and inspired the nation at large with the belief that if the goal of their ambition, the object of their desire, is to be reached, it can only be by a simultaneous move on India as well. Since that time Russia has made slow and certain progress towards India, capturing places of strategic importance, and fortifying her positions as she advanced.

It was only when Russian troops were on the march to Khiva, that our Government, aroused from their state of quiescence, protested against Russia's encroachments in the direction of India. This was followed by the mission of Count Schouvaloff to England, to convey to our Government the solemn assurances of the emperor that his object was only to chastise the Khan and people of Khiva for the wrongs inflicted on Russian subjects, and that after inflicting the chastisement, his purpose was to withdraw, and to do as we had done in Abyssinia. Sir Erskine Perry and Sir Harry Verney will remember my saying at the time that notwithstanding the solemn assurances of the emperor, every inch of ground the Russians took they would keep, and that

the count's mission was merely to dupe the Government. Subsequent events verified what I had then said.

The English Press and the English people were loud in their expressions of joy and congratulations on the occasion of the marriage of the Duke of Edinburgh with the Princess Imperial of Russia. That marriage was, unquestionably, prompted by a deeply designed policy on the part of the Russians. Its object was to inspire the British Cabinet and the British nation with the belief that, with such an alliance, Russia could not possibly entertain any views adverse to British interests, and Russia sought, by that means, to ensure to herself freedom in the prosecution of her designs against Turkey. Lord Salisbury will remember my letter to him, written more than three years ago, suggesting the construction of dams in India for the storage of rain-water, to guard against drought and the calamities of famine ; and he will remember, that in that letter the Emperor of Russia's message to the British Cabinet, and the marriage of the Duke of Edinburgh, were thus alluded to:—

“Sir Arthur Cotton, a short time ago, advocated the construction of water-ways and canals, in an able paper read before the Society of Arts. By all means let us have as many canals as possible, but at the same time let us have railways as well, through the length and breadth of India, for on railways will depend the future of the India which is now ours ; but for which, *notwithstanding*

the honied promises and professions of diplomacy, and notwithstanding the recent 'auspicious matrimonial alliance that is to bind two of the most powerful nations in the bonds of amity and concord,' we shall sooner or later have to fight. The time when we shall be driven to maintain our rights and authority by force of arms will, of course, depend upon the political evolutions in Europe."

I am not called upon to express any opinion on the advisability, or otherwise, of appointing a consul to some town in Central Asia as suggested by Lord de Mauley; but I do venture to state that the grounds upon which that suggestion was based are by no means wanting in importance of the deepest gravity. That the Russians have conquered large provinces in the direction of India, that they are steadily pressing on, that they are extending and connecting important centres by railways, that a railway extension from the sea of Aral to the Caspian is now in course of construction, that the Caspian is a Russian sea, over which Russia exercises unlimited sway, that that sea, as well as Russian territory itself, borders on Persia, are facts as clear as is the light of day. And need the Secretary of State for India be told that Russia in Persia would be equivalent to Russia in India?

The Secretary of State for India states that India is separated from Russian territory by mountain chains comprising some thousands of miles of

intervening country. Is it that he has computed the distance with Afghanistan on the one side and Persia and Beloochistan on the other as neutral zones? Even then his method of reckoning is as delusive as the measurement by the "rule of thumb" he so facetiously described and ridiculed. He contended, with good humour and pleasantry, that the danger, whatever it might be, of Russia making advances on India, was not in the direction Lord de Mauley indicated, and that while Lord de Mauley's observations might possibly interest a future generation of statesmen, they had no reference to any immediate urgency. This is correct in respect to the direction; but Lord de Mauley, nevertheless, gave expression to a weighty matter as to the danger to India of such approach. There is no probability that the Russians will be so short-sighted as to place their necks in jeopardy, by attempting the invasion of India through the intricate mountain gorges of the Hindoo Koosh: they would by no means find it necessary to do this. The capture, and the virtual retention of Khiva in opposition to the protest of the British Government, and in violation of the solemn assurance that the object was *not* conquest, had produced on the Turkoman hordes in the neighbourhood, on the Afghans, on the Persians, and even on the thinking portion of the population of India, a deep impression that the power of Russia was such as prevented England from contending with her; for,

it was said, that having protested against the occupation, England would have taken steps to dislodge the invaders had she but the power to do so. Such was the effect with reference to the comparatively small matter of the aggression upon Khiva. It was remembered, too, that in the Crimean War, England, France, Sardinia, and Turkey were united against Russia, and that it was only under this quadruple alliance that Russia was vanquished; that France having been since rendered helpless, it was concluded that England dared not oppose herself to Russia single-handed. The Oriental mind is incapable of weighing or appreciating the clogs, the obligations, and the intricacies of a constitutional government. The only thing that their minds are capable of resting upon is, that the "sirkar" is supreme, its will paramount; but the idea that a government is bound to attend to the wishes of its subjects, or may be influenced by popular opinion, is far beyond their conception. The one thing that they do see is, that the British Government, with folded arms, is regarding the present state of affairs with apparent indifference, and this inactivity is doing incalculable mischief throughout the East. In Afghanistan its effect is seriously perturbing. The Ameer is in a painful state of doubt whether he should make common cause with the British, because of their proximity, and the danger that a manifestation hostile to them may lead to, or whether, Russia being the more

powerful, he should form an alliance with her. If the intelligence lately conveyed by the Indian mail is to be depended upon, and I see no reason why it should not, the probability is that such an alliance has been already formed, for it appears he has ordered "all Afghans who are in the British service to choose between giving up their employment or leaving the country with their families." And, further, that he will receive no more arms or money from the Indian Government.

There can be no doubt that Mr. Gladstone and the Liberals have contributed largely to the complication of the Eastern Question by the enunciation of views which have tended to exhibit England as divided. Considering the share Mr. Gladstone had in bringing about the Crimean War; considering his undoubted knowledge of the systematic intrigues practised by Russia to keep Turkey in a state of domestic turmoil and violence; considering the share that she had in bringing about the Bulgarian atrocities; and, above all, considering his knowledge of the hereditary ambition of Russia to possess Constantinople, it was matter of surprise to find him straining his efforts to the utmost to persuade England at large to believe that Russia's object was purely humanitarian, and not conquest! He asks, too, "who has lifted a finger against British interests?" He will yet see.

Finding the majority by which he had been

installed Premier of England attenuated; that some measures of his Government had sustained defeat; and believing that the ballot, which he had been the means of carrying, would re-establish his power, Mr. Gladstone brought on the sudden dissolution of Parliament, and took England by surprise; but the elections proved that the result had been greatly miscalculated. Then followed the purchase by the present Government of the Suez Canal shares, which called forth the ecstasies of the nation. But it was condemned by Mr. Gladstone; and he engaged in the unavailing effort of proving it an unworthy measure.

It is not surprising that disappointments connected with rivalry in office should have distorted the powerful intellect of even a Gladstone; but that political sagacity should have proved erratic in matters of ordinary experience and common sense, is by no means excusable. To sacrifice British interests is to sacrifice British honour; and, to whatever extent Mr. Gladstone may indulge in repudiating the idea of British interests being imperilled, the Government, in my humble estimation, very properly and wisely, and certainly without losing sight of the rights of humanity, took its stand upon those grounds, and the effort made by Mr. Gladstone to dislodge them has been infelicitous and pitiable. Speaking a short time ago at Birmingham, Mr. Gladstone, availing himself of the presence of "our friend Mr. Dale," addressed his audience in the following terms:—"In dealing

with individuals, does he find it necessary continually to preach to his congregation and stimulate each of them to pay due regard to his own interests? I apprehend that if he did, he would be held in a much lower estimate than that in which you actually hold him ;” and he also added, “ To talk to nations of the necessity of maintaining their interests is throwing a dangerous temptation in their way.”

This is placing the morality of nations and of individuals upon a dead level, for he assumes that there is no distinction whatever between them. The rights and duties of individuals are defined and maintained by law and social usage, and are so effectually safe-guarded that individual morality is not required to concern itself on the rights of self-interest. But how is it in regard to the morality of nations? What law is there to protect one nation against the encroachments and aggression of another? International guarantees? Russia has set the example of treating the most solemn guarantees as so much waste paper; and under the pretence of a mission of humanity and of protection to the Slav population from Turkish atrocity and misrule, is now pursuing a course which is calculated most seriously to endanger British interests, both at home and abroad, and, with Mr. Gladstone's assistance, had so imposed upon the perceptions and judgment of a portion of the nation as, in a measure, to force the Government to abandon the means for the protection of British interests.

While France was the foremost military power on the Continent, and was ever ready to join in the repression of unjust aggressions, England needed no ally in her mission of justice and international fair-dealing. When Germany was about to engage in war with France, Russia—as might have been expected—declared her neutrality, and, in the event of any other power uniting with France, pledged herself to co-operate with Germany. France was afterwards believed to have been thoroughly beaten at Sedan, and England, as a military power, was isolated and rendered comparatively ineffective. This was doubtless followed by a large effusion of German gratitude towards Russia. Russia's bitterness against the Paris Treaty was, at the same time, no secret, and there can be no question that, under Prince Bismarck's inspiration, the attempt was made by the Russian Emperor to tear up that treaty. England, though at the time in the hands of a Liberal Government, strenuously remonstrated. The discovery, in the meantime, was made that France, instead of being thoroughly beaten, was preparing to fight it out to the bitter end, and Prince Bismarck, conscious that his advice for putting an end to the Paris Treaty had been premature, suggested that Russia should plead that she intended no violation, but that she simply desired an alteration in the Treaty according to the altered circumstances of Europe. It was at the same time suggested, by the way of flattering England and

throwing the Government off its guard, that a conference should be held in London. The bait, of course, took, and Russian diplomatists over-reaching the sagacity of British statesmen, had it all their own way, and carried all disputed points.

The war with Germany was one of provocation on the part of France, and it was right and proper that she should have been left to meet the consequences. But when it became evident that the supposed demolition of her power had prompted an act of international outrage of so grave a character as the attempt to set aside the Paris Treaty, and thereby imperil British interests; and when too there were good grounds for believing that Germany was an accessory to such attempted violation, her conduct should at once have been subjected to the test of proof, by requesting her to join England, Austria, and Turkey, the other signatories to the Treaty, in the protest against the attempt to set aside that Treaty. If political integrity had not been quite dismissed from the state councils of Germany, that request, just and reasonable in itself, would have been assented to; but, if not, then was the moment, instead of assenting to a Conference, to have set aside the blandishment of diplomacy, and to have adopted stringent measures against Germany. The moral effect of this on France would have been great. Austria, pledged to join in the struggle for her own sake, would have come forward, while Italy, that owed France a debt of gratitude, would in

all probability have joined in the common cause, and Russia being at this time frozen up, the Government, by a stroke of policy, at once bold and determined, would have brought the war to a termination without firing a single shot, and have afforded a practical illustration of what England could do, and revived the recollection of Cromwell's cherished boast, that the name of an Englishman should be as much feared as had ever been that of a Roman. But witness the contrast. Mr. Gladstone's Government remonstrated with that of Berlin, because of the enormity of the war indemnity demanded of France, and suggested a reduction. With what result? Mr. Gladstone made the acknowledgment in Parliament that no notice was taken of it. *It was treated with silent contempt!!!* Had a bold attitude been assumed at the proper moment, the after results of Sedan would have been obviated, and have rendered France the perpetual ally of England, and Russia would not then have dared to tamper with British interests.

I trust Sir Harry Verney will pardon my again alluding to our railway meeting and conversation. The subject touched upon was the political prospects in Europe. This was immediately after the meeting of the three emperors at Berlin, and I expressed my belief that the fate of Turkey had been sealed on that occasion. Prince Bismarck has been mainly instrumental in bringing about German unity. There is, however, the Austrian portion, the amalgamation of which as well, I had no doubt, was a matter of

deep concern to him, and I was of opinion that the arrangement come to at that meeting, in the prospect of a redistribution of territory, was that Austria should give up that portion to Germany, and recoup herself by joining Russia in the division of Turkey. This is still my belief. Austria, up to the present time, has made no hostile movement: her Hungarian population is doubtless keeping her in check, and she is waiting her opportunity; or what can be the meaning of the Russians being allowed, in their efforts to subjugate Turkey, to bridge over the Danube and cut off Austria's means of sea communication with the outside world? The wished-for opportunity will come so soon as Russia has vanquished Turkey, when the opposition of Hungary could easily be put down with Russian assistance, as was done on a previous occasion. These are the hypotheses by which Austria's prolonged passivity may be explained. Were these not the arrangements, Austria would, no doubt, have mobilised and held herself in readiness for action, as on the occasion of the Crimean War, when the danger to her was less formidable than at the present time. The discovery may yet be made that the understanding come to at the imperial meeting was, that Russia should go in and win, and that the cost should be mutually shared at the division of the spoil. If intervention should be eventually determined upon, it would be happy, in the interests of Europe, if it be not a hostile

intervention in furtherance of the objects of acquisition of the triple alliance. It is to be remembered, too, that in the drawing up of the Andrassy Note and the Berlin Memorandum, England was not requested to take part, and that the documents were only afterwards communicated to her.

It is to be hoped that those who were at one time disposed to view Russia as engaged only in a work of mercy, in a mission of humanity, are now beginning to penetrate her motives. The conquest and possession of Constantinople has been the long-cherished desire by which she has been tempted on. It was believed that any attempt on the part of Russia to gain a footing in Turkey would compromise German and Austrian interests, and at once evoke their hostility. Instead, however, of a compromise of interests, both, it will be found, would be greatly advantaged by the event. The supineness displayed by German and Austrian plenipotentiaries during the Conference, the peremptory interdiction conveyed on one occasion to the former by Prince Bismarck, to withhold assent to certain proposals discussed during the sittings, clearly evidence an understanding between those powers; while, on the other hand, the vast mobilisation of Russian troops on the frontier, the enormous stores of corn and food laid up in Wallachi even while the Conference was sitting, the large extent to which the Russian arsenals have been taxed during the last three years for the manufacture of arms and

munitions of war, and the large contracts entered into with America for the supply of arms, all indicate that war was the object that Russia had in view. Nor were the preparations in Asia less extensive, nor carried out with less forethought. And while Europe was being diverted with notes, memorandums, protocols, and solemn professions of peace, it was patent to every small chemist in London, from the enormous quantity of quinine that was purchased and stored away by Russia, that war was a foregone conclusion.

Russia's object now is to press on towards Constantinople, and if successful in vanquishing the Turks, our tenure of India would become precarious. The charm of England's prestige, which has enabled a handful of Europeans to hold in subjection the hundreds of millions of the populations of India, would be dispelled, and the Oriental mind, divested of the influences of the spell, would learn to invest Russia's power and irresistibility with highly exaggerated notions of superiority, and British supremacy, now standing on the pinnacle of their estimation, would then be precipitated to the very lowest depth. The Mahomedans especially, so deeply interested in the fate of Turkey, would view us with contempt. Russia's success, in fact, would *effectually demoralise India*.

It is to be regretted that Lord Salisbury's attitude at the Conference was not marked with more firmness and decision. The Russian Plenipotentiary, as a matter of course, presented himself with a catalogue

of demands which he and his Government must have been well aware that Europe would not countenance, and that Turkey would reject. Then, under pretence of large-hearted professions of benevolence on the part of His Imperial Majesty, and solemn repudiation of views of conquest, was played out that course of mock moderation by which, clause after clause, the Russian demands were allowed to be reduced to a minimised minimum, to which, eventually, the Plenipotentiaries assented. But there was nothing upon which to ground the hope that the Government of the Sultan would accept this final resolution; on the contrary, the opposition evinced by the Turkish Plenipotentiaries was stern and uncompromising. And it was easy to perceive that while General Ignatieff was indulging in specious declarations of his august Sovereign "having no other principles in view than those of humanity and moral duty," he was doing all in his power to pave the way for the invasion of Turkey, with the concurrence of the Plenipotentiaries. That Lord Salisbury was well aware of this is clear from his speech at the Conference of the 15th of January (VIII. Protocol). He there states, "The Porte should consider the injurious consequences that may result from such a change in the public opinion of Europe, and then," he adds, "*we can foresee dangers AT HAND which threaten THE VERY EXISTENCE of Turkey* if she allows herself to be entirely isolated." He further stated "that it was

his duty to free Her Majesty's Government of all responsibility *for what may happen*, and that he was instructed to declare formally that Great Britain is resolved not to give her sanction either to maladministration or oppression." Great Britain certainly cannot accord her sanction to maladministration or oppression; but how does Lord Salisbury reconcile this announcement with his report to Lord Derby, of the 4th of January—only eleven days previously—that "it is probable the movements that had recently taken place in Bulgaria and had been so terribly repressed, were due in part to AGITATORS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALITY." He might very properly have said that it was owing *entirely* to Russian conspiracy and intrigue. A careful study of the part taken by Lord Salisbury at the Conference does not inspire one with the idea that the position he had taken up, as Her Majesty's special Plenipotentiary, was an independent one. The impression left is, that influenced by the superior force of will of the Russian General, the Secretary of State for India was led into a complete forgetfulness of British interests. From first to last there is not one word in the Blue Book on the subject. Having made up his mind to join the Plenipotentiaries in announcing their final resolution to the Sultan, and following it up with the intimation that, if not accepted, Turkey would be left alone to take the consequences, he should, at the same time, have taken his stand on the grounds of British interests, and have

given Russia and Turkey clearly to understand that England, though relying on the promises and pledges of the Emperor, that Constantinople is not an object with him, would, notwithstanding, in view to possible contingencies, hold herself at liberty, in the event of the Pruth being crossed by Russian troops, to despatch a British force into Turkey for the protection of British interests. Thus might have been shadowed forth the intentions of the British Government, and have placed the present movement of troops beyond the sneers of Russian ridicule, and the misrepresentations of the small party of her partisans in England. As it is, the Secretary of State for India has seriously imperilled British interests. Russian success, if such should be the result of the war, would reduce our tenure of India to a very short term. Our best Indian friends and feudatories, looking down with contempt upon British power, would deem it necessary to make their peace with Russia. The success of the Turks, on the other hand, would lead the Mahomedan world of India and of Asia to view British power with a *deeper* contempt for having abandoned Turkey in the hour of her need, and from Turkey — their co-religionists — having successfully accomplished, single-handed, what England, they would say, dared not have taken part in. All this might have been avoided, if Lord Salisbury, uninfluenced by the Russian Plenipotentiary, had, in the event of Russian troops crossing the Pruth, provided

for the occupation of Constantinople and a certain extent of territory inland, on the understanding that if Russian efforts should prove successful, we should remain in permanent possession; or if the Turks succeeded in repelling the invasion, we should give it back to them.

It would probably be stated that Turkey would not have assented to such a proposal. If such had been the case, British diplomacy at the Turkish capital must have been a mere sham, if an arrangement of such vital importance to both Governments could not have been carried.

Speaking a short time ago at Nottingham, Mr. Gladstone, expressing himself with the confidence of an oracle, declared, that if the Government had followed his advice "not one drop of human blood would have been shed" in Turkey, which, he said, was owing to the British fleet having been despatched to Besika Bay. Whatever might have been the measures of the Government, Lord Salisbury, there can be no doubt, effectually played the disciple to Mr. Gladstone's "policy of coercion"; but both Mr. Gladstone and Lord Salisbury very greatly misapprehended the characteristic of the Moslim. Left to himself, the slow process of national decay might eventually have brought about his disappearance from Europe; but his religious frenzy having been vivified by a sense of danger, the resolution became implanted in him of stern and unyielding resistance, and this was unmistakably

apparent, from the earliest stages of the Conference, from the *très bien* of the Turkish Plenipotentiaries to all efforts at persuasion.

The gathering at Delhi of the princes and nobles of India, the reception accorded to and the titles bestowed on them by the Governor-General on the occasion of the proclamation of Her Majesty as Empress of India, was a grand stroke of conciliatory policy, and would have ensured the most satisfactory results; but like the appeal to the better judgment of the native soldiery, the recognition of good services, and the distribution of crosses of honours and purses of money by Sir Henry Lawrence on the occasion of the Durbar held by him at Lucknow, *it was too late*, and, as was the case on that occasion, it was ascribed to fear.

Russia, calculating largely on European credulity, started with the plea of redressing the wrongs inflicted by Turkey on the Christian population of Europe; but what was it that led her into Asia? Would she have been satisfied with the province of Erzeroum alone, which it is urged was her object, if the fortune of war had placed it in her possession? The thirst for victory becomes more and more insatiable, especially when incited by sturdy resistance and feelings of revenge; and to expect that an army that is aggressive would limit the bounds of its aggression, is to expect that for which history accords no warrant.

That the policy of Russia has always been a

shifting policy, and that her promises are not to be depended upon, is evidenced by several instances of her own conduct. In 1828 she acted in alliance with the great powers, but so soon as the Turkish fleet was destroyed at Navarino, she suddenly separated herself from her allies, and in opposition to their views and wishes, invaded Turkey in prosecution of her own objects. The facts connected with the Treaty of Unkiar Skillessi, surreptitiously entered into with Turkey, and the protectorate pretensions afterwards put forward by Russia in respect to the Sultan's subjects of the Greek Church, which eventually led to the Crimean War, and her conduct in regard to the Treaty of Paris, need no repetition. But be all this as it may, Russia's success in Turkey, Constantinople in her possession, and the command she would acquire over the Black Sea, would deeply imperil British interests in Europe and in India. In Europe, especially in respect to England's universally acknowledged naval supremacy, which Russia would in a few years render a nullity, unless countervailed by the addition of millions to the taxes. In India it will shake our power to the very centre. And what are the means for averting such a calamity?

His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales came away from India very favourably impressed with the sepoy army. And there is a very large body of British officers of sepoy regiments who, I am aware, would stand up in defence of sepoy valour, of sepoy

allegiance, and of sepoy devotion ; but it is necessary only for a moment to call to mind certain incidents in connection with the Indian Mutiny. Could confidence in their men on the part of their officers have been more generous, more perfect ? The very idea of their fidelity being questioned led to scenes in which swords were unbuckled and flung away or snapped, and resignation of commissions tendered with the wildest sympathy and tenderness for their sepoy comrades. But what did it all result in. It resulted in the sepoys shooting down most of those officers, and in slaughtering their wives and children in cold blood. If confidence in sepoy valour and devotion should, in the future, be persisted in by their European officers, the mistake would again prove as egregious as it did during the period of the Indian Mutiny. At the present time reports are tolerably concurrent that the object of the Russians in Turkey is the extermination of the Turks. It might well have been then said, that the object of the sepoy army was the extermination of the white population.

This reminds me of a remark made by Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons, during a debate on the Bulgarian atrocities. When the conduct of the Russians in Poland and elsewhere was alluded to, his reply was, "Produce the papers in regard to the conduct of the British in India during the Mutiny, and you will see what had been there done." This, again, is another instance of the extent to which a great mind

is liable to suffer perversion. In India the slaughter of European men, women, and children, had been appalling. Can human nature contemplate with subdued feelings, cruelties and horrors the most revolting, and not feel stirred up to revenge? Under the wildest excitement of the moment, some outrages may have been committed; but is that to be compared to the cold-blooded atrocities perpetrated by the Russians in subjecting men and women to the punishment of the knout, and in many instances beating them to death, because of a conscientious adherence to their own religious belief? Or to houses being set on fire, in which were the sick and wounded, and, on their attempting to escape, shooting and bayoneting them?

To proceed with my subject. I have no hesitation in stating that in the event of an emergency, such as being brought into the presence of a European foe, the sepoy army would prove itself worthless. I shall leave my own experience of and association with the sepoy's elements out of the question, and will found my statement on historical and official record. In the early days of the British career in India, when their military measures were in a state of inception, and British fighting-power was held in very low estimation, the French, more powerful, more advanced in their organisations, landed at Madras, "compelled the town and fort to capitulate," displayed the French flag on Fort St. George, seized the

contents of the warehouses as prizes of war, carried off the Governor and several of the first gentlemen as prisoners to Pondicherry, and marched them in a triumphal procession through the town (Macaulay's "Essays," page 451). This inspired the native princes of that part of the continent of India with contempt for the British, and one of those princes, with reference to the incident I shall now refer to, stated that "he never before believed that Englishmen could fight." Soon after, Clive, with a handful of European and sepoy soldiers, suddenly appeared before and captured Arcot, was himself besieged by the forces of the Nabob and the French, and, notwithstanding the presence of a hundred and fifty French European soldiers—in those days by no means a contemptible number—he vanquished them all, and inspired his enemies with the belief that he was *the stronger*, as compared with the French. And what was the result? Six hundred sepoys who had served in the enemy's army came "over to Clive's quarters, and were taken into British service." Instances of this kind were by no means uncommon.

In the Sepoy War, "with reference to the small disaster in Ramoo in Burmah, it is stated (page 266) nothing tries the fidelity of the sepoy army so fatally as disaster. When news came that the war had opened with a great failure, strange stories relating to the difficulty of the country to be traversed, the deadliness of the climate to be endured, and the

prowess of the enemy, forced their way into circulation, and the willingness which the sepoy had once shown to take part in the operations beyond the frontier began to subside, and they were eager to find a pretext for refusing to march." With reference to the Afghan disaster (page 174), "The sepoy learnt then, for the first time, that a British army is not invincible in the field, that the great fortune of the Company which had carried us on gloriously through so many great enterprises, might sometimes disastrously fail us." "The charm of a century of conquests was then broken." "The crisis was a perilous one, and the most experienced Indian statesmen regarded it with dismay, not knowing what a day might produce. They had no faith in our allies (the Sikhs), no faith in our soldiery. An army of retribution, under a wise and trusted leader, went forth to restore the tarnished lustre of the British name, but ominous whispers soon came from his camp that that army was tainted—that the sepoy regiments, no longer *assured and fortified by the sight of that ascendant star of fortune which once had shone with so bright and steady a light, shrunk from entering the passes.*"

The occurrence at Purwun-Durrah, in the Kohistan of Cabool, is thus mentioned in general orders by the Governor-General of India, under date 2nd November, 1841:—"Two squadrons of the 2nd Regiment of Bengal Light Cavalry, comprising two-thirds of the whole regiment, while confronting a body of Afghan

horse, were ordered to charge, but could not be induced to follow their European officers ; and, further, when their manifest cowardice emboldened the enemy to become the assailants, so far from defending themselves, they turned their horses and fled in panic and inextricable confusion, and only staid their flight when they had gained the rear of the column from which they had been detached in pursuit. The noble example set them by their European officers, whom they basely allowed to charge unsupported, and of whom Captains Fraser and Ponsonby were severely wounded, and Lieutenant and Adjutant Crispen killed on the spot, rendered their dastardly conduct the more inexcusable, and imposes on the Government the necessity of removing them from the army."

Such was the cowardice displayed in the presence of an Oriental enemy by a crack, high caste cavalry regiment. What, then, will be the effect upon the native army if brought face to face with a European foe—the Russians for instance, a name which for years past has been associated in the Oriental mind with what is by no means weak or pusillanimous? If the efforts of the Turks in repelling the tide of invasion should prove unsuccessful, and Russia plants herself in Constantinople, and is successful in Asia, our hold on India would be at her mercy. Her success, while elevating her irresistibility to the highest pinnacle of importance, would reduce British estimation to the lowest depth, and place Persia and Afghanistan at her

feet. In such a case a native army would be more an element of danger than of safety, and our only dependence will be in our European forces, but they are merely a handful, and would require to be largely reinforced.

The Sikhs and Napaulese may be very good soldiers. Led on from victory to victory, they may prove good warriors; but a single check would undermine their loyalty, and lead them to side with the party which, for the time, may appear to be the stronger.

If Russia's present efforts should prove temporarily unsuccessful, we should have time which ought to be utilised to the fullest possible extent in maturing arrangements for the protection of India. An Oriental foe is out of the question. Russia is the only European power with whom India—whatever may be the opinion of the Secretary of State—is an object. To effect our purpose the services of British officers will be available in abundance for training the Turkoman tribes, the Afghans, and the Persians, in the system of European warfare. This should be taken advantage of under arrangements for officering their army with British officers. This could be easily effected by sending them to enter their service, and any little difficulty that might present itself may be smoothed down by means of a little judicious diplomacy. Hobart Pasha and Colonel Valentine Baker, and others, have already set the example; and the earliest opportunity might then be taken to dislodge the Russians from Khiva, and bar Russia's progress in the direction of India.

The Turks, fighting for existence, have been doing admirably; but if their efforts should fail, matters in regard to India will be rendered urgent. There are some reports in Bombay of the despatch of troops to Egypt, which is hardly to be credited. In the event of war, Russia will not find Egypt within easy access: nor is she likely to run the gauntlet of attempting an ingress by the way of Afghanistan, unless the Ameer, seduced by the promises of Russia, proves perfidious. In such case, Quetta will of course be at once occupied; but Persia, from the Caspian, there can be no doubt, would be selected by preference, as the ground best suited for concentration and studied arrangements, and this ought to be guarded against at all cost and at all risk.

With railways traversing India, with our European forces gradually augmented to about 120,000 under a permanent residence arrangement, with a society in England for the promotion of female emigration to provide our soldiers with wives, so that, in time, the forces might be recruited on the spot, the present enormously large sepoy army might, in my very humble opinion, be allowed to die out. The general tranquillity of the country has not been by any means dependent on the sepoy army. The police has always, with some very rare exceptions, been found equal to maintaining order, and, under the possible contingency of disaffection or conspiracy among the people, a superintendent of police

of ordinary judgment, with an efficiently organised police force, ought to be able either to nip it in the bud or obtain military aid in time to prevent mischief.

The proposal for doing away with the native army will, no doubt, be deemed outrageous, and as involving an arrangement for the exclusion of the natives of India from the honourable profession of arms. It may be at the same time looked upon as foreshadowing the wish to perpetuate British rule, without reference to the rapidly growing intelligence and capacity of India to govern itself. I should be the last man in the world to entertain any such views. In suggesting that the native army should be left to die away, I have the regeneration of India more at heart than at first sight may appear to be the case. India is split up into an innumerable number of castes. The native army itself is an agglomeration of castes, and is, of all castes, the most haughty and overbearing. So long as these internal social divisions continue, so long will India be deprived of the power to govern herself. If by any chance England should lose her hold on India, India left to herself would soon exhibit a moral chaos, an anarchy, all the more embittered by the restraints in which the bold, the daring, and the licentious among her populations have been held. If the efforts of the sepoy army during the period of the Mutiny had been successful in bringing about our extermination, they would soon afterwards have

commenced the work of oppression and bloodshed among themselves, and that would have continued to be the normal condition in which India would have remained. Education, however, is advancing, and caste prejudices are fast crumbling away. I was myself on one occasion, in Bombay, surprised by the request of a high caste Hindoo gentleman, now in a high social and official position, who called to see me. He said he was thirsty, and asked for a glass of water. I rose to get it for him. He would not have me do so, but desired that I should call my servant to fetch it. I said my servant was a low caste man. He smiled, and said that he had quite got over prejudices of that kind. Between Christian converts intermarriages of high caste Bhramins to Mharatta and Dher women have taken place, and marriages between different castes are by no means uncommon. Education and enlightenment, in combination with their own common sense, are effacing the demarcations of caste and the exclusiveness of religious prejudices, and the permanent settlement of European soldiers in India, with the permission to intermarry when any should wish to do so, will largely promote the blending of the races. The places vacated in the army by the fathers should, as a rule, be made available to the sons, if physically eligible. The Indian sun will, of course, tan their skins, but it will not impede the development of the higher virtues of courage and intellect. Time was when England too was split up and divided

by caste, when the animosities existing amongst them exceeded the animosity of "countries at war with each other," when the ordinary imprecation of a Norman was, "May I become an Englishman!" and his ordinary form of indignant denial, "Do you take me for an Englishman?" It is a matter of universal acknowledgment, too, that Englishmen owe what they are to the amalgamation of the different races which in bygone days inhabited England. India, there can be no doubt, would in time be as largely benefited by the same process. The germs being set, their growth will naturally follow, and the doing away with the native army will, in my humble opinion, hasten on the wished-for consummation. In its course religious prejudices would be blotted out, and religious barriers broken up, and love of country, taking place of these, will hold forth the hope of India being able to govern herself, and so becoming a source of strength to England.

The Government, it is to be hoped, will be despatching forty or fifty thousand troops to Turkey for the protection of British interests, if circumstances should render necessary such a measure; but the advantage to be derived from such a step can be only temporary. The Balkans and other approaches to Constantinople present configurations which it may be easy to defend, but no nation can now pretend to exclusive superiority in arms, and the word "impregnable" must be expunged from the military vocabulary. By the sharp firing of the present system of warfare

the process of mowing down is effected with a rapidity that almost bars the use of the bayonet. The memories, therefore, of the great deeds accomplished by British pluck at Cressy, at Waterloo, and other battle-fields, may be obliterated as well. The only elements which at the present time constitute invincibility are the superior masses that one nation has the power of hurling against another. In this respect our power is exceptionally limited, and Continental nations are well aware of it. So long as mankind freely indulge in the pastime of slaughtering each other, the numerical inferiority of Great Britain in combative strength would be regarded with injurious disparagement. A Bismarck has already treated the nation with contempt; and if Englishmen, notwithstanding the portentous political exigencies now evolving around them, by a childish estimation of the privileges of personal liberty, by a sentimentalism which does not stand above the level of morbid puerility, will still hold themselves restrained from following the example of Continental nations—of every man enrolling himself a soldier, which, after all, imposes but a limited restraint, he must make up his mind to resign his legitimate sphere of elevation in the scale of the Nationalities of the World, and, availing himself of the “peace at any price policy,” descend to a depth which after generations will contemplate with feelings that will not be unmingled with contempt for the legacy of dishonour that we will have bequeathed to them.

APPENDIX A.

THE CASE OF RAMCHUNDER KHISTEE.

DECISION REGARDING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF HINDOOS AND CONVERTS FROM HINDOOISM.

Suit No. 474 of 1847.—The Plaintiff sues the Defendants, Luxmee Bae and Gunesh Balkrishna, in order to gain possession from them of the person of his son Ramchundra, a child now about seven years of age.

The Defendant, Gunesh Balkrishna, in his answer No. 12, pleads that he has been unnecessarily made a Defendant in this case, and as he asserts no right to keep possession of the child, the Court considers the case as only between the Plaintiff and the other Defendant, Luxmee Bae.

The Plaintiff states that the Defendant, Luxmee Bae, is his wife by marriage, and the boy Ramchudra his child begotten of her ; that the boy is now about seven years of age ; that from the time of his birth to the present period he remained with his mother at Poona, that he (Plaintiff) became a Christian shortly after the birth of the child, and has since then resided at Nuggur ; that after his conversion he endeavoured to persuade his wife to join him, and petitioned the Magistrate to commit his child to his guardianship, but without effect ; that recently the Defendant Luxmee Bae having come to Nuggur with the boy, he took him away to his house ; that she then complained to the Magistrate, who ordered Plaintiff to give him up to his mother ; but that being the child's father he sues to be placed in possession of his child.

In answer No. 32, the Defendant Luxmee Bae states that she became pregnant with the child now claimed by Plaintiff while the latter was a member of his caste ; but that he, having afterwards become an outcaste by embracing Christianity, has, according to the Hindoo law, forfeited all his rights ; that she has brought up the child, whose " Moonz "

(ceremony of investiture with the thread as a Brahmin), &c., she has performed.

Regulation IV. of 1847, Section XXVI., prescribes.—The law to be observed in the trial of suits shall be Acts of Parliament and Regulations of Government applicable to the case. In the absence of such Acts and Regulations, the usage of the country in which the suit arose. If none such appears, the law of the Defendant; and in the absence of specific law and usage, justice, equity, and good conscience alone.

Acts of Parliament and Regulations of Government bearing on the point at issue there are none; and no question of the kind having before arisen, there is no usage of the country to which the Court can look for guidance in the case. It follows, then, that the Court must consider whether and how the Hindoo law—the law of the Defendant—bears on the question.

Plaintiff is a converted Brahmin; and it would appear from the evidence of witnesses Nos. 43 and 44 that he became a Christian from a conviction of Christianity being the only true religion.

The Shastree of the Adawlut, in his exposition of the Hindoo law on this matter (Exhibit No. 45), states that Plaintiff has by repudiating Hindooism committed “Mahapatak” (sin in the highest degree), and become an outcaste, grounding his opinion on the following texts:—

Yadnyawalkya, chapter III. verse 22.—“By omitting to do that which the Shaster enjoins, and doing that which it forbids, the person becomes an outcaste.”

Manu, chapter IX. verse 235.—“A slayer of a Brahmin, a drinker of spirituous or vinous liquors, one who steals the gold of a priest, or who violates the bed of his father, are respectively ‘Mahapatkis.’”

Yadnyawalkya, chapter III. verse 230.—“Eating that which is forbidden, reviling (his own or another’s) religion, speaking untruth to enhance his own importance, and kissing a woman in a state of menstruation, are tantamount to drinking spirituous liquor, and constitute ‘Mahapatak.’”

It is not alleged by the opposite party that Plaintiff became an outcaste by committing any of the acts enumerated as offences in the 2nd and 3rd of these texts, and they are not to be presumed from either his having renounced Hindooism or adopted Christianity.

The first text declares the penalty (whatever that may be

shall be hereafter considered) incurred by one who omits to do what the Shaster enjoins, or does what it forbids. This can apply only to a Hindoo, for none but a Hindoo can do what it enjoins. A person not a Hindoo cannot therefore be subjected to a penalty for doing what is forbidden, or omitting to do what is enjoined in the Shasters. The question then arises, is the penalty incurred by a renunciation of Hindooism *ispo facto*?

The Court deemed it necessary therefore to question the Law Officer whether the Shaster contained any specific law bearing on this point.

His answer, grounded on Manu, chapter X. verse 97, and Bhugwut Geeta, chapter III. verse 35, is as follows:—

“If one believes his own religion to be inferior, yet it is the best and causes happiness: should the religion of another be rightly practised even, still he will not attain to happiness; for he who obtains a livelihood by taking upon himself the religion of another immediately becomes an outcaste.”

The Court observes that the Law Officer has here given the text an entirely religious construction. Taken, however, with the context, viz., the five verses immediately preceding it, the passage quoted by him would appear to have reference solely to secular matters, relating to the special means of livelihood to which the several classes of Hindoos are required by the Hindoo law strictly and exclusively to confine themselves. To give the true sense of the text, therefore, it should, according to its literal construction, be rendered as follows:—

“One’s own (prescribed) office, though inferior, is the best; the office of another, though rightly (or completely) performed, is not the best; for he who obtains a livelihood by performing the office of another class, immediately becomes an outcaste.”

The following is a translation of the Bhugwut Geeta:—

“One’s own religion, though inferior, is better than the religion of another, however well followed. One’s own religion is profitable to death, while that of another inspires fear.”

In extending the meaning of this text which concerns secular employments so as to make it include religious creeds, the Court conceives that the Law Officer has put upon it a construction which it does not bear.

On the authority of Manu, chapter IX. verse 268, the Shastree states that the right of both father and mother over a son is co-ordinate.

The text merely prescribes that when that (particular) rite is performed, "the father and mother, or both (if present), shall give their son in adoption." It does not establish equality of authority. The Court concludes that the exposition rests only on the text cited from no other being quoted in support of it; while on the other hand, the interdiction of female independence by the Hindoo law, and the servile submission which the Shaster imposes* on a wife towards her husband, is opposed to and incompatible with such equality of authority.

In chapter IX. verse 241, Manu states that "for crimes by a Brahmin (who had a good character before his offence) the middle fine should be imposed, or (if his crime was premeditated) he shall be banished from the realm, taking with him his effects and his family."

The words in brackets are not in the original, but are added because they are implied from the context of the succeeding verse, as well as the wording of the above; and from it, it would appear that the Plaintiff, be his offences what they may, has a right to have his family with him.

The Shastree urges that the word परिच्छंद in the original implied property, and not family; but Professor H. H. Wilson, in his Lexicon, gives family as being one of the meanings of this word; and Sir William Jones translates it as "family."

The text however, the Shastree says, nullified by chapter III. of the Nimecosindoo, which states, "that in the 'Kritayug' there shall be no intercommunion with the people of the 'Desh' (country) of the outcaste: in the 'Tretayug' with the people of the village of which he is an inhabitant: in the 'Dwaparyug' with him and his family: in the present 'Kalliyug' with the outcaste himself:—and therefore the Shastree concludes that Plaintiff has no right to the guardianship of her son.

* Manu, chapter V. verse 148—"In childhood must a female be dependent on her father, in youth on her husband; her lord being dead, on her sons: a woman must never seek independence."

Skund Poorana, chapter IV. verses 35, 49, 82—"Let the wife who wishes to perform sacred ablution wash the feet of her lord, and drink the water, for a husband is to a wife greater than Shankur or Vishnool. The husband is her god and gooroo, and religion and its services; wherefore, abandoning everything else, she ought chiefly to worship her husband. If (after the death of the husband) the wife wishes to worship Vishnool, let her abstain, or worship him in the character of her husband, and let her always remember her husband as assuming the form of Vishnool, and denominated Hurri."

Without dwelling on the fabulousness of the "yugs," and the monstrosity of basing on them any judicial decision, the Court deems it necessary only to remark, that this text does not apply to Plaintiff's case, inasmuch as it has not been shown that he has committed any offence which the Hindoo law specifically denounces as a crime.

A Brahmin is a Brahmin so long only as he continues to wear the "Janve" or sacred thread. The investiture of the "Janve" and the communication of the Gayatri are the rites by which "the son of a Brahmin becomes a twice-born or regenerate man."

Suppose, by the divesting himself of the former characteristic emblem, previous to receiving baptism, Plaintiff ceased to be a Brahmin,* and by this act incurred the penalty of becoming an outcaste, this may involve the loss of privileges pertaining to caste membership, and of civil rights based on Hindooism; but does it entail forfeiture of natural rights? Guardianship of a child, the Court conceives, must be regarded as a natural right of the parents, and the mere renunciation of one's religious creed, or adoption of another (where the demoralisation of a child, which is opposed to the interests of society and the State, does not necessarily follow), is not shown by any of the text quoted by the Shastree to be an act involving, under any "Specific Law" of the Hindoos, the forfeiture of such a right, and this appears the more remarkable from the Hindoo law containing specific provisions for the forfeiture of every civil right, even that of the loss of control over his wife by the outcaste, while it preserves a complete silence as regards his loss of authority over his offspring.

After a careful consideration of the Hindoo law quoted by the Shastree, the Court arrives at the conclusion that the law itself contains nothing in defeasance of the right of Plaintiff to the guardianship of his son.

The Section of the Regulation which, in the absence of Acts of Parliament and Regulations of Government and usage of the country applicable to the case, provides for the adoption of the law of the Defendants in the trial of cases, prescribes that that law shall be a "Specific Law." In the absence of such law therefore the Court must, in the decision of this case, be guided by justice, equity, and good conscience alone.

The circumstance of the Plaintiff having taken another wife

* Regarding this Act too the Shastree admits that there is no specific text of Hindoo law.

since his conversion to Christianity does not in the opinion of the Court affect this case.

Defendant, Luxmee Bae, admits that Plaintiff is father of the child by marriage lawfully contracted, and Plaintiff has proved (Exhibit No. 35) that subsequently to his becoming a convert he made strenuous exertions to induce the Defendant, Luxmee Bae, to join him with their son, and desisted only when obliged to abandon all hope of her doing so : and he represents that a belief that he was prevented by the regulations from claiming his child before he was seven years old prevented his adopting legal measures for that purpose.

The child is not now of such infantile age as absolutely to require its mother's care. No mother, by either English law or any other law, has any right of property in or guardianship over her children adverse to that of her husband. She owes them duties, such as protection, &c., but the father has a paramount right of guardianship over them : this is a universal maxim of law.

The natural right of the father to the guardianship of the child is beyond dispute ; and he has not, by adopting the Christian faith, committed an act which renders him morally unfit for the exercise of that right.

Had the position of the parties been reversed—had the Defendant, Luxmee Bae, renounced Hindooism and embraced Christianity, or Islamism, or Judaism, and her husband, the Plaintiff, remained a Hindoo, the Court holds that it could not have decreed against his right to the guardianship of his child after it had attained that age when it no longer necessarily needed a mother's care. Since Hindooism is not by the law of the land viewed as a sufficient ground for depriving a father of the care of his offspring, neither is Christianity. Religious belief in the abstract is not, in the opinion of the Court, an element by which its decision should be influenced in a case like this.

It is urged that as the child was not born until after Plaintiff was, according to her religious law, dead to his wife, she should be regarded as the surviving parent, and ought not to be obliged to give the child to him. This, however, is an untenable position, because it assumes that being dead to her, he is therefore civilly dead also ; or in other words, devoid of all civil and natural right—in fact, an *outlaw*. Such, however, is not the case. He has, by renouncing Hindooism, forfeited certain rights and privileges, but not those pertaining to him as the acknowledged father of the child. He has, as has been already observed, a natural authority over it,

paramount to the authority of all others, and not to be abrogated by any inference of religious law. He would have just the same authority if he had adopted the Mussulman or Jewish creed, or any other which did not evidently render him morally unfit for the guardianship of his child.

The Court therefore decrees that the right of guardianship over the child is now vested in his natural guardian, the father, and that as such guardian he is entitled to the possession and charge of the child, which the Defendant, Luxmee Bacc, is accordingly directed to make over to him.

C. FORJETT, *Principal Sudder Ameen.*

A P P E A L.

The above Decision having been set aside by the Judge.

To the JUDGES of the SUDDER DEWANEE ADAWLUT.

The humble Petition of NARAYEN RAMCHUNDER KHISTEE, a Brahmin by caste, but now a convert to Christianity.

MOST HUMBLY SHOWETH,

1. That your Petitioner is a Brahmin, and became converted to Christianity in the year 1840. Your Petitioner's wife, the Respondent, Luxmee Bacc, at the time he received baptism was in a state of pregnancy, and shortly afterwards gave birth to a son. After this event your Petitioner made many and strenuous efforts to induce her to join him with their child, but without success. He only desisted when he found all his endeavours were unavailing, deferring the adoption of legal measures for the recovery of his child until that child should be of age to admit of separation from his mother.

2. The child being seven years old, and Respondent having come with him to Nuggur on her way to Benares, your Petitioner took him away to his house. Respondent having complained to the Magistrate, your Petitioner was directed to return him to her, and told that if your Petitioner wished, he might sue Respondent before the Civil Court to obtain possession of his child.

3. Your Petitioner accordingly instituted a suit in the Court of the Principal Sudder Ameen, and obtained a decree in his favour. But Respondent having appealed to the Judge, the decision of the lower Court was reversed.

4. Being aggrieved by this decision, which he submits is opposed to justice and every principle of law, your Petitioner prefers this, his Petition of Special Appeal, to your Honourable Court.

5. Your Petitioner begs leave to state the grounds of the Judge's decision, and solicits attention to his remarks thereon.

6. The Judge considers—1st, That the Hindoo law on the point at issue is clear, and that the texts quoted in the case are ample to show that the Brahmin renouncing his religion, becomes an outcaste, and thereby resigns and *forfeits* all his *civil rights*, which he understands to comprise the guardianship of his children lawfully begotten previous to his renunciation. 2ndly, That by the mere act of renouncing Hindooism a Brahmin necessarily does that which the Hindoo law forbids, and omits to do that which it enjoins, and therefore becomes an outcaste; and 3rdly, That it is to be presumed that as a Christian, and living with other Christians, he cannot possibly live without partaking of food forbidden either on account of its nature or mode of preparation,

7. Before commenting on the views of the Judge as to the conclusiveness of the Hindoo law on the point at issue, your Petitioner thinks it necessary to state his dissent from the opinion expressed by that officer as to the right of guardianship of a parent over his child being a civil right. Civil rights, your Petitioner submits, are the rights created and fostered by law, in contradistinction to rights that are inherent and natural to every man, whether in a state of civilisation or in a state of nature.* The right of property in or guardianship over a child is not shown by any Code, either European or Oriental, to be the creature of any Civil or Municipal law, and your Petitioner therefore indulges a hope that it may be conceded by your Honourable Court that a parent's right over his child, like "personal safety," "personal liberty," and "personal property," is an absolute or natural right of which he cannot be deprived, except in those cases of crime against society which the laws of that society have specifically declared are to involve the forfeiture of that right.

8. Whether, as stated by the Judge, the Hindoo law on the point at issue is clear, and the texts quoted in the case are ample, will appear to your Honourable Court on a perusal of the exposition of the Law Officer, recorded in the case.

9. The Judge assumes that by the mere act of renouncing Hindooism, a Brahmin necessarily incurs the penalty of an outcaste

* I. Blackstone's "Commentaries," 125.

by doing that which the Hindoo law forbids ; but this position is obviously untenable, unless it is shown that the renunciation of Hindooism is clearly and specifically denounced as a crime by some *text or other of such law*. But from a perusal of the answers of the Shastree to the questions propounded to him by the lower Court on this very important point, it will be seen that no such specific law exists.

10. The Judge further says that by renouncing Hindooism a Brahmin necessarily omits to do that which the law enjoins, and therefore becomes an outcaste. This, if taken literally and to its fullest extent, would, perhaps, render all but a very few Brahmins outcastes, and if the consequence of being an outcaste be, as the Judge maintains, forfeiture of all civil and natural rights, including the guardianship of one's own children, then there are few Brahmins who have not incurred that penalty ! But the Judge could scarcely have intended to go so far, and your Petitioner presumes that your Honourable Court will perceive that the Judge's statements must be received with limitation. A perusal, however, of *Manu* and other writings, which are esteemed sacred by Hindoos, will satisfy your Honourable Court, that the law upon which the Judge has grounded his opinion, strictly, emphatically, and exclusively applies to *Hindoos*, who are bound to act according to the Hindoo law, and that such a law cannot apply to your Petitioner, who, not being a Brahmin, is not within its pale.

11. In passing judgment on a claim of so solemn a nature as the present, your Petitioner regrets that the Judge should have, without any evidence whatever, assumed that as a Christian and living with Christians, your Petitioner has necessarily eaten forbidden food, and upon such assumption concluded that he has necessarily forfeited under the Hindoo law all civil and natural rights. Your Petitioner believes the point to be irrelevant ; in fact it is not touched upon by the opposite party ; but he submits that had he been called upon, he would have proved to the satisfaction of the Judge, as he is now willing to prove to your Honourable Court should it be deemed necessary, that he was deemed an outcaste, and solemnly expelled from caste by an assembly of Brahmins, long before he became a Christian, on the ground that your Petitioner was disposed to become one.

12. The Judge states that according to the Hindoo law, as already shown in many passages in Sir Thomas Strange's "*Elements of Hindoo Law*," Macnaghten's "*Hindoo Law*," Macnaghten's

"Reports of Civil Cases decided in Bengal," there are two kinds of outcastes : that in one case the delinquent may be restored to his rights by expiation ; that in the other the degradation is irrevocable, no expiation being allowed ; that apostacy is of the latter description : that the apostate is irrevocably lost and dead in law, the same as though he were naturally dead.

13. Every nation, your Petitioner submits, has laws suited to its own genius and peculiarities for the purposes of checking vice and punishing crime. Expulsion from caste is amongst Hindoos a punishment which, according to the magnitude or veniality of the crime, is either irrevocable, or temporary and atonable by expiation ; and the crimes so punishable are specifically enumerated in the various codes of Hindoo law and distinguished as "Maha-patuk," "Oop-patuk," and "Loho-patuk."

14. Patuk is crime, and your Petitioner, with much deference, appeals to the judgment of your Honourable Court as to whether that which is no crime, morally or legally, and which is not specifically named as crime even in the Hindoo law, should be brought under the provisions of a code which provides only for the punishment of crime ; whether that law (Regulation IV. of 1827, Section XXVI.) which prescribes that the law of the Defendant to be observed in the trial of suits shall be a "specific law" might be set aside at the option of any Judge, and whether that check which the Legislature contemplates with regard to a code which is both equivocal and ambiguous, and in reference to which the interpreter may at once become a legislator, might be overthrown, and inferences or deductions drawn either by the Law Officers or the Judge from the law of the Defendant, be substituted for "specific law."

15. The Judge states that the Principal Sudder Ameen argues that according to the Shasters a Brahmin cannot be banished for any crime without his family, and that your Petitioner cannot be deprived of his son. Your Petitioner, however, does not perceive ANY such arguments in the decree of that officer.

16. The Judge admits that by the strict letter of the Hindoo law the persons, families, and property of Brahmins have many and wondrous immunities ; but observes that these immunities are not recognised in our Courts, many of them being disallowed and made void by our Penal Code.

17. He then, by way of illustration, remarks that according to the Shasters, the highest penalty that can be inflicted on a Brahmin guilty of the greatest enormities is banishment with his

family and property ; but that by the law as it now stands, *i.e.*, by the regulations of Government, he is subject to death, to banishment, and to transportation “beyond the seas” without his family, and his property being confiscated. The precise object of the Judge in these observations is not very apparent, since it is not to be supposed that your Petitioner admitted that he had committed a crime, and by way of immunity wished his family to be visited with his punishment.

18. But there is a most important principle to be drawn from the fact alluded to by the Judge, of the Government, by its regulations, having abrogated the immunities conferred by the Hindoo law on Brahmin culprits. That fact most significantly manifests the intention of the Legislature in setting aside and entirely repudiating certain portions of the Hindoo code. Where the criminal would escape, or on the ground of being a Brahmin, suffer only a minor and very inadequate punishment under the Hindoo code, the present code is meant to place him on the same footing with other criminals, denying him special privileges or immunities. Surely it never intended to punish where no crime had been committed.

19. The Judge says that the present Penal Code never intended to prevent a Brahmin from abdicating his rights to his heir, or to interfere with the forfeiture of his civil rights, either by death, apostacy, or by entering into a religious order ; and he then states that by apostacy, or by entering into a religious order, such as becoming a “Sunyasee,” every Hindoo is accounted as dead in law as though he were naturally deceased. As regards becoming a “Sunyasee” there is, your Petitioner begs to remark, a specific law in the Shasters declaring the effects of that act, and by that act a Hindoo does not renounce Hindooism. He continues within its pale, and avowedly and voluntarily remains subject to the law of the Shasters. As regards what the Judge designates “apostacy,” the renunciation of Hindooism, there is no *specific* law in the Shasters, and by that act a man voluntarily withdraws himself from the pale of Hindooism. Your Petitioner submits that while the present Code permits a Brahmin to resign certain rights and privileges by becoming a “Sunyasee,” it does not deprive a Hindoo of his natural rights, and thus punish him for renouncing Hindooism and becoming a Christian. The two acts differ essentially in character, and the Judge is not borne out in classing them as one in nature and effect.

20. The entire spirit of the present Code is against upholding whatever is contained in Hindoo law opposed to the principles of justice and equity or to natural rights. It accordingly abolished the unnatural right of "Suttee," and subjected all assisting in any act of self-immolation to the penalty of murder. It pronounced all immunities to Brahmins under the Shasters for crimes against society or the State to be at an end. How, then, could it be construed as to render those who renounced the law of the Shasters subject to its penalty for that act which the legislature has not only not forbidden, but recognises as a natural right.

21. But as regards his own case, your Petitioner submits that the Hindoo law is perfectly silent; that there is not the shadow of a pretext, on the ground of such law, by which his claim to the custody and guardianship of his child could be set aside, and that the Regulation already quoted, precludes a mere inference from texts relating to outcaste that the act of renunciation of Hindooism, *ipso facto*, on the part of a Brahmin, involves the forfeiture of the right of custody and guardianship of his child.

22. Your Petitioner would, moreover, submit that such a decision is essentially repugnant to reason, justice, and nature: that therefore it ought not to be upheld.

23. Your Petitioner is told that a Brahmin renouncing his religion becomes an outcaste and forfeits all his civil rights; that he is dead in the eye of the law. Is such your Petitioner's position? Are the doors of your Courts closed against him? Is he debarred from suing for the recovery of any debts that may be owing to him? No. The statement of his having forfeited his civil rights and being dead in law is therefore a solcism—a position contradicted by the very fact of his being a recognised party of this suit. Your Petitioner's "apostacy may involve the loss of privileges pertaining to caste-membership and of civil rights based on Hindooism," but it cannot affect his right as father of his child, which right your Petitioner submits is not a right based on Hindoo law, but a right of which he cannot and ought not to be divested under the operation of that law which the Regulations permit him to renounce.

24. In conclusion your Petitioner would urge on the solemn consideration of your Honourable Court the peculiar circumstances of his case. A conviction of the truth of Christianity, and the paramount obligations thence arising, led your Petitioner to embrace the Christian religion in order to escape eternal condemna-

tion. Having, as he hopes, entered the way which leadeth to life everlasting, he would fain have his child go with him in the same way. It now rests with your Honourable Court to decide on your Petitioner's claim justly and equitably; and your Petitioner, as in duty bound, shall ever pray.

NARAYAN RAMCHUNDER KHISTEE.

The circumstances under which the above appeal was prepared were as follows:—

In the year 1847 Narayen Ramchunder, a Christian convert connected with the Ahmednuggur Mission, instituted a suit against his wife in the Court of the Principal Sudder Ameen for the recovery of his son. Mr. Forjett, who was then Principal Sudder Ameen, gave a decree in his favour. An appeal was then made to the Sessions Judge, W. J. H * * * *, Esqre., who reversed that decree. An appeal was then made by Narayen Ramchunder, under my direction, to the Sudder Dewanee Adawlut. In preparing this appeal we felt it important to present the merits of the case in the clearest possible light. A draft of an appeal was made and shown to Mr. Forjett, who disapproved of it as not presenting the arguments in the best form. I then requested him to prepare a draft of an appeal, as he was so well acquainted with the law, the customs of the Hindoos, and the whole merits of the case. He expressed a doubt as to the propriety of his preparing an appeal from the decision of his superior officer, but said he would consult some friend in regard to the matter. After consultation with a gentleman high in the service of Government and one of his official superiors, he came to the conclusion that there was no impropriety in his preparing a draft of an appeal agreeably to my request. He accordingly prepared this appeal, a copy of which was sent in to the Sudder Adawlut in Bombay, and at length, after two or three years, a decision was obtained from the Sudder Adawlut, reversing the decision of the Sessions Judge and confirming the decree of the Principal Sudder Ameen.

H. BALLANTINE,

American Missionary at Ahmednuggur.

Ahmednuggur, 18th December, 1854.

APPENDIX B.

No. 881 of 1863.

TO THE HONOURABLE H. L. ANDERSON,

*Chief Secretary to Government.**Poona, 17th September, 1863.*

SIR,

1. The inquiry instituted at Cawnpoor with reference to the prisoner who was taken into custody at Ajmeer, appears from letters published in the columns of *The Times of India* newspaper, from its own Correspondent, to have resulted in the belief that the prisoner is not the Nana, of Bitoor.

2. It is *possible* that he may not be the Nana, but his capture having been brought about under arrangements recommended to Government by me, I very respectfully beg that I may be pardoned in submitting for the consideration of His Excellency the Honourable the Governor in Council, whether, as regards the great importance of the capture of such a person as the Nana, the inquiry instituted at Cawnpoor with reference to the prisoner can be deemed to be complete; or the means taken by the authorities to satisfy themselves that he is *not* the Nana, such as may be considered to be exhaustive.

3. I beg to enclose a photographic likeness of the Nana taken from a woodcut print in Chambers' "Indian Mutiny." Woodcuts may not be trustworthy representations of the originals as regards exact delineation of countenance, but my object in submitting the photograph is to bring to notice the clear indication presented by the appearance of his person, of a man in the enjoyment of the greatest comfort, and of the most luxuriant ease, and that he was from his childhood tenderly nurtured, is a fact which admits of no doubt.

4. Raised at the age of twelve years from a state of comparative poverty to a birthright of affluence, he was, up to the time of the outbreak of the Mutiny, surrounded by all the blessings that peace and plenty, and an overflowing treasury could bestow. The plenitude of his grandeur suffered no change; the tide of his prosperity knew no ebb; it flowed on, and promised to him a lifetime of enjoyment.

5. In the meantime the mutinies break out. He becomes possessed of the idea of subjugating the British Power and establishing his own Brahmanical Raj ; and in the prosecution of that great enterprise, he indulges in deeds which place him beyond the



The NANA SAHIB, from an Original Drawing.

pale of humanity. Success, however, must have seemed to him certain, and the aspirations he indulged in could have known no bounds.

6. Within one short fortnight, General Havelock and his detachments are found marching on to Cawnpoor. Large bodies of his very highly trusted sepoy army are despatched by the Nana

to intercept and destroy the General and his handful of Europeans. By them, however, each hostile body is successively encountered and overthrown, and very soon the Nana himself is forced to fly, a wretched fugitive; harrassed by the torments of a terrible disappointment, experiencing a pang of terror at the sight of every stranger, and existence rendered intolerable by fears for his safety, intensified by the offer for his capture of so large a reward as one lac of rupees (£10,000).

7. Six years of such a life, with its vigils and vicissitudes, it need not be doubted, would very much alter his appearance.

8. It would, I am very humbly of opinion, render a "fair complexion" "rough and dark;" a "well-built, stout, powerful frame, well-formed and graceful figure," into one that is "spare, bony, unmuscular, lean, stooping, bent, and ungraceful." The bend and the stoop, which a six years' listlessness of life was well likely to bring on, would account for the difference in the height; and it is quite probable that such a life as the Nana has been leading would turn "black hair" into "quite grey."

9. In the description of the Nana after the Mutiny he was stated to be thirty-six years of age. If his age was then correctly given, at the present time he would be forty-two years old. Dr. Cheke and Dr. Jones state that the prisoner at Cawnpoor is at least fifty-five—adding that he has the *arcus senilis*, an absolute physiological proof that he is above fifty years. Eminent medical authorities, I beg to state, very clearly show that the *arcus senilis* constitutes no such proof, and that its presence in persons under forty years of age, even, is by no means uncommon; nor is the face—"flat, full, and round," as stated in the description after the Mutiny—incompatible with the "sunken features, angular face, and singularly prominent nose" of the prisoner at Cawnpoor. A flat, full, round face, divested of all superfluous flesh, must exhibit an appearance very different from what it did.

10. In the original description, the Nana is said to have "large round, dark eyes." In Dr. Cheke and Dr. Jones' description of the prisoner at Cawnpoor, his eyes are stated to be "greyish and bleared," and the cicatrix of a lance wound on the left big toe, mentioned in the description, is stated not to be perceptible. But in letters to me, Major Davidson, I beg to state, very clearly states that the prisoner "resembles the Nana in every particular," and that "*he has the lancet scar on his toe as entered* in the descriptive

roll." I would, therefore, very respectfully submit whether its imperceptibility at Cawnpoor may not be deemed unaccountable, and inquiry with reference thereto suggested.

11. Singularly, the prisoner himself admits that he is of the same age as the Nana.

12. With some apparent show of freedom the prisoner states that his name is Apparam Damadur; that his father was murdered when he was twelve years old; that he soon after adopted the "vagrant life of a faqueer;" that a few years ago he visited the village where he was born; was recognised by three or four persons whose names he gives, but who, he declares, are all dead; and he adds, the village was washed away by an encroachment of the river; but he, nevertheless, very singularly maintains the strictest silence with regard to the name of the village, and the district in which it was situated. This, I would submit, he would not be likely to do were he the person he states himself to be.

13. Legally, however, a prisoner under trial need not give any account of himself, especially if such account is calculated in any way to lead to his crimination. It is possible, if the prisoner be not the Nana, that he may be in some such difficulty, and therefore maintains the silence he does. I would therefore very respectfully submit, whether a free pardon may not be offered to him, on the condition, *if he be not the Nana*, that he make known who he is, and prove it to the satisfaction of the authorities to whom the inquiry may be delegated.

14. I would also very respectfully submit, if after such promise of pardon, the prisoner still maintains silence, whether he should be set at large without having been seen and examined by Dr. Tressider, by whom the operation on the Nana's toe was performed.

15. In conclusion, I would very humbly solicit the kind offices of his Excellency the Honourable the Governor in Council, in suggesting to his Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, the expediency of not setting the prisoner at Cawnpoor at large, till every doubt as to his identity is quite set at rest.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed)

C. FORJETT,

Acting Commissioner of the Police.

NOTE.—The Nana's eyes were "large, round, and dark." Doctors Cheke and Jones, tacitly admitting that the prisoner's eyes were large and round, stated that they were "greyish and bleared." Blear is a disorder which a change from a life of voluptuous ease and comfort to one of the severest trial and privation, was well calculated to bring on, and ought not to have weighed in the consideration of the prisoner's identity with the Nana. With regard to the term "greyish," if it referred to the cornea, it constituted no objection to the prisoner being the Nana; but if it referred to the iris, then the prisoner was not the Nana. To render the medical examination complete, this most important point should have been clearly determined. With natives of India greyish eyes are phenomenal. Hardly one in twenty thousand has them, and if the iris of the prisoner was grey, it could not have escaped the observation of Doctor Murray, by whom he was examined at Ajmere immediately after his capture, and who, in his evidence, stated that he *corresponded* with the *description* of the Nana in *almost every particular*. Notwithstanding the prisoner's admission that he was of the same age as the Nana, Doctor Cheke and Doctor Jones, jumped to the conclusion that the *arcus senilis* was an absolute physiological proof of his being more than fifty years of age—hence it is by no means unreasonable to suppose that the conclusion in respect to the greyish appearance of the eyes was equally perfunctory.

The difference—as noticed in paragraphs 8 and 9 of my letter—in the appearance of the prisoner, and that of the Nana as stated in the descriptive roll which was issued shortly after the mutiny, is by no means irreconcilable. In that roll was indicated the scar of an operation performed by Doctor Tressider on the second toe of the Nana's right foot, and Doctor Murray certified that "he had examined the prisoner said to be the Nana and found the mark of a small wound or cut on the anterior portion of the first phalanx of the second toe of the right foot; that the cicatrix was a little more than half an inch in length, as fine as a horse hair slightly opaque, and precisely the sort of mark that would be made by a lancet or a fine, sharp-pointed bistoury." The discovery of this scar leaves no doubt as to the prisoner's identity with the Nana of Bithoor.

APPENDIX C.

Calcutta, 14th May, 1858.

MY DEAR FORJETT,

I have to acknowledge, with my best thanks, your two last letters. The long one I found most interesting, and I think the plain straightforward narrative you give of the most important and intricate events is highly creditable to you. I have shown it to several friends here, who have all expressed their admiration of your zeal and energy and good sense. Sir James Outram has read it. He thinks it highly creditable to you; but he, as a military man, and a friend of the Brigadier, will not give a military opinion of the merits of your respective plans. You have, however, showed pretty plainly that, had any outbreak occurred in the sepoy lines, the troops and guns, as placed by you, must have been more effective against them than the body of men located by the Brigadier could possibly have been; but still, as the movement was a military one, etiquette requires that the military head (under the gravest responsibility, no doubt) should be obeyed. It certainly would have been poor consolation to people who lost their lives and property, had any short-lived advantage been gained by the sepoys; and we must all feel thankful that a higher power interfered to prevent mischief, which certainly it would seem to have been very much in the power of the sepoys to have caused, had they mustered the pluck to rise. Thanks be to God they did not. I suppose all Governments are more or less bound by red tape. It is very sad, but so it is; but it was very sad to see the number of valuable lives which were last year sacrificed to the absurd infatuation of British officers choosing to consider their men *staunch*. Altogether, there is great cause for thankfulness in Western India. I believe the evils and horrors were, humanly speaking, in a great measure averted by the governing class being better acquainted with the *governed* than they were in Bengal, and the police being more efficient. * * * * * I shall break off now, and with the warmest assurances of my admiration of your measures and conduct, believe me,

Yours always sincerely,

P. W. LEGEY.

APPENDIX D.

THE Southern Mharatta country was so overrun with crime as to have elicited from the visiting judicial commissioners the remark, that "it was a disgrace to British rule." The men here actively engaged in the commission of crime were the rural police, about 15,000 of whom were tenants-in-chief of the Government, and held lands, in lieu of cash payment, as a consideration for their services; but our courts of law sustained the claims of coparceners to share the land and do the duty with their chiefs in half-yearly or yearly rotation, and this swelled their ranks to more than double 15,000, which rendered the produce of the lands insufficient for their maintenance, and the property of the people at large suffered seriously, in consequence, from their depredations. *These co-heirs I at once struck off.*

The success which attended this measure, and the re-organisation that was carried out, is matter of record. They were the means of giving "*the most complete protection to life and property that could possibly be afforded*;" of reclaiming the rural police from a state of lawlessness; of making them what they should have been—the guardians of life and property; and of converting some thousands of their relations, who, as co-heirs, had struggled in vain to exist on the scanty produce of their lands, into peaceful and independent cultivators of the soil.

It is matter of record also that this duty was delegated by Government, without any specific instructions, and in carrying out the re-organisation, I was compelled to take upon myself the gravest responsibility; I was, during a part of the time, seriously thwarted and interfered with by the chief magistrate (Mr. W. H. Reeves), who represented my measures as "oppressive and intolerable," and obtained the sanction of Government for their relaxation. The co-heirs whom I had struck off, about this time, gathered round my tent in hundreds, armed with matchlock, gun, and sword, and sullenly seated themselves before it, and declared that they would rather lose their lives than give up their "wutton," or hereditary right. A written notice was left at my tent door that twenty matchlocks would be levelled at me if the order I had issued against them was not rescinded. A Canarese never gave a notice of that kind without having made up his mind to put his threat into execution. I thought it necessary, therefore, when I

again went among them, to be armed, in addition to a club I always carried, with a pair of loaded pistols ; and, alluding to the notice, I said I was rather obliged to them for the warning, and, pointing to my pistols, stated that it was my intention to benefit by it. At the same time, I repeated the assurance that nothing should induce me to recall the order I had issued ; that it was for their good, although they did not then choose to look at it in that light ; and as to their threats, whenever they might think proper to begin, by night or by day, they should find me prepared. No precaution was taken by me to guard against the threatened danger. I continued my intercourse with them with my usual freedom, and kept up the practice of sleeping in my tent at night without a single sentry, and at some distance from the five or six Peons then and previously with me. This was not without exciting surprise. When the excitement was at the highest, finding a larger number than usual of armed men about my tent, engaged in boisterous talk, I told them to amuse themselves at target practice, for which they seemed quite ready. After the firing had continued for some time, there was a cry that one of their best shots had pierced the bull's-eye ; this was disputed by the Peon who was placed on the watch. I went forward to look at the target. While doing so, a matchlock was fired, and the ball whizzed and passed within two or three inches of my head. The ball, I had no doubt, was intended for me. On turning round, I saw the man who had fired lowering his matchlock. My first impulse was to run to and strike him down. I had proceeded about half way. Better reflections, however, succeeded. The odds were greatly against me, and I felt that no good could result from so rash an act. On coming up to the man, I said to him, if the shot was intended for me he was a great idiot for having missed me, and if it was intended for the target, he was a still greater one for having failed to hit so large an object ; and, addressing the men around me, I said, " Here is one of your best shots, see what a fool he is." I added something more to the same effect. One laughed, then another laughed, and I laughed, and the whole was turned into a joke. Knowing that I was dealing with a great evil, and feeling convinced that I had adopted the right means of effectually removing it, I persevered in my purpose. It is also matter of record that the opposition of the chief magistrate, as to my measures being "oppressive and intolerable," and the orders of

Government for their relaxation, were met by me with explanations. Subsequently, one of my native officers was cut down, and an anonymous notice was forwarded to the chief magistrate (Mr. J. D. Inverarity), that if I were not immediately removed my life should be sacrificed within "ten days," and that gentleman had instituted an inquiry to discover by whom the threat was made, but I begged of him to stop proceedings, for I was of opinion that the discontented would be led to believe that their threat was inspiring fear.


The re-organisation being completed, it became necessary to increase the pay of the men whom I had appointed as police to the scale at which I had fixed it, and this rendered necessary a measure which brought about the resignation, within a fortnight, of more than 2,000 men whom I had set down for reduction.


The Kittoor rebellion, in 1825, is matter of history. On that occasion, Mr. Thackarey, the principal collector and political agent of the Southern Mharatta country, and Captain Black with Lieutenants Sewell and Dighton, and a strong detachment of the Madras Artillery, were shot down within an hour. The men who resigned were the descendants of these rebels, and belonged to the class that, in 1843, rose in rebellion against the Government at Kolapoor. The resignations, therefore, alarmed Government, and I was told that "I had disregarded their orders to such an extent that upwards of 2,000 men of the rural police had been brought to resign by being called upon to do service in villages where their lands were not situated; that *there was nothing to justify the deliberate contravention on my part of the orders of Government; that I had needlessly incurred a heavy responsibility, such as I could not free myself of; that I had, by my impatience, involved Government and myself in difficulties of which the limits could not then be perceived, and that I had very materially altered the opinion entertained by Government of my prudence and judgment.*" Orders were then issued for undoing all that I had during five years been toiling to establish—a well-regulated, efficient rural police—and in communicating to me the resolution of Government, the chief magistrate's instructions, to give immediate effect to it, may be characterised as peremptory.


I presumed, however, to make a stand against even the orders of Government, and respectfully submitted an explanation in vindication of the policy that brought about those resignations, which, as I clearly showed, did not take place until ample precautions had

been taken by me, for guarding against the possibility of any rising on the part of the disaffected. In fact, I had created to myself the means by which any attempt of that kind could have been met and crushed at once. I was the bearer of my letter to the Government, and I was deeply indebted to Lord Elphinstone for his ready comprehension of the difficulties under which I had carried out the reform, and for his appreciation of the principles that had guided my measures; and, notwithstanding the severity of the censure passed upon my conduct, and the peremptory manner in which I was required to undo what I had done, every one of my measures were allowed to remain undisturbed. And to this fortunate decision was owing, in a great measure, the quiet of the Southern Mharatta country during the Mutiny.

If this large body of armed men, numbering more than 15,000 together with a larger number whom I had struck off, and who eventually became contented and well-to-do cultivators, had remained united as they were previous to the re-organisation, and might have continued to be if the orders of Government had not been withstood; if they had been left with inadequate means of maintenance, and continued their depredations upon the property of the people; and if the attachment of the reformed police to their rulers had not been secured by placing them above want, the condition of the Southern Mharatta country during the time of the Mutiny, it is reasonable to suppose, would have been very different. It is well known that the native regiments at Belgaum and Dharwar were ripe for mutiny, and if they could have calculated on being joined by 30,000 armed men, who, for a short time at least, would have commanded the resources of the country, it is difficult to conceive to what extent the quiet of the Southern Mharatta country would have been disturbed. The result, too, as regards the mutiny at Kolapoor of the 27th regiment N.I., would have been serious.







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